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Chapter 1  
Introduction and 
research questions 
1.1 Religious diversity 
1.1.1 Religious diversity in the contemporary world 
In the contemporary sociology of religion, most attention goes to the fading of religion 
in industrial and post-industrial societies, whereas fewer studies aim to understand 
why religions with specific characteristics prevail in some societies but not in others 
(Greeley 2003). In other words, the sociology of religion is becoming the sociology of 
irreligion. This is not warranted on the basis of the statistics presented by Smart 
(1999). He shows, as can be seen in table 1.1, that there is diversity in religions and 
that only a small minority of the world population does not belong to a religious 
movement or is markedly atheist. 
Table 1.1 The world population by religion (1998) 
Religion Number Percentage Total 
Christianity 1,965,993,000 31.3  
Islam 1,179,326,000 18.8  
Hinduism 767,424,000 12.2  
Buddhism 766,672,000 12.2  
Native religions 356,875,000 5.7  
New religions 244,164,000 3.9  
Sikh 22,874,000 0.4  
Taoism 20,050,000 0.3  
Judaism 15,050,000 0.3  
Other  19,520,000 0.3 85.4 
Not religious 913,078,000 14.6 14.6 
Total 6,271,026,000 100 100 
Source: Smart, N. (1999).
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More specifically, table 1.1 shows that half of the world population belongs to 
Christianity or Islam, which both preach monotheism, that is the belief in the existence 
of one deity. Hinduism and Buddhism, Indian world religions in which gods are less at 
the centre, both cover twelve percent of the world population. Only ten percent 
belongs to another religious movement. This implies that four religions – Christianity, 
Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism – dominate today’s religious landscape. This is not to 
say that world religions are homogeneous. These massive religious movements all 
consist of several sub-movements, and in some societies, are mingled with native 
religions (Smart 1999). 
It cannot be denied that today’s diversity in religion is much less than it was in 
earlier times, when societies were more isolated. The colonization of large areas by the 
Western world and the emergence of missionaries brought along contact between 
people from different continents. Although Smart (1999) argues that we should not 
underestimate the diffusion of religious ideas, he observes that religions of societies 
that never came into contact with each other contain similar elements. The present 
study attempts to explain worldwide religious diversity, and for that reason, operates 
within the sociology of religions, and not the sociology of religion. It does answer the 
question as to what religious ideas prevail under which circumstances, and not the 
question of whether God(s) exist. We answer our question by examining religious 
ideas not only in contemporary societies but also in pre-industrial ones. 
1.1.2 Subsistence technologies and godly images 
In the final chapter of his book, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975: 561), Wilson 
examines under which circumstances the belief in an all-powerful god prevails. Here, 
he refers to calculations made by Lenski (1970: 298) on the godly images of 66 
agrarian societies partitioned according to the percentage of subsistence derived from 
herding. On the basis of these calculations, Wilson observes that the belief in an all-
powerful god, as a characteristic of Christianity and Islam, is not universal and more 
often occurs in agrarian societies that depend for a larger part on herding for their 
subsistence. With regard to the belief in all-powerful gods, Wilson notices two other 
things: the god in monotheistic religions is always male and, in the Hebrew Bible, is 
depicted as a shepherd and the chosen people as his sheep. On the basis of these 
regularities, Wilson suggests that social relations in everyday life can stimulate deeper 
questioning about the relation of man to the powers that control him (Wilson 1975: 
561). 
Lenski argues that the patterns described by Wilson - and first by Lenski himself 
- can be traced back to societal differences in subsistence technologies. For example, 
male authority is more likely in pastoral societies: shepherds are highly mobile, tightly 
organized, and often militant. Also, tending the flock is the chief responsibility of men. 
Whereas Wilson restricts his observations to agrarian societies, Lenski (1970) 
classifies societies of all technological types which arose in human evolution according 
to their level of subsistence technology. The exact typology is shown in table 1.2. Using 
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a classification of religious beliefs borrowed from Swanson’s (1960) Birth of the Gods, 
Lenski shows that the image of an active all-powerful god who is supportive of human 
morality prevails in a majority of agrarian societies. Furthermore, advanced 
horticultural societies are much less familiar with a moralizing all-powerful god. These 
societies often have a belief in an all-powerful god, but this god is not concerned with 
the conduct of human beings. Lenski’s ecological evolutionism (systematized and 
expanded into an encompassing sociological theory by Ultee, Arts & Flap 1992) 
incorporates the hypothesis that as society’s subsistence technology advances, its 
dominant ideologies become more activist. 
Table 1.2 Beliefs in God, by societies’ dominant subsistence technology 
Subsistence technology No idea of a 
supreme creator 
Idea of an 
inactive or 
unconcerned 
supreme creator  
Idea of an active 
supreme creator 
not supportive of 
human morality 
Idea of an active 
supreme creator 
supportive of 
human morality 
Number of cases 
Hunting and gathering 60 29 8 2 85 
Fishing 69 14 7 10 29 
Simple horticultural 60 35 2 2 43 
Advanced horticultural 21 51 12 16 131 
Herding 4 10 6 80 50 
Agrarian 23 6 5 67 66 
Source: Lenski (1970: 134) 
1.1.3 Several findings: is a theoretical synthesis possible? 
Whereas Lenski (1970) focused on the relationship between subsistence technologies 
and godly images, other researchers found relationships between godly images and 
other aspects of a society’s structure. These disparate findings raise the question of 
theoretical synthesis. 
In line with Lenski, Jensen (1951) and Eliade (1965) both assumed that societal 
differences in religious ideas concord with societal differences in technology. Breasted 
(1933), who focused on ancient Egypt, and Ottenberg and Ottenberg (1960) who 
focused on Africa, observed that the organization of gods and spirits parallels the 
political organization of the societies involved. Already in 1861, Bachofen showed that 
in matriarchal societies, deities often refer to the earth and fertility, whereas Father 
God images dominate in patriarchal societies. Following this example, researchers 
found that female gods and feminine symbolism occur in societies with less gender 
inequality (Sullerot 1970; Carmody 1979), with a larger female contribution to a 
society’s food supply (Sanday 1981) and with a higher female status (Hope and Stover 
1984, 1987; Gray 1987). Underhill (1974, 1976) demonstrated that all-powerful gods 
emerged in societies with a division of labor, and Snarey (1996) and Roes and 
Raymond (2003) found that this belief is more common in societies with high levels of 
natural and social insecurity, respectively. 
Because of the different focus on religious ideas and societal characteristics, it is 
difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions from the studies just mentioned. These 
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focused on specific cultures, specific structural and religious characteristics, and are 
therefore difficult to compare. According to Swanson (1960), ‘beliefs in gods or other 
spirits arise as symbols of men’s experiences with the basic purposes and decision-
making procedures of societies and of enduring and independent groups within 
societies’. He considers religion as the symbolic expression of the dependence of 
human beings on their society. In comparing pre-industrial societies, Swanson 
demonstrated that the idea of an all-powerful god emerged in societies with three or 
more sovereign groups and that polytheism occurs in societies with a strong division 
of labor. Furthermore, he showed that the idea of ancestral spirits dominate in 
societies with one or more sovereign kinship groups and that reincarnation beliefs 
arise in societies with small, scattered units of settlement. The ideas of the immanence 
of the soul and witchcraft occur most often in societies with a high level of 
unlegitimated contacts. Although Davis (1971) and Peregrine (1996) were not able to 
replicate all of these findings, they found enough evidence for the relationship 
between religious traits and social organization. 
Swanson argues that men’s conception of the supernatural reflects important 
characteristics of the social organization. However, he overlooks the fact that these 
aspects, like religious traits, are not randomly distributed over human societies. 
Following Davis (1971), we use Lenski’s ecological evolutionism to explain the 
relationship between religious ideas and social organization. Because of its generality, 
ecological evolutionism (Lenski 1970, Nolan and Lenski 2006) may offer a synthesis of 
the above mentioned research findings. Ecological evolutionism argues that changes in 
a society’s subsistence technology are the most important force driving evolutionary 
processes in human societies, including social organization and religious change. In 
this study, we will use ecological evolutionism to make new predictions about the 
relationship between religious traits and societal characteristics. 
1.2 The evolutionary explanation of religions 
1.2.1 Ecological evolutionism 
The aim of this study is to provide answers to questions about the relationship of 
human beings to the supernatural in different stages of technological development, 
and to test these explanations. The answers we provide are given by ecological 
evolutionism, a major macro-theory in contemporary anthropology and sociology 
(Lenski 1970; Nolan and Lenski 2006; Lenski 2005). This theory explains evolutionary 
processes in human societies, or as Lenski put it: ‘as many as possible of the more 
important characteristics of human societies, both individually and collectively, past as 
well as present, as parsimoniously and as falsifiably as possible’ (2005: 13). 
According to ecological evolutionism, societies are adaptive mechanisms. People 
have a higher chance of survival in an organized form: human societies. Every human 
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society is part of the world system of societies. Societies that provide their inhabitants 
better chances of survival persist at the expense of societies that provide their 
inhabitants fewer chances. A process of selection takes place, where societies favoring 
technological innovations survive and societies resisting change disappear. Lenski 
explicitly made societies subject of the evolution process. Whereas Darwin primarily 
studied genetic evolution, Lenski argued that there is also such a thing as cultural 
evolution (Lenski 2005: 5). 
Subsistence technologies give people information on how to use the natural 
resources available in their surroundings. Ecological evolutionism states that changes 
in a society’s subsistence technology are the primary force driving cultural evolution 
(Lenski 1970: 142). Advances in subsistence technology constitute a precondition for 
further major changes within societies, like any significant increase in either the size 
or the complexity of any society (Nolan and Lenski 2006: 57). Ideologies, such as 
religions, form a second important driving force in societies. They do not set limits on 
the possible, but rather, affect the choices that people make among the available 
options. Ideologies can be defined as cultural information that helps people to 
structure their social life, and therefore conform to some extent to the subsistence 
technology of the society in which they arise. Like Harris’ cultural materialism (Harris 
1969), ecological evolutionism considers technologies as exercising greater influence 
than ideologies on society’s social organization. 
Lenski (1970: 124) distinguished six modes of subsistence in human history 
before the Industrial Revolution (see table 1.2). Populations that chase and trap 
animals and also forage fruits, roots and seeds, are called hunting and gathering 
societies. Populations that grow plants in gardens, and use digging sticks or hoes to do 
so, bear the name horticultural societies. They do not merely collect food, but produce 
it, and so intervene in nature to reach what Lenski labels a ‘higher technological stage’. 
Simple horticultural societies, like hunting and gathering ones, only have tools of bone, 
stone and wood; advanced horticultural societies also have metal implements. The use 
of these latter marks a new level of technological development, since metals are not 
found ready for use in the natural environment, and skills are required to attain the 
high temperatures needed to smelt ores. Societies that plough fields are termed 
‘agrarian’. Whereas horticulturalists abandon small plots if yields drop, agrarian 
populations renew the earth’s fertility, thereby invoking more advanced technology. 
Fishing societies and herding societies are environmentally specialized. On the 
yardstick of technology, fishing is close to hunting and gathering, while herding 
resembles advanced horticulture and agriculture (Lenski 2005: 93, 103). Ecological 
evolutionism states that the rise of technologically more advanced societies, like 
agrarian societies, resulted in the decline of technologically less advanced societies, 
like hunting and gathering and horticultural societies, because the survival chances for 
the latter reduced substantially unless they too adopted new technology (Nolan and 
Lenski 2006: 59). 
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1.2.2 Evolutionary theory renewed 
Ecological evolutionism originates from a long tradition of evolutionary theories that 
tried to capture the mechanisms behind socio-cultural evolution. Already in the 
nineteenth century, anthropologists used evolutionary theories in explaining cultural 
and religious diversity. Tylor (1871) and Frazer (1890) presented theories of cultural 
evolution, which state that human societies go through successive stages of cultural 
development. These stages are characterized by their own cultural and religious traits. 
However, in the first half of the twentieth century, when more ethnographic data had 
been collected, a new generation of anthropologists emerged that rejected these 
‘deterministic’ theories of cultural evolution. They claimed that cross-cultural 
generalizations are dangerous because each culture has its own unique history, based 
on both internal and external developments (Boas 1911; Benedict 1934; Georges 
1968). However, in both the biological and social disciplines evolutionary theory is 
flourishing again, because of some important adjustments (Lenski 2005). 
According to Lenski (2005: 4), the basic objective of evolutionary theories is to 
explain processes of change, and more specifically cumulative long-term 
transformations. He argues that ecological evolutionism builds on older generations of 
evolutionary theories around 1900, but distinguishes itself in three ways that do away 
with all the criticisms (Lenski 2005: 7). First, the older evolutionary theories often 
lacked a satisfactory explanation of the causes of societal development and growth. In 
contrast, ecological evolutionism clearly states that changes in a society’s subsistence 
technology precedes other evolutionary processes in human societies. According to 
ecological evolutionism, it is important to distinguish between intrasocietal and 
intersocietal selection, as opposed to the evolutionary theories of Tylor and Frazer. 
Ecological evolutionism argues that because of intersocietal selection, big changes 
occurred in human life, while the great majority of individual societies hardly changed 
through time. The societies that survived intersocietal selection were those societies 
that did not resist change (Nolan and Lenski 2006). 
A second important difference between the older evolutionary theories and 
ecological evolutionism refers to the concept of progress. Whereas older theories 
noticed progress in almost every sphere of life, ecological evolutionism is aware of the 
fact that technological progress brought along regresses like large-scale wars and 
social inequality (Nolan and Lenski 2006). 
Third, ecological evolutionism rejects determinism, in contrast to most older 
theories. Although ecological evolutionism considers technological progress as the 
most important force of evolutionary change, it takes into account the importance of a 
society’s natural environment. A society’s subsistence technology depends in part on 
the material resources in the natural environment (Meggers 1952), and the 
environment itself may have independent effects on various societal characteristics 
(Diamond 1997). For example, since areas with little precipitation and soils lacking in 
nitrogen are less suitable for plant cultivation, these areas will be less populated by 
horticulturists and agriculturists. Ecological evolutionism also takes into consideration 
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the possibility of feedback loops. Although advances in subsistence technology 
precede societal development, aspects of the social organization can increase or 
decrease the probability of further advances in subsistence technology. For example, 
population growth increases the potential number of innovators and restrictive 
religious ideas can resist technological innovations (Nolan and Lenski 2006: 58). 
Due to the just mentioned improvements, the new generation of evolutionary 
theories, among which ecological evolutionism, can help us enlarge our knowledge 
about religious differences between human societies. 
1.2.3 Religion as adaptive or non-adaptive 
Ecological evolutionism belongs to a larger tradition of evolutionary theories which 
aim to explain religion. In his book ‘Darwin’s Cathedral’, Wilson (2002: 44, 45) gives 
an overview of the different types of evolutionary theories concerning religion. The 
most important division he makes is between theories that consider religion as 
adaptive and theories that consider religion as non-adaptive. Adaptive theories argue 
that religion increases the reproductive success of individuals or societies. An example 
is commitment theory, in which religion is perceived as a system of costly signaling 
that reduces free-riding and stimulates cooperation within groups (Irons 2001; Sosis 
2004). Evolutionary theories that consider religion as adaptive differ from each other 
in their ideas about religion as a group-level adaptation or an individual-level 
adaptation (Wilson 2002). An adaptive theory that explicitly promotes group-level 
adaptation is the ecological regulation theory, as described by Dow (2006). The 
general idea of this theory is that religion sends control signals to group members 
about the required interaction with the natural environment (Harris 1974). In this 
regard, groups that guard their natural resources against depletion will survive at the 
expense of groups that exhaust their resources (Rappaport 1999). 
According to evolutionary theories that consider religion as non-adaptive, 
religion is an adaptation to past environments that has become maladaptive or is a 
side-effect of adaptive change (Wilson 2002). Cognitive theory (Boyer 2001; Atran 
2002), for instance, sees religion as a by-product of models in the human brain that 
evolved to solve non-religious problems, like the awareness of predators or the 
detection of cheaters (Dow 2006). However, this theory does not explain religious 
diversity and for that reason is beyond the scope of our study. Ecological evolutionism 
also considers religion as non-adaptive but sees it as a by-product of inventions in 
subsistence technologies. According to Nolan and Lenski (2006), societies’ subsistence 
technology is the primary driving force behind societal changes, including religious 
change, which is to say, improvements in technology contribute independently to 
societies’ reproductive success. Religion, however, has no independent influence in 
this regard. Although, in this study, we use ecological evolutionism to derive 
predictions about religious diversity, we do not immediately reject the adaptive 
variant of evolutionism. After all, Wilson (2002) argued that under certain conditions 
religion can be an adaptive force. In chapter 2 we will revert to the contrast between 
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adaptive and non-adaptive evolutionary theories and answer the question which 
factor, religion or technology, has the largest effect on the reproductive success of 
societies. 
1.3 Macro-theories and micro-hypotheses 
Ecological evolutionism is a macro-theory and answers questions about the 
relationship between subsistence technologies and godly images on the societal level. 
However, when explaining macro-to-macro relations, it is important to start from 
micro-to-micro relations. When we answer the question of why people in societies 
with different subsistence technologies have different ideas about God, we explicitly 
bring in the individual level. 
1.3.1 The rational explanation of religion 
Lenski’s macro-hypothesis states that religion is an ideology, and that technologically 
more advanced societies have more activist ideologies. One micro-explanation for the 
relationship between subsistence technology and images of god(s) is proposed by 
Stark & Bainbridge’s (1987) market theory of religion. Its prime assumption holds that 
religious beliefs compete for the adherence of rationally acting people who want to 
fulfill their necessities in the best possible way. When a desired reward is not 
available, such as eternal life, people accept explanations holding that the reward can 
be obtained in the future, or in another non-verifiable context. People’s choice for a 
particular religion depends on the costs and benefits of those on offer. People will not 
enter into an exchange with a god when a cheaper or more efficient alternative is 
available, and a god of ever-greater scope is such an alternative. With the passage of 
time, humans come to understand that it is more efficient to deal with one god of 
infinite scope than with several less powerful gods. This can explain why people in 
technologically more advanced societies more often believe in an all-powerful god 
than people in technologically less advanced societies. 
This explanation leaves at least two puzzles. Firstly, what evidence, if any, speaks 
in favor of the market theory explanation? Contemporary evidence supporting the 
market theory explanation, does not explain the process of secularization in Europe 
(Bruce 1999). Regarding the image of an all-powerful god in pre-industrial societies, 
Stark (2001: 39) points to the twelve volumes (Der Ursprung der Gottesidee) produced 
by Schmidt (1912–55). However, since Schmidt ‘proved’ by lopsided arguments that 
God revealed Himself to the first human beings and that the religions of all societies on 
earth bear witness to this (Petermann 2004: 600), this evidence is weak. Secondly, the 
market theory of religion does not give a satisfactory explanation for religious 
diversity. If human beings are so rational, why didn’t they all immediately start 
believing in ‘one true god’ and, why did people in some parts of the world longer 
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persist in believing in many gods than people elsewhere? In consideration of these 
objections, we do not think that the market theory of religion can provide a 
satisfactory explanation for religious diversity. 
1.3.2 Reasoning in analogy 
A more promising micro-explanation is taken from the literature ranging from Hume 
(1757) to Guthrie (1993), which states that people do not always think logically or 
deductively. When it comes to understanding religions, we assume that people reason 
by analogy and seek to understand the unknown by drawing parallels with the known. 
People think not so much in terms of ‘if…, then…’, but more in terms of ‘like…, so too…’. 
They thus have images of gods being something they are familiar with. For example, 
people do not believe in an all-powerful god because this god is the best available 
option, but because an all-powerful god reflects the all-powerful ruler in daily life. 
Hume (1757) advanced the ‘anthropomorphism’ thesis, which stated that human 
beings make gods according to their own image. Durkheim (1912) rejected this thesis, 
and argued that people are only capable of representing the supernatural according to 
the image of the small social world in which they live. The philologist and sociologist 
Topitsch (1954, 1958) expanded this argument and stated that people fall back upon 
the things that are familiar and crucial to their society when accounting for the 
unknown. He specified the analogy-hypothesis by pinpointing three models of thought 
with which people, in the course of human history, have explained the unknown as a 
vital process, as a social phenomenon and as a technical achievement. The first one is 
biomorphic. People make images of the unknown by drawing an analogy with sexual 
reproduction: birth, maturation and death. An example of a biomorphic image is the 
earth that gave birth to the first human beings, as women give birth to their children. 
In societies with sociomorphic models, people regard the unknown as a well-ordered 
household or state. A case in point is the notion that as a king rules his people, so too is 
God master of His creation. Finally, there are the technomorphic models, in which 
people relate the unknown to manual skills and productive powers. An example is that 
just as a person has a plan when making an instrument, so too did God when he 
created the universe. 
1.3.3 Thought models and subsistence technologies 
In this study, we assume that a thought model is dependent on the subsistence 
technologies human societies employ. This implies that differences in religious ideas 
will coincide with differences in subsistence technologies because beliefs that are 
comprehensible and recognizable in technologically less advanced societies appear 
unfamiliar to people in technologically more advanced societies. We expect 
biomorphic thinking about the unknown to be most frequent in societies with less 
advanced subsistence technologies, where people strongly depend upon the resources 
of their natural niche and intervene in their surroundings only to a limited extent. 
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Technomorphic thinking is expected to replace biomorphic thinking in those societies 
where people have a firmer grip on nature, and full-time craft specialization has 
emerged. Sociomorphism is expected to be present in all human societies because 
every society is a group of people. However, in the course of human history, 
interpersonal bonds changed in two important ways, each leading to different 
analogies. With technological advancement, the focus shifted from kinship ties to 
authority relations between state and subjects (Nolan and Lenski 2006). For that 
reason, we expect ruler analogies to gradually replace kinship analogies at higher 
levels of technology. The second change involves gender (Sanday 1981). With 
technological advancement, the inequalities between men and women in pre-
industrial societies increased. Feminine symbolism is expected to occur less often in 
the religious ideas of people in more advanced societies. 
1.4 Research questions 
The aim of this study is to develop and test theoretical answers to questions about the 
relationship of human beings to the supernatural in different stages of technological 
development. In doing so, we address the issue of long-term cultural development 
within the human species (Wilson 1975). The overarching research question in this 
study is what religious ideas prevail under which circumstances? In the following 
paragraphs we subdivide this general research question into seven sub-questions that 
logically follow each other each time shifting the focus of study. 
1.4.1 A shift from descriptive questions about subsistence technologies and godly 
images to explanatory questions about this relationship. 
Lenski shows in table 1.2 the percentage of societies with a belief in a (moralizing) all-
powerful god by the dominant subsistence technology societies. The table shows that 
the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god occurs more frequently in societies that are 
technologically more advanced. These findings corroborate Lenski’s hypothesis that 
people in societies with a more advanced subsistence technology have more active 
godly images. Although Lenski showed that there exists a relationship between a 
society’s subsistence technology and the prevailing godly images, it remains unclear 
how this relationship comes about. For that reason, we move from the descriptive 
question about the relationship between subsistence technologies and godly images to 
explanatory questions about this relationship. 
Although the relationship between subsistence technology and godly images is 
demonstrated, it remains unclear whether this involves a causal link. First, we will 
examine whether or not the relationship between subsistence technologies and godly 
images is spurious. Research indicates that subsistence technologies are strongly 
dependent on their natural environment (Meggers 1952; Nolan and Lenski 2006). 
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Besides this, there are indications that a society’s natural environment affects the 
prevailing religious ideas. It is argued that a moralizing all-powerful god functions as 
an authority telling people how they must interact with their natural environment in 
the case of natural scarcity (Harris 1974; Snarey 1996). On the basis of these 
arguments, we argue that a society’s natural environment can determine both the 
subsistence technology and the godly image. Another possibility is that subsistence 
technologies have their effect on godly images via other characteristics, and are thus 
indirect. Apart from a society’s dominant subsistence technology, relations were found 
between the belief in all-powerful gods and characteristics of the economic structure 
(Underhill 1974, 1976) and political structure (Swanson 1960, 1967, 1975). We 
therefore answer the following question: 
1. Is the relationship between a society’s subsistence technology and the belief 
in a moralizing all-powerful god a spurious relationship, a direct 
relationship, or an indirect one? 
Our second research question is a theory-building one and refers to the deeper 
question of why there is a relationship between subsistence technology and godly 
images at the level of individuals. To answer this question, we apply the micro-level 
hypothesis that people reason in analogies and use three thought models to explain 
the unknown: biomorphic, sociomorphic and technomorphic. Our second question 
reads: 
2. Assuming that people understand the unknown by analogy with what is 
known and important to them, then exactly which hypotheses  explain the 
relationship between a society’s subsistence technology and the belief in a 
non-moralizing all-powerful god, and a moralizing all-powerful god? 
The third research question concerns the division between adaptive and non-adaptive 
evolutionary theories. Although a test of the non-adaptive variant of evolutionism is 
beyond the scope of this study, we revert to the discussion raised in paragraph 1.2.3. 
The question is whether religion, independently from technology, influences the 
reproductive success of societies and, if both factors have consequences, which factor 
has the largest effect. 
3. Is the effect of subsistence technology on reproductive success larger than the 
effect of a society’s godly image? 
We answer these three questions by analyzing data from Murdock’s Standard Cross-
Cultural Sample, which provides coded information for 186 pre-industrial societies. 
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1.4.2 A shift from questions regarding gods who now and then create, to questions 
about creations that sometimes involve a god. 
Our answer to the question about diversity in godly images links Lenski’s ecological 
evolutionism - a macro-theory - with Topitsch’s assumption that people reason in 
analogies and explain the unknown in biomorphic, sociomorphic and technomorphic 
terms, dependent on the society’s subsistence technology. The analogy thesis, 
however, raises questions about the unknown, not only questions about gods. We 
argue that the belief in god only explains a limited part of the unknown, and that it 
does so by postulating a controlling power, a creative agent or a perpetrator of certain 
phenomena. However, it does not by definition answer questions about the origin of 
life, an important void, since no one was around at the time of the world’s nascence. 
Therefore, to press the ideas-and-societies issue, we analyze creation stories, which 
occasionally involve a god, as distinct from analyzing images of gods that now and 
then create and sometimes do things afterwards. By studying creation stories, we can 
locate processes of human thought. After all, creation stories can be considered the 
result of human thinking about the unknown. Creation stories also represent 
communal thinking because they are produced by a culture and not by one author. 
Topitsch (1954) holds that in explaining the unknown people fall back upon the 
things that are familiar and crucial to their society. On the basis of this theoretical 
assumption, we examine whether creation stories in societies with different 
subsistence technologies will contain ideas that reflect important aspects of the 
societal structure. We will particularly examine, in technologically more advanced 
societies, whether biomorphic analogies are replaced by technomorphic analogies, and 
whether sociomorphic analogies referring to kinship ties are replaced by 
sociomorphic analogies referring to states. Our fourth and fifth research questions 
read: 
4. Given that a relation has been established between a society’s subsistence 
and its godly ideas, is its technology also linked to the content of its creation 
stories? 
5. To what extent does the thesis that human beings comprehend the unknown 
by drawing particular analogies explain the relation between a society’s 
subsistence technology and the substance of its creation stories? 
We answer these questions by coding data from the Human Relations Area Files on 
characteristics of societies’ creation stories. 
1.4.3 A shift from questions regarding who believes in God to questions regarding 
which god do people believe in. 
Lenski’s findings in table 1.2 only refer to pre-industrial societies. In this study, we 
also take into account religious diversity in industrial and post-industrial societies. We 
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question how industrialization affect people’s ideas about god. Although table 1.1 
shows a great diversity of religious ideas in post-industrial societies, most 
comparative research in these societies focused on secularization, the shift from a 
religious society to a non-religious society (Martin 1978; Stark and Bainbridge 1985; 
Bruce 2002). Only few studies aim to understand why different images of god prevail 
in different societies (Greeley 2003). It has been hypothesized that in (post-)industrial 
societies the idea of a personal god is diminishing (Halman and De Moor 1993; 
Dobbelaere and Jagodzinski 1995) and is gradually being replaced by the concept of a 
more vague and general higher power, here characterized as an abstract god (Lenski 
1970; Dobbelaere 1999; Lambert 1999). Whereas most studies focused on the decline 
of the traditional image of a person-like god, we aim to study more in detail what 
substitutes the image of the personal god. For this reason, we shift the focus from the 
question “who believes in God” to “which god do people believe in”? 
According to ecological evolutionism, subsistence technologies present societies 
a range of options, and the prevailing ideologies affect the choices that people make 
among these options. In technologically more advanced societies, the range of 
available options is greater and for that reason, ideologies are expected to exert more 
influence on a society’s social-cultural characteristics than in technologically less 
advanced societies (Nolan and Lenski 2006: 59). Nolan and Lenski noticed that the 
overall level of social inequality, which in pre-industrial societies increased with 
technological advancement, is declining in industrial and (post-)industrial societies 
(Nolan and Lenksi 2006: 270). They argue that the best explanation for this egalitarian 
trend is the growth of production caused by the industrial revolution, together with 
the shift from autocratic to democratic regimes. According to Nisbet (1966), religious 
change in (post-)industrial societies is a consequence of both the Industrial Revolution 
and Political Revolution. Thus, we study how industrialization and democratization 
influence the different ideas about God that prevail in (post-)industrial societies: the 
idea of a personal god, the idea of an abstract god, the idea that God is unknowable and 
the idea that God doesn’t exist. 
With regard to (post-)industrial societies we have survey data at our disposal 
(European and Word Values Studies). This enables us to study religious diversity at 
the micro level (Dobbelaere 1999). More specifically, we examine to what extent 
industrialization and democratization have influenced people’s ideas about God at the 
individual level and at the contextual level, apart from people’s own characteristics. 
Here, we add Inglehart’s (1990) notion of formative years that are assumed to be 
crucial when it comes to the transmission of culture. This leads to our sixth research 
question: 
6. How do individual and societal characteristics that refer to industrialization 
and democratization affect the adherence to the idea of a personal god, the 
idea of an abstract god, the idea that God is unknowable and the idea that 
God doesn’t exist, of individuals living in (post-)industrial societies in Europe? 
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1.4.4 A shift from the question in which god do people believe to the question which 
characteristics people attribute to their gods. 
In paragraph 1.4.2 we raised the question of how a society’s subsistence technology is 
linked to the content of its creation stories in pre-industrial societies. Miller, Scott and 
Okamoto (2006) focused on ‘creation stories’ in (post-)industrial societies and related 
people’s ideas about evolution to the belief in a personal god. They hypothesized that 
the theory that humans evolved from earlier forms of life implies a distant and 
impersonal god. Miller et al, indeed showed that people who hold a strong belief in a 
personal god have more difficulties with the concept of evolution. We argue that the 
personal notion of god is not only related with people’s ideas about the origin of 
humanity, but also with another important void: their ideas about death and afterlife. 
After all, a personal god rewards its loyal subjects by sending them to heaven and 
punishes those who trespass law by sending them to hell. As a result, we shift the 
focus from the question “in which god do people believe” to the question “which 
characteristics do people attribute to their god”? 
In paragraph 1.4.1 it was argued that an all-powerful god can function as an 
authority signaling people about the required interaction under circumstances of great 
insecurity. However, Norris and Inglehart (2004) suggest that the belief in God can 
also offer people consolation. More specifically, they argue that decreasing insecurities 
in (post-)industrial societies can explain why people in these societies no longer need 
comfort beliefs, such as the belief in God or in an afterlife. This idea can be traced to 
the work of Feuerbach (1830, 1841) and Marx (1867), who argued that religion is a 
delusion that people use for their own comfort and as a distraction from the sorrow 
present in the world. In this light, Norris and Inglehart (2004) present the percentages 
of people who believe in God, Heaven and Hell by type of society. Table 1.3 shows their 
calculations, based on the World Values Surveys. 
Table 1.3 Religious beliefs by type of society (in percentages) 
Religious beliefs Agrarian Industrial Post-
industrial 
Eta Sig. 
Belief in Heaven 63 45 44 .09 * 
Belief in Hell 59 36 26 .23 ** 
Belief in God 78 72 69 .02 n.s. 
Source: Norris and Inglehart 2004; WVS 1981-2001, 74 societies ; +p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
Norris and Inglehart see the statistics in table 1.3 as confirming their hypothesis that 
human security, which is lowest in agrarian societies and highest in post-industrial 
societies, decreases people’s religiosity. In our opinion, this conclusion is premature. 
Norris and Inglehart’s argument about human security cannot explain why the 
percentage of people who believe in Hell is lower than the percentage of people who 
believe in Heaven, or why the belief in Hell decreases more rapidly with ongoing 
industrialization than the belief in Heaven. Apparently, the beliefs in Heaven and Hell 
do not always form a fixed combination. In chapter 5 we will therefore examine how 
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ongoing industrialization affects people’s belief in Heaven and Hell at both the 
individual and contextual level. We will not only take into account the societal 
situation in people’s formative years, but also the societal situation in which people 
currently live. Our final research question reads: 
7. How do individual characteristics and societal characteristics that refer to 
industrialization and democratization affect the belief in Heaven and the 
belief in Hell of individuals living in agrarian, industrial and post-industrial 
societies? 
1.5 Data 
In this paragraph we describe the most important data sources we use in this study. 
More specific information about all the data sources we used will be given in the 
empirical chapters 2 to 5. 
1.5.1 Murdock’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample 
The basis of the analyses of the first part of this study is Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas, 
which originally appeared in Ethnology in 1962. It provides coded information for 
1,267 pre-industrial societies, each pinpointed to a particular locus and point in time. 
It is important to realize that the societies in the Atlas in most cases are not countries, 
but autonomous groups of people that form subgroups within countries. Original 
fieldwork descriptions of these societies were coded by way of content analysis by 
third persons. Most descriptions pertain to the period between 1800 and 1950. More 
recent descriptions were left out to avoid Western influence on the dataset as much as 
possible. To obtain a more representative set of human societies, a subset of the 
Ethnographic Atlas was taken: the World Sample comprising 734 societies. However, 
most people work with a subset of the World Sample: The Standard Cross-Cultural 
Sample of 186 societies that is representative of the world’s societies known by way of 
accounts written by professionals who lived in the societies for some time. Table 1.4 
shows the distribution of societal types in the Ethnographic Atlas, the World Sample 
and the Standard Sample. It demonstrates that our distribution of societal types in the 
Standard Sample differs slightly from Nolan and Lenski’s distribution. The reason for 
this is that Nolan and Lenski classified societies that were equally dependent on two 
subsistence techniques as missing. We chose, however, to categorize these ‘hybrid’ 
societies according to their lowest level of subsistence technology. In this manner we 
carry over as much information as possible without overestimating the relation 
between subsistence technology and godly images. 
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Table 1.4 Distribution of Societal Types in Different Data Sets 
Societal type Ethnographic Atlas  World Sample Standard Sample Our distribution 
 N % N % N % N % 
Hunting and gathering 174 21 84 16 27 17 48 26 
Simple horticultural 155 19 146 27 35 22 29 16 
Advanced horticultural 246 30 140 26 38 24 47 25 
Agrarian 103 13 90 17 32 20 31 17 
Fishing 60 7 38 7 11 7 15 8 
Herding 78 10 37 7 16 10 16 8 
Unknown 451  199  27    
Total 1,267   734   186   186   
Source: Nolan and Lenski (2006: 367). 
There are two reasons why we prefer the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample above the 
Ethnographic Atlas. First, societies in the Sample are not neighboring societies 
(Murdock & White, 1969). To eliminate possible effects of diffusion and obtain a clear 
picture of technological effects, units in any sample should not have a common origin 
or be spatially close to one another. A second reason for using the Sample is that it 
provides more detailed information than the Atlas. Because of its smaller size, new 
information is added from time to time, by researchers who coded the ethnographic 
records on new characteristics. 
1.5.2 The Human Relations Area Files 
We use the Human Relations Area Files, which contain uncoded information for over 
370 pre-industrial societies, for obtaining data about creation myths for a majority of 
the societies of Murdock’s Standard Sample (138 of the 186 societies are both in the 
Human Relations Area Files and in the Standard Sample). The Human Relations Area 
Files are developed to stimulate and facilitate comparative research on cultural and 
social life, so that theories of human behavior can be tested on their universal validity 
(Ember & Ember, 1988). The collection was developed by the Human Relations Area 
Files, Inc., a nonprofit research organization based at Yale University. The files contain 
mostly primary source materials on selected cultures or societies representing all 
major regions of the world. The available information is classified by a unique system 
of subject-indexing that is designed for a rapid and accurate retrieval of specific data. 
For the 138 societies that overlap with the Standard Sample, we reread the original 
fieldwork descriptions and coded the available information on characteristics of the 
creation stories. Additional information about the coding can be found in paragraph 
3.4.1. 
The Standard Cross-Cultural Sample and the Human Relations Area Files are 
currently the most widely used datasets in cross-cultural research. However, there are 
some difficulties that have not yet been satisfactorily resolved. First, the societies 
included can be influenced by the Western European culture. In order to minimize this 
influence, earlier descriptions are preferred above the more recent ones. Of course this 
does not mean that the influence of Western culture is completely absent. Many 
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societies were ‘pacified’ by the West around the time of earliest description (Roes & 
Raymond, 2002). Second, even though the data contains a large part of the human 
societies that are described by anthropologists, it is not complete (Underhill, 1974). 
Some societies have become extinct by the time ethnographers started their field work 
and there are also societies for which ethnographic descriptions do not exist. 
However, despite their shortcomings, the Standard Sample and the Human Relations 
Area Files provide a great amount of information and are the best available data. 
1.5.3 The European Values Studies 
To study the godly images of people living in contemporary societies, we make use of 
individual level data from the European Values Studies and the World Values Surveys. 
The European Value Systems Study Group initiated the European Values study, a 
large-scale cross-national and longitudinal survey research program on basic human 
values. The European Values Studies are clustered around four themes of human life: 
religion and morality, politics, work, and leisure. The first wave was conducted in 
1981 and contains information about ten European countries. A second wave was 
launched in 1990 in all European countries, including Switzerland, Austria and 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the US and Canada. About ten years 
later (1999/2000), the third wave was launched. Countries not included in this wave 
are Norway, Switzerland and some of the former Yugoslavian countries. Researchers 
from the participating countries were responsible for the translation and the 
distribution of the questionnaire. In a methodological questionnaire, they had to fill in 
how the questionnaire was translated and which changes were made in relation to the 
original questionnaire. The interviews were conducted face-to-face by persons trained 
for this purpose. Because of the available data, we only used the third wave of 
1999/2000. 
1.5.4 The World Values Surveys 
The European Values Studies aroused interest in North and South America, The 
Middle and Far East, Australia, and South-Africa. In several countries, affiliated groups 
were established to administer a similar questionnaire: the World Values Surveys. The 
first wave was launched in 1990 and is a replication of the European Values Studies, 
initiated by the University of Michigan. The second wave was launched in 1995 by the 
World Values Survey Organization, without the collaboration of the European Values 
Study. In 1999, the European Values Study was repeated in 33 European countries, 
while the World Values Surveys conducted surveys in 32 countries outside Europe. 
This survey was conducted in three countries in 2000. We use this third wave. 
Although the questionnaires of the two research groups display many similarities, 
there are some differences. For example, questions about people’s beliefs in God, 
Heaven and Hell were asked in both the European Values Studies and World Values 
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Surveys. However, people’s exact image of God was only asked in the European Values 
Studies. 
1.6 Outline of this study 
This study is divided in four parts. The first part consists of chapter 1, which 
introduces the topic of religious diversity, as well as an enumeration of the research 
questions. 
The second part concerns religious diversity in pre-industrial societies and 
consists of chapters 2 and 3. The starting point of chapter 2 is Lenski’s findings about 
differences in godly images between pre-industrial societies. We explicitly test which 
mechanisms lie behind the relationship between subsistence technologies and the 
belief in all-powerful gods. We take into consideration the possibilities of spuriousness 
and of indirect relationships. Furthermore, we develop a micro-level explanation for 
the relationship between subsistence technologies and godly images by combining 
Lenski’s ecological evolutionism - a macro-theory - with Toptisch’ micro-hypothesis 
that people interpret the unknown through analogies with what is known and 
important to them. Chapter 2 answers research questions 1 to 3. Chapter 3 addresses 
the relation between a society’s subsistence technology and the content of their 
creation stories. In this chapter, we perform a more profound test of Topitsch’s 
assumption that people reason in analogies and explain the unknown in biomorphic, 
sociomorphic and technomorphic terms, dependent on the society’s subsistence 
technology. In this chapter we aim to answer research questions 4 and 5. 
The third part of this study addresses religious diversity in (post-)industrial 
societies and consists of chapter 4 and chapter 5. Chapter 4 raises the question how 
industrialization and democratization affect the godly images of people living in (post-
)industrial societies, on both the individual and contextual level. This chapter gives an 
answer to research question 6. In chapter 5 we examine whether industrialization and 
democratization affect people’s belief in Heaven and Hell, independently from 
increasing human security. In this chapter, we aim to answer research question 7. The 
fourth part of this study consists of chapter 6, in which we answer our main research 
question: under which circumstances does what image of God prevail? Furthermore, 
we discuss the consequences of our findings for Lenski’s ecological evolutionism and 
Topitsch’s assumption that people explain the unknown with the known and 
important. Finally, we want to remark that there may be some repetition between the 
empirical chapters (chapter 2 to 5) of this study since they were initially written as 
journal articles. In this format, the chapters are independently readable. 
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Chapter 2  
Analogies, subsistence 
technologies and all-powerful 
gods in pre-industrial societies∗ 
This study investigates why pre-industrial societies differ in their godly images. Our 
answer to this question about religious diversity links Lenski’s ecological evolutionism – 
a macro-theory – with Topitsch’s micro-hypothesis that people interpret the unknown 
through analogies with the known. Hereby, the known can consist of biological processes, 
societal relations and technical skills. We test our expectations regarding societal 
characteristics and godly images using data from Murdock’s Standard Cross-Cultural 
Sample. We find that the belief in a non-moralizing all-powerful god flourish in advanced 
horticultural societies, whereas the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god burgeons in 
agrarian and herding societies. The relationship between subsistence technology and 
godly images is to a large extent mediated by economic craftsmanship. 
2.1 Societal characteristics and godly images1 
In the first part of the twentieth century, cultural anthropologists from Western 
European countries conducted fieldwork in societies that had a considerably simpler 
way of life. According to the priest Schmidt (1912-1955), findings from this work show 
that some of these societies had an image of god similar to that of Christianity: an all-
                                                             
 
 
∗ A slightly different version of this chapter was published in the Dutch journal Sociologie (Moor, 
Ultee & Need, 2007). A German version was published in the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie (Moor, Ultee & Need, 2007). 
1 We thank David Sloan Wilson for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 
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powerful god that had created the world and remained active in it by punishing evil 
and rewarding good.2 That fieldwork also demonstrated that, in addition to societies 
with a moralizing all-powerful god there were also societies that had an all-powerful 
god that provided no guidelines on what is right and what is wrong. The Inca high god 
Viracocha is an example of such a non-moralizing all-powerful god. Moreover, there 
turned out to be societies without an all-powerful god. The people then believe in 
numerous gods without a high god, or had no image of any god whatsoever. An 
example is the polytheist Maori society of New Zealand. Given all of these findings, it is 
no surprise that the biologist Dawkins (2006) recently used the diversity of religions 
as an argument for the proposition that god is a delusion. Why societies differ in their 
image of god, however, Dawkins leaves unexplained. Neither does he refer to the 
extensive body of sociological research into this question, which extends from 
Swanson (1960) up to and including Roes & Raymond (2003). Dawkins does assert 
that religion has to do with the human tendency to interpret events as purposeful. 
Nonetheless, how the multiformity of religion can thus be explained is unclear. The 
current chapter attempts to respond to this question of how to explain the worldwide 
religious diversity found in pre-industrial societies. 
To answer this question, we use the ecological evolutionary theory of Lenski 
(1970; 2005; Nolan & Lenski 2006) and Topitsch’s (1954) thesis that people interpret 
the unknown by analogy with what is known and important to them. Here, three 
thought models are indicative. We further link Lenski’s macro-theory with Topitsch’s 
micro-theory, and in so doing, heed the call so often made within sociology to derive 
macro-hypotheses from micro-hypotheses. 
Because of its general character, ecological evolutionism can offer a synthesis of 
earlier research findings regarding godly images. Quantitative comparisons of 
ethnographic reports show that godly images are associated with uncertainty (Snarey 
1996; Roes & Raymond 2003), political relations (Swanson 1960), technological 
advances (Lenski 1970) and economic aspects (Underhill 1974). These all form part of 
the complexity of societies. In this chapter, an attempt is made to bring these earlier 
findings together within one general theoretical framework. 
2.1.1 A series of questions 
Lenski (1970: 134) conceived table 2.1 using Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas. In later 
editions, the table is abbreviated to its last column (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 70)3. In 
                                                             
 
 
2 An all-powerful god is usually responsible for the creation. However, there are some instances in 
which all-powerful gods rule over a universe that they did not create (Swanson 1960: 57). 
3 In 1970, Lenski also made a distinction between belief in an all-powerful god that is inactive or 
uninterested in human affairs and belief in an all-powerful god that is active with respect to human 
affairs but is not involved in human morals. For simplicity of our argument, we combined these 
categories to ‘belief in a non-moralizing all-powerful god’. 
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making the table, Lenski takes as his starting point the instruments used in a society to 
provide for the basic food needs of its members. Lenski thus distinguishes in the table 
four primary levels of subsistence technology. According to his schema, hunting and 
gathering, which is done using a bow and arrow and a digging stick, is categorized as 
the lowest level, and agriculture, whereby fields are ploughed, as the highest level.4 
Lenski interprets fishing and herding societies as evolutionary side-paths, because 
they occur in less conventional natural environments (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 64). 
Lenski saw the table as confirming the hypothesis that people in technologically more 
advanced societies are more likely to believe in a single moralizing, all-powerful god 
than people in technologically less advanced societies. 
Table 2.1 Image of god according to society type (in percentages) 
Societal subsistence 
technology 
No idea of a 
supreme creator 
Idea of an 
inactive or 
unconcerned 
supreme creator 
Idea of an active 
supreme creator 
not  supportive 
of human 
morality  
Idea of an active 
supreme creator 
supportive of 
human morality 
Number of cases 
Hunting and gathering 60 29 8 2 85 
Simple horticultural 60 35 2 2 43 
Advanced horticultural 21 51 12 16 131 
Agrarian 23 6 5 67 66 
Fishing 69 14 7 10 29 
Herding 4 10 6 80 50 
Source: Lenski (1970: 134). 
Table 2.1 indeed shows that the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god occurs more 
frequently in societies that are more technologically advanced. However, Lenski’s own 
explanation of the link found between subsistence technology and godly image is 
ambiguous: Does a certain technology lead to a certain godly image? Or is there rather 
a spurious relation, for example, does a society’s natural environment determine both 
subsistence technology and godly image? Further, there is the question of the extent to 
which the consequences of subsistence technology have their effect via other 
characteristics and are thus indirect (Simpson 1984: 218). Tables other than that by 
Lenski show quantitative comparisons of pre-industrial societies and demonstrate 
godly images as associated with, for example, economic complexity (Underhill 1974). 
This leads to the following question: 
1. Is the relation between a society’s subsistence technology and the belief in a 
moralizing all-powerful god a spurious relationship, a direct relationship, or 
an indirect one? 
                                                             
 
 
4 This chapter is limited to the analysis of godly images in pre-industrial societies. We therefore 
make no statements about industrial or post-industrial societies. 
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Table 2.1 also shows three aspects that Lenski did not discuss and did not incorporate 
into his theory. To begin with, it turns out that the relation between subsistence 
technology and belief in a moralizing all-powerful god is not straightforward. In fact, 
the difference between the societal types in table 2.1 is not consistent throughout. 
Second, it turns out that the image of a non-moralizing but nonetheless all-powerful 
god occurs most in the advanced horticultural societies. Lenski provides no 
explanation for the predominance here of this godly image. Moreover, he presents 
results for fishing and herding societies, but does not expand on these further. In this 
chapter, we attempt to explain these findings with conjectures about the subsistence 
technologies of societies and the type of analogical reasoning that people employ. We 
also test a hypothesis derived from that explanation, and a new prediction that can be 
made with it. This leads to the following question: 
2. Assuming that people understand the unknown by analogy with what is 
known and important to them, then exactly which hypotheses can explain the 
relationship between a society’s subsistence technology and the belief in a 
non-moralizing god and a moralizing all-powerful god? 
Marx and Weber left to contemporary sociology the question of whether the material 
‘foundation’ determines the conceptual ‘structure’ of societies or whether economic 
rationalization progresses through a religiously anchored work ethic. According to 
ecological evolutionism, however, the importance of this question has been 
considerably overstated. In fact, in light of this theory the question of the relation 
between these two factors needs to be cast differently. According to evolutionism, the 
main explanatory characteristic of societies is their more or less successful adaptation 
to their environment. Furthermore, according to ecological evolutionism, 
technologically more advanced societies will be more successful reproductively. 
Because societies are human populations, ecological evolutionism views their 
reproductive success as being demonstrated when members of a population live 
longer, balance less often on the edge of survival, and subsist in larger numbers from 
the product of a smaller area of land, leading to a higher population density. The 
question is whether religion, irrespective of technology, influences the reproductive 
success of societies and, if both factors have consequences, which factor has the largest 
effect. Nolan and Lenski (1996) already showed that the effect of technology on 
various social variables is more persuasive, stronger and more robust than that of 
ideology. The third research question in our series of questions therefore reads: 
3. Is the effect of subsistence technology on reproductive success larger than the 
effect of a society’s godly image? 
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2.2 Subsistence technology and godly images 
2.2.1 Technological evolutionism 
According to Lenski (1970: 142), changes in a society’s subsistence technology are the 
primary force driving social evolution. Technological progress constitutes a 
precondition for further major changes within societies (cf. Harris 1969). 
Lenski (1970:124) divides pre-industrial societies into four main types. Societies 
in which people provide for their needs largely by hunting animals and by gathering 
fruits, roots and seeds are named ‘hunting and gathering societies’. Societies in which 
plants are cultivated with the aid of a digging stick or hoe are called horticultural 
societies. Simple horticultural societies have tools made of rock and wood; advanced 
horticultural societies also possess metal tools. In order for simple horticulture to 
make the transition to advanced horticulture, new techniques are needed, because 
high temperatures are required to melt ore. Societies where people work the land 
using a plough are called ‘agricultural societies’. Whereas gardeners seek new land 
once their old plots, due to soil depletion, start to produce less, agriculturalists use 
ploughing to maintain the fertility of their lands. Agricultural societies then can also be 
said to have a higher level of subsistence technology than horticultural societies. 
Lenski views fishing and herding societies as side-paths in the development 
progression of human society, because these societies have adapted to a less 
commonplace natural environment. The populations of fishing societies have attuned 
their existence to the large amount of water in their living environment, and they hunt 
water animals instead of land animals. In herding societies, people have to deal with 
infertile soils and arid conditions, and they therefore take to raising animals instead of 
cultivating plants. In terms of technology level, fishing societies are broadly equivalent 
to hunting and gathering societies, while herding societies resemble advanced 
horticulture and agricultural societies (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 176). 
Subsistence technologies give people information on how to use the natural 
resources available in their surroundings. Ideologies, such as religions, form a second 
key ingredient of societies. While the technology of a society places boundaries on 
what is possible, and new technologies push back these boundaries, ideologies set no 
limits on the possible, but rather, influence the choices that people make among the 
available options. Ideologies therefore conform to some extent to the subsistence 
technology of the society in which they arise. Lenski assumed that people in 
technologically more advanced societies intervene more strongly in their natural 
environment and therefore are also more prone to believing in a god of creation that 
still intervenes in the world. In this study we test this hypothesis that the belief in a 
moralizing all-powerful god is more common in societies with a higher level of 
subsistence technology for statistical significance using multiple regression analysis. 
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2.2.2 From technological to ecological evolutionism 
According to Lenski (2005), societies’ subsistence technology is attuned to the natural 
resources in their living environment. Where there are fewer natural resources, the 
subsistence technology will be of a lower level. With this proposition, technological 
evolutionism becomes an ecological evolutionism. Amongst others, Diamond (1997) 
showed that a society’s natural environment has a large influence on other key societal 
aspects. As such, areas with little precipitation and infertile soils are not populated by 
horticulturalists or agriculturalists, since the land is unsuitable for crop cultivation, 
but rather by herding societies. 
Ecological evolutionism states that a society’s natural environment has an 
indirect effect on the godly image that is dominant there, via the subsistence 
technology. After all, the natural environment of a society determines, to some extent, 
the dominant subsistence technology. As such, agriculture will have developed mainly 
in societies located in areas with sufficient precipitation and fertile soils. Snarey 
(1996) states that environmental scarcity, in addition, has a direct effect on the 
presence of a moralizing all-powerful god. He showed that belief in a moralizing god is 
more common in societies where people have insufficient, or barely sufficient, water at 
their disposal. We incorporate the effect of environmental limitations into our 
theoretical model, so that we test the extent to which the association between 
subsistence technology and godly images is a spurious one. Environmental limitations 
could, after all, influence both the subsistence technology of a society and its godly 
images. 
Following this reasoning, we arrive at the following three hypotheses in answer 
to our first research question: Environmental limitations reduce the level of 
subsistence technology in societies (H1); societies with more environmental 
limitations are more likely to believe in a moralizing all-powerful god than societies 
with fewer environmental limitations (H2); and the direct effect of subsistence 
technology on the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god will decline, but not 
disappear, when environmental limitations are taken into account (H3). 
2.2.3 Godly images, political differentiation and economic complexity 
The subsistence technology of a society will influence not only the dominant godly 
images, but also other features of a society, which in turn, could have an impact on the 
belief in a moralizing and all-powerful god. With this, we address the issue of the 
direct or otherwise the indirect influence of subsistence technology on the godly 
images held by societies. In this regard, we examine two other sociological attributes: 
the political differentiation and the economic complexity of societies. 
Swanson (1960, 1975) relates the belief in an all-powerful creator to the political 
structure, and showed that this image of god was most common in societies where the 
state is present as the highest power, above families as groups and above communities 
as groups. Because we want to test whether subsistence technology influences the 
godly images in a society indirectly via the political structure, we formulate the 
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following hypotheses: Societies with a higher level of subsistence technology are 
characterized by more political differentiation (H4). And thus, societies with more 
political differentiation have the belief in a single moralizing all-powerful god more 
frequently than societies with less political differentiation (H5). 
Underhill (1974, 1976) subscribes to Lenski’s proposition that technology 
influences the political and economic climate of a society. He assumes, in addition, that 
political differentiation and economic relations explain the link between subsistence 
technology and the belief in an all-powerful god. With this, we arrive at the 
hypotheses: Societies with a higher level of subsistence technology are economically 
more complex (H6); and economically more complex societies have the belief in a 
moralizing all-powerful god more often than societies that are less complex 
economically (H7). 
2.2.4 Direct influences and mediating factors 
With the distinction between direct and indirect effects, we can better understand the 
stance that Swanson (1960) and Underhill (1974) took in relation to Lenski (1970). 
Swanson and Underhill do not suggest that subsistence technology has no effect on 
religious representations, but rather, that the effect is primarily indirect and is 
brought about via structural aspects of societies. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: The direct effect of subsistence technology on the belief in a moralizing all-
powerful god will decline, but not disappear, when the political differentiation and 
economic complexity of a society are taken into account (H8). Figure 2.1 presents the 
theoretical model for belief in a moralizing all-powerful god that we test in this 
chapter. The arrows in the model indicate the relations that we expect. 
Figure 2.1 Theoretical model to explain belief in a moralizing all-powerful god 
 
Environmental limitations  Subsistence technology  
Political differentiation  
Economic complexity  Belief in a moralizing god  
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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2.3 Micro-hypotheses about analogies and macro-hypotheses 
about technologies 
A promising micro-explanation for the relationship between subsistence technologies 
and godly images is found in a research tradition that spans from Hume (1998 [1757 
and 1779]) to Guthrie (1993). When it comes to explaining the religious diversity 
found worldwide, it is fruitful to assume that people reason through analogies. People 
think not so much in terms of ‘if…, then…’, but in terms of ‘like…, so too…’. Topitsch 
(1954, 1972, 1988) expanded on this assumption by distinguishing three aspects with 
which people draw comparisons: biological processes, social structures and technical 
skills. These correspond, according to Topitsch, to three thought models: biomorphic, 
sociomorphic and technomorphic. A thought model is assumed to be dependent on the 
things that people know and which are important for the continued existence of their 
society. By figuring out in what type of societies people use which thought models, we 
can explain more findings about the godly images that emerge in societies. In societies 
with biomorphic thought models people explain the unknown in terms of a 
reproductive act. An example is the birth of the earth from a sexual union of the sun 
and the moon. In societies with sociomorphic thought models people explain the 
unknown in terms of social relations. An example of this is the notion that god is 
master of his (or her) creation, ruling like a king over his/her subjects. Finally, there 
are technomorphic thought models, by which people interpret the unknown as the 
product of technical and trade skills. This is, for example, the idea that god created the 
universe according to a plan, just as people work according to a plan when they make 
tools and instruments. 
Before we derive the macro-findings from table 2.1 from the micro-theory that 
people reason by analogy, and in so doing use three thought models, it must be 
mentioned that we cannot test our micro-explanations directly. Murdock’s Standard 
Cross-Cultural Sample, the richest dataset with information about societies ranging 
from hunters and gatherers to farmers, contains no information about the thought 
models used within these societies. Nonetheless, by devising new hypotheses about 
the use of biomorphic, sociomorphic and technomorphic thought models in societies 
with various levels of subsistence technology, we attempt to advance existing theory 
in this regard. 
Our argument deals with four main levels of subsistence technology and three 
thought models. Below we deduce which thought model will predominate in which 
type of society. As Topitsch (1972: 127) proposed, sociomorphic thought models were 
dominant in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, whereas in ancient Greece 
technomorphic thought models were the rule. In accordance with our hypotheses, we 
employ the findings obtained by Topitsch (1972: 63) in an analysis of ancient Hebrew 
texts. The image of god as creator came into being on the basis of a technomorphic 
model, and the image of god as a moralizing person based on a sociomorphic model. 
Based on Topitsch’s examples, it seems likely that belief in an all-powerful god is more 
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probable in societies where the people intervene more in their natural environment, 
and the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god is more probable in societies where a 
ruler has drawn a great deal of power to him or herself. 
2.3.1 Agricultural societies and the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god 
We now present our hypotheses regarding the subsistence technology of societies and 
the thought models employed amongst their populations. To start with, we assume 
that biomorphic thought models commonly occur in hunting and gathering societies. 
In societies at the lowest level of subsistence technology, the repertoire of tools is 
limited. Specialization in making tools and strong political leadership are not, or are 
hardly, in evidence. For these reasons, the frame of reference for such populations will 
consist mainly of biological processes. More or less the same is true for simple 
horticultural societies. As has become clear (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 108), hunters and 
gatherers often possess the knowledge of how to cultivate plants, though they made 
little use of it. This implies that they are more similar to simple horticulturalists than 
originally thought. 
Simpson (1984: 221) suggested that the presence of an all-powerful creator is 
associated with the presence of autonomous and pragmatic individuals. He showed 
that in those societies where the ‘tools’ people worked with were unpredictable and 
difficult to control, the notion of an all-powerful creator was more common (Simpson 
1979, 1984). He hereby suggested that animals are more difficult to control than 
plants (1979: 302). In this chapter we categorize all societal types to the extent to 
which people exercise control over their natural environment. Furthermore, we expect 
that the image of god as an all-powerful creator will occur more frequently in societies 
where the subsistence technology is more advanced and people not only cultivate 
their own foodstuffs, but also possess tools crafted using self-made materials. After all, 
the known and important in these societies encompasses products of human creativity 
and inventiveness. Here, in the advanced horticultural societies, technomorphic 
thought models will be in emergence next to biomorphic thought models. 
Finally, we consider the idea of an active moralizing god to be most probable in 
societies with a strong state and autonomous leadership. Because the state arose in 
advanced horticultural societies, we expect that in these sociomorphic thought models 
will have gained in importance. We expect these to be even more important in 
agricultural societies, which amongst Lenski’s (1970: 241-257) four main types have 
the strongest state. The ruler in these societies rewards loyal subjects and punishes 
those who violate the sovereign’s laws. By analogy, especially in these communities, 
people will develop the notion of an all-powerful god that is active in upholding human 
morality. 
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2.3.2 New macro-hypotheses about the belief in a (non-)moralizing all-powerful god 
In order to answer our second question about moralizing and non-moralizing all-
powerful gods, we derive macro-hypotheses from the above. We link the assumption 
that people interpret the unknown by analogy with what is known and important for 
their survival, with the bridge assumption that in societies that differ in technological 
level, different things will be important to the population. By shifting questions about 
belief in a moralizing all-powerful god to questions about the extent to which gods, 
according to a religion, are active in a society, we derive three hypotheses: Belief in an 
all-powerful god will be as good as absent in hunting and gathering societies and 
simple horticultural societies (H9); belief in a non-moralizing all-powerful god will be 
found especially in advanced horticultural societies (H10); and belief in a moralizing 
all-powerful god will occur most often in agricultural societies (H11). Table 2.2 
sketches our micro-explanation. 
Table 2.2 Subsistence technology, thought models and godly images 
Subsistence technology Dominant thought model Godly image  
Hunting and gathering Biomorphic No god or only gods without a high god 
Simple horticulture Biomorphic No god or only gods without a high god 
Advanced horticulture Technomorphic Non-moralizing all-powerful god 
Agriculture Sociomorphic Moralizing all-powerful god 
 
2.3.3 New macro-hypotheses about godly images in fishing and herding societies 
In deriving new predictions about godly images in fishing and herding societies, we 
expand further on ecological evolutionism. Although we expect that biomorphic 
thought models will dominate in both fishing and hunting and gathering societies, we 
might make some inferences about in which of these society types people will reason 
more according to technomorphic models. As Hewes (1948) noted, seas are larger 
than hunting grounds, which means that their natural resources will be depleted less 
rapidly. Furthermore, according to Hewes (1948), catching fish is simpler and requires 
less inventiveness than hunting land animals. Our expectation is therefore: Belief in an 
all-powerful god is less probable in fishing societies than in hunting and gathering 
societies (H12). 
Herding societies surpass agricultural societies in the extent to which people 
intervene in their surroundings. After all, the domestication of animals requires more 
effort and knowledge than the domestication of plants (Krader 1968). Because land 
animals by nature shun humans, techniques must be developed and applied such as 
the imprinting of young animals. Moreover, shepherds are continually at work keeping 
their animals together, while farmers, once they’ve sown merely wait for results to a 
certain extent (Krader 1968). We therefore also expect that technomorphic thought 
models will be more common in herding societies than in agricultural societies. 
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We further assume that sociomorphic thought models will be more widely used 
in herding than in agricultural societies. After all, invasions of neighbours and waging 
war were common in herding societies. An important innovation in herding societies 
was the use of horses and camels as mounts. Riding these animals gave the herders a 
great military advantage. As a result of this, herding societies evolved strong political 
authority (Lenski 1970: 298). The hypothesis that people reason by analogy, leads us 
to expect that the god of the herders will be a strong ruler. As Wilson (1975: 561) 
suggested, the god of the Hebrew shepherds watched over his chosen people like a 
shepherd watching over his herd. The hypothesis that we test reads as follows: Belief 
in a moralizing all-powerful god is more probable in herding societies than in 
agricultural societies (H13). 
With the above, we have located fishing and herding societies on Lenski’s 
schema of the four main livelihood types according to technological level. In order to 
more rigorously test the explanations formulated above, we derive a few more 
hypotheses. Fishing and herding are sometimes combined with other means of 
livelihood (Lenski 1970). Therefore, we are interested in the godly images of those 
hunting and gathering and simple horticultural societies that are partially dependent 
on fishing for their livelihood. Although herding may form the dominant subsistence 
technology of a society, agricultural societies could also be partly dependent on 
herding. We therefore look at godly images in agricultural societies that vary in their 
degree of dependence on herding as a supplemental means of livelihood. Thus we test 
the hypotheses: The more hunting and gathering societies and simple horticultural 
societies are dependent on fishing, the less probable the belief in an all-powerful god 
will be (H14); and, the more an agricultural society is dependent on herding as a 
means of subsistence, the more probable the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god 
will be (H15). 
2.4 Evolutionary explanations about religion and reproductive 
success 
Our third and final question deals with the independent effect of technologies and of 
godly images on the reproductive success of societies. In this regard, two hypotheses 
are found in the literature, which are known as the adaptive and the by-product 
variants of the evolutionary explanation of religion (Dawkins 2006: 172). The first 
states that religion increases the reproductive success of societies. According to the 
second, religion is only a side-effect of adaptive change. According to Lenski, societies’ 
subsistence technology is the primary driving force behind societal changes, including 
religious change, which is to say, improvements in technology contribute 
independently to societies’ reproductive success. Religion, however, has no 
independent influence in this regard. According to Wilson (2002: 45), in contrast, 
religion has its own consequences for the reproductive success of societies. Why 
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religion would have an independent effect is not really clarified by Wilson, and his 
specific examples do not lead to general hypotheses. We therefore propose: The effect 
of subsistence technology on the reproductive success of societies is larger than the 
effect of godly images on reproductive success (H16). 
The literature reports numerous indicators of the reproductive success of a 
society. In our current study, we follow Lenski (1970) in taking the population density 
as the indicator of reproductive success, and we test the by-product and the adaptive 
explanation against one another by looking at which of the two factors has the greatest 
influence on the population density of societies: subsistence technology or godly 
image. 
2.5 Monographs collected and coded 
2.5.1 Murdock’s Cross-Cultural Sample 
Many descriptions of populaces flowed from the pens of people who did extended 
periods of fieldwork in pre-industrial societies. Murdock (1962) brought together all 
available ethnographies for 1,267 pre-industrial societies and assigned numeric codes 
to certain phrases appearing in them. In a similar fashion, other researchers added 
codes to the dataset in later years. These are found in the Ethnographic Atlas. The 
Atlas first appeared in the journal Ethnology in 1962 and is now electronically 
available as World Cultures. 
To answer our questions, we make use of Murdock’s Standard Cross-Cultural 
Sample, a random sample from the Ethnographic Atlas. The Standard Cross-Cultural 
Sample has information on 186 societies, all for a specific place and time. The Sample 
is representative worldwide of the populations described by experts who spent some 
time with them. Most of these descriptions relate to the period between 1800 and 
1950. In this chapter, we make use of the Standard Sample because it contains more 
detailed information than the Ethnographic Atlas. 
The fact that in our study we compare societies with one another means that we 
have to study the central tendency in societies with respect to images of god. Of 
course, not all members of a society share the same image of god. Nolan and Lenski 
(2006) point out, for example, that the common folk in agricultural societies were 
more fatalistic in their beliefs than the elite. 
2.5.2 Measurements 
Variable v238 in the Sample provides information about the predominant godly 
images in societies. We distinguish three types: societies without an all-powerful god, 
societies with a non-moralizing all-powerful god and societies with a moralizing all-
powerful god. 
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Because in ecological evolutionism the influence of subsistence technology 
stands central, a broadly conceived measurement instrument for technology would be 
unsuitable (Parker Frisbie, Krivo, Kaufman, Clarke & Myers 1984). In measuring 
subsistence technology, we followed the instructions of Nolan and Lenski (2006: 366-
67). Lenski classified societies that were equally dependent on two subsistence 
techniques as missing. We chose, however, to categorize these ‘hybrid’ societies 
according to their lowest level of subsistence technology. In this manner we carry over 
as much information as possible without overestimating the relation between 
subsistence technology and godly images. 
In order to test hypotheses 4-7, which we formulated as a result of Swanson 
(1975) and Underhill (1976), we also measured economic complexity and political 
differentiation. The hypothesis that people reason by analogies, leads to a particular 
operationalization. We operationalize economic complexity as ‘craftsmanship’. The 
presence of this is determined as the sum of three dichotomous variables: weaving 
(v249), leather-working (v250) and pottery (v251). Societies with a score of 0 display 
no craftsmanship, societies with a score of 3 exhibit the most craftsmanship. Societies 
have a score on this variable only if they had a score on at least two of the three 
variables. We operationalize political differentiation as the presence of a central 
leadership figure. The presence of a sovereign ruler is measured on the basis of 
variable v85 in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. This variable reflects the political 
status in which the primary decision-making takes place (Tuden & Marshall 1972). 
Societies with one central leader get a score of 1. We assigned the remaining societies 
the score 0. 
For measuring a society’s level of natural scarcity we take into account three 
variables: precipitation, steepness of landscape and soil fertility. To calculate the 
precipitation that falls in the land area of a society, we take the average of three 
variables. This information is from climate maps of weather stations located as close 
as possible in both place and time to the cultures included in the Standard Sample. The 
first variable is the yearly precipitation in societies (v189). Precipitation is viewed as 
‘low’ if on a yearly basis less than 250 ml of rain falls (score 0), as ‘moderate’ if 
between 251 and 500 ml falls (score 1), and as ‘high’ if it is more than 500 ml (score 
2). The second variable is the amount of precipitation in the driest month (v193). 
Precipitation is viewed as ‘low’ if in the driest month, there is no precipitation at all 
(score 0), ‘moderate’ if between 1 and 5 ml falls (score 1), and ‘high’ if the amount is 
more than 5 ml (score 2). Third, we look at the number of dry months in a year. 
Precipitation is viewed as ‘low’ if in a society there are 8 or more dry months per year 
(score 0), ‘moderate’ if there are between 5 and 8 dry months (score 1), and ‘high’ if 
there are fewer than 5 dry months (score 2). The Cronbach’s alpha of this scale is 0.74. 
Agriculture is difficult in steep, strongly sloping areas. We therefore used a 
variable for the extent to which there are hills and cliffs in the landscape (v922). Pryor 
(1986) collected these data regarding the average steepness in societies on the basis of 
topographical maps. For some societies, he used supplementary information derived 
from descriptions of these areas. The variable has five categories, ranging from 
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‘strongly sloping through mountainous’ to ‘gently rolling’. Pryor (1986) also coded 
information about the fertility of the soil (v924) on the basis of soil maps. He 
distinguished 106 soil types, which he re-coded to a scale that measures suitability for 
agriculture, composed of eight categories from ‘very poor’ to ‘very good’. 
We take population density as our indicator for the reproductive success of 
societies. The population density variable (v156) has five categories, which reflect the 
number of persons per square mile. This variable was transposed into a continuous 
variable by repeatedly taking the lowest value of one category and then log-
transforming the variable. 
2.6 Testing the ecological evolutionaristic explanation of 
religious diversity 
We now analyze the data from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample by multiple linear 
regression, logistic regression and multinomial logistic regression. In discussing the 
hypotheses, we do not always keep to the numerical order. Rather, we follow the time 
sequence in figure 2.1. 
2.6.1 Environmental limitations and technology 
First we focus on the relation between environmental limitations and subsistence 
technology. Table 2.3 shows the results of a multinomial logistic regression. 
Table 2.3 Multinomial logistic regression of subsistence technology on ecological characteristics 
  Hunting & 
gathering – 
fishing 
Hunting & 
gathering – 
simple 
horticultural 
Hunting & 
gathering – 
advanced 
horticultural 
Hunting & 
gathering – 
herding 
Hunting & 
gathering – 
agrarian 
 b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE 
Precipitation 2.48  1.64  1.69  1.09 -1.27 * 0.50 -3.58 ** 0.78 -1.74 ** 0.56 
Steepness of landscape -0.39 + 0.21 -0.14  0.20 -0.03  0.17 -0.48 + 0.29 -0.39 * 0.19 
Soil fertility -0.15  0.26  0.33 + 0.19 0.08  0.15 -0.32  0.26 0.46 * 0.19 
N 150 
Chi2 78.11 
Source: Standard Sample of the Ethnographic Atlas; +p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
Table 2.3 shows that the least precipitation falls in herding societies. Interestingly, 
there is significantly less rainfall in advanced horticulture and agricultural societies 
than in hunting and gathering societies. Agricultural and herding societies also inhabit 
significantly less steep landscapes than hunting and gathering societies. Agricultural 
societies further have access to more fertile soils than the other societal types. This 
perhaps explains why these societies get by with less precipitation. Fertile soil is more 
common in simple horticultural societies than among the hunters and gatherers. 
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Herding takes place in less fertile areas than horticulture and agriculture. In general it 
can be said that environmental limitations, as stated in hypothesis 1, have a negative 
effect on the level of subsistence technology. However, herding societies constitute an 
exception to this. 
2.6.2 Technology, craftsmanship and leadership 
The hypothesis that people reason by analogy, leads to a specific operationalization of 
economic complexity and political differentiation. We expect belief in an all-powerful 
god to occur most frequently in societies with more products of human inventiveness 
and the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god to be most common in societies with a 
central leadership figure. We therefore operationalize economic complexity and 
political differentiation using the presence of specialized trades (craftsmanship) and 
the presence of a sovereign ruler. 
To test for indirect effects of subsistence technology, we present, in table 2.4, a 
linear regression for the presence of craftsmanship and a logistic regression for the 
presence of one leadership figure. 
Table 2.4 Linear regression of craftsmanship and logistic regression of the presence of one leader on subsistence 
technology 
   Craftsmanship  One leader 
  b  SE b  SE 
Constant 1.36 ** 0.12    
Subsistence technology       
   Hunting and gathering (ref.)       
   Fishing -0.51 * 0.25 1.52 + 0.78 
   Simple Horticulture 0.04  0.21 1.23 + 0.74 
   Advanced Horticulture 0.80 ** 0.19 2.66 ** 0.62 
   Herding 0.46 + 0.27 2.15 ** 0.80 
   Agriculture 1.12 ** 0.20 3.71 ** 0.72 
N  150  150 
Relation Adjusted R² = 0.29 Chi² = 46.45 
Source: Standard Sample of the Ethnographic Atlas; +p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
The first model in table 2.4 shows the results for craftsmanship. In general, economic 
complexity is greater in societies with a more advanced subsistence technology. 
Advanced horticulture, herding and agricultural societies all exhibit more 
craftsmanship than hunting and gathering societies. Fishing societies have 
significantly less craftsmanship. Advanced horticultural societies have significantly 
more craftsmanship than simple horticultural societies, and in agricultural societies 
craftsmanship is most common. 
The second model displays results for the presence of one leadership figure. The 
frequency of a central leadership figure in hunting and gathering societies is 
significantly the least. Advanced horticulture and herding societies have one central 
leader more frequently than simple horticultural societies. In agriculture, having a 
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central leadership figure is most common. Broadly speaking, our hypotheses 4 and 6 
are confirmed. 
2.6.3 The occurrence of the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god 
Table 2.5 tests our hypotheses about the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god. In 
model 1, we see that, compared to hunting and gathering societies, agricultural and 
herding societies more frequently have the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god. 
However, simple and advanced horticultural societies do not differ significantly from 
hunting and gathering societies in this regard, although the parameters do differ in the 
expected direction. Lenski’s hypothesis is then partially supported, that 
technologically more advanced societies tend more to believe in a moralizing all-
powerful god. 
Table 2.5 Logistic regression of the odds of the presence of a moralizing all-powerful god on subsistence 
technology, ecological factors and other societal attributes 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE 
Subsistence technology             
   Hunting and gathering (ref.)             
   Fishing -0.16  1.17 -0.06  1.19 0.62  1.24 0.62  1.25 
   Simple Horticulture 0.13  0.91 0.53  0.95 0.24  0.98 0.42  1.03 
   Advanced Horticulture 0.91  0.67  0.69  0.71 -0.04  0.79 -0.29  0.83 
   Herding 2.51 ** 0.80 1.15  0.95 2.30 ** 0.88 1.02  1.08 
   Agriculture 2.09 ** 0.66  1.85 * 0.72 0.84  0.82 0.50  0.92 
Precipitation    -1.17 ** 0.44    -0.86 + 0.47 
Steepness of landscape    -0.17  0.16    -0.27  0.18 
Soil fertility    -0.18  0.16    -0.13  0.18 
Craftsmanship       1.36 ** 0.38 1.26 ** 0.40 
One leader       0.29  0.55 0.50  0.58 
N 150  150  150  150  
Chi² 20.88  30.13  37.16  42.44  
Source: Standard Sample of the Ethnographic Atlas; +p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
Model 2 adds to model 1 the presence of environmental limitations. Here we 
investigate the possibility of a spurious relation between subsistence technology and 
godly images. In societies with more precipitation, the belief in a moralizing all-
powerful god is less probable. The fertility of the soil and the steepness of the 
landscape are not significantly related to the presence of a moralizing all-powerful 
god. Our expectation that environmental limitations are associated with the belief in a 
moralizing all-powerful god, as stated in hypothesis 2, holds only in the case of 
precipitation. The results also demonstrate that the difference between hunting and 
gathering societies and herding societies disappears after controlling for 
environmental limitations. Our hypothesis 3, that the effect of subsistence technology 
on godly images partly, disappears after taking environmental limitations into account 
is then supported by the results. 
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In model 3 we include craftsmanship and the presence of a single leader. 
Societies in which specialization in trades is more common have a moralizing all-
powerful god significantly more frequently, as stated in hypothesis 7. The presence of 
a central leadership figure has no significant influence here, so that hypothesis 5 must 
be discarded. Once we take into account the presence of craftsmanship and one central 
leader, the significant difference between agricultural societies and hunting and 
gathering societies disappears. The influence of subsistence technology on godly 
images thus runs partly via the structural features of a society. Hypothesis 8 is hereby 
supported. 
In model 4 we add both the environmental limitations and the structural 
features to model 1. We see that the negative effect of the amount of precipitation 
becomes less strong after controlling for the structural features. Furthermore, the 
findings show that the direct effect of subsistence technology on godly images 
completely disappears after taking environmental limitations and structural features 
into account. 
2.6.4 The level of activism in godly images 
We move on to the relation between subsistence technology and the level of activism 
in godly images. table 2.6 shows the results of a two-step logistic regression. First we 
investigate which societies do or do not have an all-powerful god; then, if there is an 
all-powerful god, we examine whether this god is or is not morally active. In this 
analysis, we take into account craftsmanship and the presence of a central leader. 
Table 2.6 Logistic regression of the odds of belief in a (moralizing) all-powerful god on subsistence technology 
and other societal attributes 
  
  
No vs. yes there is an all-powerful god Non-moralizing vs. moralizing all-
powerful god 
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b 
 b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE 
Subsistence technology             
  Hunting and gathering (ref.)             
  Fishing -0.25  0.64 -0.19  0.68 0.00  1.25 1.20  1.42 
  Simple Horticulture -0.62  0.57 -0.80  0.61 0.69  1.03  0.77  1.15 
  Advanced Horticulture 1.48 ** 0.50  0.62  0.57 0.29  0.71 0.15  0.86 
  Herding 1.73 * 0.84  1.24  0.88 2.08 * 0.90 2.18 * 1.00 
  Agriculture 1.17 * 0.54 -0.20  0.68 1.84 * 0.74 1.25  0.94 
Craftsmanship     0.60 * 0.24    1.18 ** 0.43 
One leader     1.06 * 0.46    -0.22  0.62 
N 150 150 86 86 
Chi² 22.90 35.22 12.77 22.16 
Source: Standard Sample of the Ethnographic Atlas; +p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
In model 1a we test whether subsistence technology has an effect on the chance of 
believing in an all-powerful god, rather than having no high god. Advanced 
horticulture, herding and agricultural societies all have an all-powerful god more often 
than hunting and gathering societies. Model 1b shows that societies in which 
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craftsmanship is more common and/or where a one leader holds power significantly 
tend more to have an all-powerful god. If we account for these two aspects, the effect 
of subsistence technology on the chance of believing in an all-powerful god disappears. 
In model 2a we find that herding and agricultural societies believe in a 
moralizing all-powerful god, rather than a non-moralizing one, more frequently than 
hunting and gathering societies. The simple horticultural societies do not deviate 
significantly from these last societies. In model 2b, we add craftsmanship and the 
presence of one central leader. Only craftsmanship has a positive influence on the 
chance of a moralizing rather than a non-moralizing all-powetable 2.6table 2.6rful god. 
When we control for craftsmanship, the difference between agricultural and hunting 
and gathering societies turns out to be no longer significant. 
The conclusion is that belief without an all-powerful god predominates in 
hunting and gathering societies and in simple horticultural societies. If we make a 
distinction between a non-moralizing and a moralizing all-powerful god, we see that 
the former is most common in the advanced horticultural societies and the latter in 
agricultural societies. Hypotheses 9, 10 and 11 are supported by these findings. Table 
2.6 also shows that although the parameters differ in the expected direction, fishing 
societies do not significantly differ from hunting and gathering societies and herding 
societies do not significantly differ from the agricultural societies. Thus far, hypotheses 
12 and 13 are not supported. 
Table 2.7 tests the proposition that hunting and gathering and simple 
horticultural societies that are more dependent on fishing, tend more to believe in an 
all-powerful god. The results indicate that in societies where fishing is more 
important, belief in an all-powerful god is indeed less frequent. This association is 
significant at an alpha of 0.10 in a one-tailed test. Subsequently, we test whether the 
agricultural societies that are more dependent on herding are more likely to have a 
moralizing all-powerful god. This turned out to indeed be the case (significant at an 
alpha of 0.01): In societies where herding is more important, the population is more 
likely to believe in a moralizing all-powerful god. Hypotheses 14 and 15 are supported 
by the data. 
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Table 2.7 Percentage of societies with belief in a (moralizing) all-powerful god according to the degree of 
dependence on fishing or herding 
Dependence on fishing within hunting 
and gathering and simple horticultural 
societies 
Belief in an all-powerful god 
 (in percentages) 
N 
0-5 43  56 
6–15 48  54 
16–25 41  58 
26–35 32  44 
36–45  34  38 
46–55 21  29 
Chi2 7.79 +  
    
Fishing societies 38  47 
    
Dependence on herding within 
agricultural societies 
Belief in a moralizing all-powerful god 
(in percentages) 
N 
0-5 -  - 
6–15 30  10 
16–25 38  37 
26–35 80  44 
36–45 88  16 
46–55 -  - 
Chi2 23.60 **  
    
Herding societies  73  70 
Source: Lenski (1970: 298) and the Ethnographic Atlas; +p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 (one-tailed test). 
2.6.5 The influence of subsistence technology and godly images on reproductive 
success 
Table 2.8 tests whether the effect of subsistence technology on societies’ reproductive 
success is larger than the effect of godly images, with the population density taken as 
the indicator of reproductive success. The first model investigates whether the 
presence of a (moralizing) all-powerful god increases the population density of 
societies. We find indeed a small positive correlation between the belief in a 
moralizing all-powerful creator and population density. However, the variation 
explained points to a small relation. In the second model we look at the relation 
between subsistence technology and population density. The results show that in 
general technologically more advanced societies are reproductively more successful in 
terms of the population density criterion. The high explained variance indicates that 
this relation is a strong one. In the third model we include both the godly images and 
the subsistence technology of societies in the analyses. The weak relation that we 
found in model 1 between godly images and population density disappears when we 
take the subsistence technology into account. In short, subsistence technology does 
indeed have a stronger influence than religion on the reproductive success of societies. 
We could even state that godly images, independent of subsistence technology, have 
no influence at all on reproductive success. Hypothesis 16 is thus supported by our 
results. 
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Table 2.8 Linear regression of population density on godly images and subsistence technology 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b  SE b  SE b  SE 
Constant 0.26  0.19 -1.14 ** 0.16 -1.01 ** 0.18 
All-powerful god          
   None (Ref.)          
   Non-Moralizing 0.15  0.28    -0.20  0.21 
   Moralizing 0.59 + 0.31    0.02  0.25 
Subsistence technology          
   Hunting and gathering (ref.)          
   Fishing    1.89 ** 0.32 2.01 ** 0.34 
   Simple horticulture    1.48 ** 0.26 1.43 ** 0.29 
   Advanced horticulture    2.38 ** 0.22 2.36 ** 0.24 
   Herding    0.78 * 0.31 0.63 + 0.36 
   Agriculture    3.01 ** 0.25 2.92 ** 0.27 
N 166 166 166 
Adjusted R² .01 .51 .50 
Source: Standard Sample of the Ethnographic Atlas; +p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
2.7 Conclusion and discussion 
The starting point of this chapter was the question of how to explain religious 
differences amongst pre-industrial societies. This was translated into three successive 
questions about the relation between a society’s subsistence technology and the belief 
in certain types of gods. We now review the answers found by testing hypotheses 
derived from ecological evolutionism enriched with the proposition that people 
reason by analogy, and in doing so, depending on their societal circumstances, employ 
three thought models. 
Our first research question related to the presence or absence of the belief in a 
moralizing all-powerful god. This belief is influenced by the technology that people 
employ to meet their survival needs. It is more probable in agricultural and herding 
societies than in societies with another subsistence technology. In fact, the other 
societies hardly differ from one another in this respect. We tested what mechanisms 
lie behind this relation. Our first question related to the possibility of a spurious 
relation, where ecological conditions determine both societies’ subsistence technology 
and their notions about god. We found that in societies with less precipitation herding 
as subsistence technology is more probable, as is the belief in a moralizing all-
powerful god. Ecology, however, explains only a limited part of the correlation 
between subsistence technology and ideas about god. Our first question also related to 
political and economic societal characteristics as mediating factors. We showed that 
the idea of a morally all-powerful creator frequently occurs in agricultural societies, 
because it is closely linked with economic craftsmanship. 
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Our second question was a theory-building one. Earlier findings by Lenski 
(1970) showed that the chance of believing in a moralizing all-powerful god in 
advanced horticultural societies hardly differs from that in simple horticultural 
societies, while this difference is much larger between agricultural societies and 
advanced horticultural societies. How can this be explained? Lenski (1970) suspected 
that as people intervene more in their natural environment, their gods are also 
conceived as being more creative and more involved with the affairs of the living. To 
this macro-theory we added Topitsch’s (1954) micro-theory that people reason by 
analogy and use three thought models to explain the unknown: biomorphic, 
sociomorphic and technomorphic. Lenski alluded only to technomorphic thought 
models. However, we suggested that these models have little influence at the lower 
levels of subsistence technology, and that biomorphic thought models predominate in 
hunting and gathering societies and in simple horticultural societies. We also argued 
that in agricultural societies, given the strong growth of the state, sociomorphic 
thought models are most important. We subsequently proposed that technomorphic 
thought models increase the likelihood of an image of god as creative and all-powerful, 
and moreover, that sociomorphic models increase the likelihood of belief in a 
moralizing all-powerful god. This could explain the prevalence of this belief in 
agricultural societies. 
The micro-explanation led us to expect that the belief in a non-moralizing all-
powerful god is more probable in societies with a lower level of subsistence 
technology, compared to the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god. We expected this 
belief to be most common in advanced horticultural societies. We tested whether this 
prediction holds, to which our analyses gave an affirmative response. Because we 
could not directly test the hypothesis that people reason by analogy and in so doing, 
employ different thought models, we tested macro-hypotheses that we derived from 
this micro-hypothesis. 
We found some support for the suggestion that fishing societies have an all-
powerful god less frequently than hunting and gathering societies do, and that herders 
have a moralizing all-powerful god more often than agriculturalists. Because hunting 
and gathering, like simple horticulture, is often combined with fishing, we also looked 
at the presence of a non-moralizing all-powerful god in these societies. When hunting 
and gathering societies and simple horticultural societies are more dependent on 
fishing, belief in a non-moralizing all-powerful god occurs less frequently. We also 
found that agricultural societies that are dependent to a larger degree on herding 
more frequently display belief in a god that created the world and remains morally 
active in it. 
In answer to our third research question, we tested the hypothesis that religion 
increases the reproductive success of societies against the hypothesis that religion is 
only a by-product of adaptive processes. Ecological evolutionism views religion 
primarily as a by-product of technological development. Our results show that the 
influence of subsistence technology on the reproductive success of societies - as 
measured by the population density - indeed is much greater than the influence of 
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godly images on such success. In fact, no independent effect of religion was even 
found. On the basis of these findings, we can answer the question of whether religion, 
independent of subsistence technology, leads to reproductive success, with a cautious 
no. 
2.7.1 To conclude 
In this chapter, we supplemented ecological evolutionism with another theory that 
assumes that people try to understand the unknown by drawing analogies with things 
that they do know. Pinker (2002: 435) refers to Brown, who in 1989 proposed that 
anthromorphism is inherent to human nature. We expanded on this proposition with 
Topitsch’s (1954, 1972, 1988) thesis that people think in terms of biological processes, 
societal relations and technical skills. Subsequent research on religious diversity 
should then also pay more attention to Topitsch’s micro-theory, operationalized in our 
hypothesis that couples the various levels of subsistence technology with the thought 
models this theory distinguishes. 
A final question is what these results mean for the sociology of contemporary 
Western societies. An important theory about contemporary Western societies is the 
modernization theory (Martin 1978). This theory, however, does not specify what the 
starting point of secularization is. Ecological evolutionism does do this. Lenski (1970: 
411) stated that religious ideas that appeared obvious to people in the agrarian era are 
odd to inhabitants of industrial nations: The idea that one god created the world and 
still governs it is, according to him, no longer plausible in industrial societies. The 
analogy with one person who sovereignly rules is no longer valid because in industrial 
countries, political power is distributed more evenly over the population (Lenski 
1970: 416). Secularization is, from this viewpoint, more probable in societies where 
people believe in a moralizing all-powerful god. We therefore expect ideas about the 
unknown in industrial nations will have an impersonal character. We will test this 
hypothesis in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3  
Analogical reasoning and the 
content of creation stories: 
quantitative comparisons of pre-
industrial societies∗ 
This chapter proposes a shift from questions regarding gods who now and then create, to 
questions about creations that sometimes involve a god. For pre-industrial societies, it 
addresses the relation between their subsistence technology and the content of their 
creation stories. This study’s answer combines Hume’s general hypothesis that people 
reason by analogy with Topitsch’s specification, which invokes vital, technical and social 
analogies. This conjunction yields concrete hypotheses about the substance of creation 
stories in societies with varying levels of subsistence technology according to Lenski’s 
typology. To test these hypotheses, we used Murdock’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample 
and the Human Relations Area Files. Field reports were coded for 116 pre-industrial 
societies. The findings show that people use different thought models to explain the 
unknown, depending on the society’s level of subsistence technology 
3.1 Introduction 
Ancient texts (Bachofen 1861), eye-witness testimonies (Snouck Hurgronje 1889), 
questionnaires completed by colonial administrators (Frazer 1890), stories recorded 
                                                             
 
 
∗
 A slightly different version of this chapter was published in Cross-Cultural Research (Moor, Ultee & 
Need, 2009). 
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during expeditions (Jensen 1939) and fieldwork diaries filled with casual remarks 
made by natives (Evans-Pritchard 1956) all suggest that ideas about gods differ 
markedly from one pre-industrial society to another. Furthermore, the content of 
these ideas appears linked with pivotal societal properties. Quantitative comparisons 
add credence to this notion (Swanson 1960, Underhill 1974), and recent comparisons 
draw on Swanson’s catalogue of godly images (Peregrine 1996, Roes & Raymond 
2003). A key finding is that the image of one god that created the world and now 
punishes evil and rewards virtue is most likely found in agrarian and herding societies. 
Sociologist Lenski (1970: 134) first reported this observation, referring to 404 
societies in Murdock’s (1962) Ethnographic Atlas. Table 3.1 reproduces these 
findings.5 Sociobiologist Wilson (1975: 561) accepted them, and they became part of 
‘ecological evolutionism’ (Lenski 2005), which is one of sociology’s few comprehensive 
theories. 
Table 3.1 Pre-industrial societies’ particular idea of god in relation to that society’s subsistence technology, (in  
percentages) 
Societal subsistence 
technology 
No idea of a 
supreme creator 
Idea of an 
inactive or 
unconcerned 
supreme creator 
Idea of an active 
supreme creator 
not  supportive 
of human 
morality  
Idea of an active 
supreme creator 
supportive of 
human morality 
Number of cases 
Hunting and gathering 60 29 8 2 85 
Simple horticultural 60 35 2 2 43 
Advanced horticultural 21 51 12 16 131 
Agrarian 23 6 5 67 66 
Fishing 69 14 7 10 29 
Herding 4 10 6 80 50 
Source: Lenski (1970: 134). 
Lenski (1970: 124) distinguished six modes of subsistence in human history before 
the Industrial Revolution, and these return in table 3.16. Populations that chase and 
trap animals and also forage fruits, roots and seeds, are called hunting and gathering 
societies. Populations that grow plants in gardens, and use digging sticks or hoes to do 
so, bear the name horticultural societies. They do not merely collect food, but produce 
                                                             
 
 
5 Lenski’s reading of this table was restricted to its last column and neglected its two bottom rows. 
Moor, Ultee & Need (2007) accounted for the full table, tested an analogy explanation of the link 
between subsistence technology and godly images for 150 societies and did so with multivariate 
statistical models. 
6 Lenski’s (1970: 124) typology of subsistence technologies is richer. Hunting and gathering 
societies are divided into simple and advanced, as are agrarian societies. The best weapon of simple 
hunters and gatherers is a wooden spear; advanced hunters and gatherers have the spear-thrower 
or bow and arrow. All hunting and gathering societies in the Ethnographic Atlas are advanced. 
Advanced agrarian societies have iron tools, though it is not possible to code the agrarian societies 
in the Ethnographic Atlas after the possession of this item. Lenski also distinguishes maritime 
societies. They are too rare to merit attention in this study. 
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it, and so intervene in nature to reach what Lenski labels a ‘higher technological stage’. 
Simple horticultural societies, like hunting and gathering ones, only have tools of bone, 
stone and wood; advanced horticultural societies also have metal implements. The use 
of these latter marks a new level of technological development, since metals are not 
found ready for use in the natural environment, and skills are required to attain the 
high temperatures needed to smelt ores. Societies that plough fields are termed 
‘agrarian’. Whereas horticulturalists abandon small plots if yields drop, agrarian 
populations renew the earth’s fertility, thereby invoking more advanced technology. 
Fishing societies and herding societies are environmentally specialized. On the 
yardstick of technology, fishing is close to hunting and gathering, while herding 
resembles advanced horticulture and agriculture (Lenski 2005: 93, 103). 
Lenski’s spin of table 3.1 is that the more interventions in nature a society’s 
subsistence technology comprises, the more that society’s gods control human life. In 
this study, we gird that macro-thesis with the venerable micro-thesis that the 
members of any society comprehend the faraway and unknown by crafting analogies 
with things that are near and known to them and crucial for their survival. We take the 
origin of the world as a major case of the unknown, and people’s subsistence 
technologies as one instance of the familiar and important. The sociologist Topitsch 
(1954) pinpointed three kinds of everyday matters on which people model unknown 
things: they liken them to vital processes, to societal arrangements and to technical 
achievements. To advance the issue of the relation between a society’s ideas and its 
other features, we link Lenski’s six technological levels to Topitsch’s three types of 
thought models. We then test these hypotheses by classifying the content of creation 
stories for 116 pre-industrial societies. To embed this study’s theoretical thrust, we 
finish by showing that Topitsch’s ideas combine notions from classical sociology, and 
that Lenski’s amplified ecological evolutionism goes beyond contemporary Darwinian 
hypotheses on religion. 
Until now, comparisons of pre-industrial ideas aimed to learn about the 
prevalence of specific godly images. The analogy thesis, however, raises questions 
about ideas in general and thus upgrades the study of creation stories. After all, why 
examine the incidence of the idea that a god created the world? Certainly, this notion 
fills a vacuum, and people abhor voids. However, we argue the belief in god only 
explains a limited part of the unknown for a select group of societies, and that there 
still are lots of blanks. In this study, we hold that a prime void involves origins, since 
no living member of a society was around at the time of its nascence. So, to press the 
ideas-and-societies issue, we dissect creation stories,7 which occasionally involve a 
god, as distinct from analysing images of gods that now and then create and 
sometimes do things afterwards. We classify these stories by (i) the creative force 
                                                             
 
 
7 Although the expression ‘creation stories’ smacks of technomorphism, it here refers to all stories 
about the origin of the universe, world and humankind. The term is taken from Sanday (1981). 
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mentioned, such as an inanimate natural object, an animal or a human being, (ii) the 
designation of this generator as parent or as ruler, (iii) the gender assigned to this 
agent and (iv) the declared character of this agent’s creative act, such as a sexual deed, 
a technical feat or a verbal command. 
We avoid the word ‘myth’ and instead speak of ‘creation stories’, as the term 
myth may miscast questions. The foremost issue is not the glaring inconsistencies in 
so many religions. It is unfortunate that several theories of religion address this minor 
matter, a point missed in Dow’s (2006) vetting of contemporary evolutionary 
hypotheses about religion. Crucial questions regard the diversity in the content of 
ideas about the unknown prevalent in pre-industrial societies: 
1. Given that a relation has been established between a society’s subsistence 
technology and its godly ideas, is its technology also linked to the content of 
its creation stories?  
2. To what extent does the thesis that human beings comprehend the unknown 
by drawing particular analogies, explain the relation between a society’s 
subsistence technology and the substance of its creation stories? 
3.2 General hypotheses 
3.2.1 Ecological evolutionism 
Tylor (1871) and Frazer (1890) answered questions about religious diversity, and 
according to their answers, all societies go through the same series of stages, each with 
specific technological, organizational and religious traits. Boas (1911: 174–196) 
rejected such an evolutionary scheme and held that each society has a unique history. 
Sociology is now witnessing a revival of evolutionism. These new theories – with 
Lenski’s ecological evolutionism as an exemplar – allow for bypaths from the main line 
(Nolan & Lenski 2006: 64) and explain features of societies by invoking their 
environment (Lenski 2005: 84). They also incorporate effects of their past (Lenski 
2005: 187–201). This is done with the hypothesis that human beings’ innate capacity 
to learn and to speak contributes to their society’s stock of materials and store of 
information (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 30–38). In addition, these theories discard the 
moral overtones of the word ‘progress’ by showing that new technologies may lead to 
violence and a lower quality of life for a society’s underclass (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 
116, 133, 331). Lastly, since ecological evolutionism highlights issues of population 
size, density and growth (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 68, 83, 109, 336), it is close to 
biologists’ recent applications of Darwinian theories to human societies (Diamond 
1997) rather than, say, to flocks of finches. 
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The ‘ultimate’ causes in ecological evolutionism’s explanations are 
environmental factors. Certain biophysical environments rule out specific subsistence 
technologies; and other technologies thrive only in certain niches (Meggers 1952). As 
more ‘proximate’ causes, changes in subsistence technology bring forth craft 
specialization (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 69), shifts in labour division between men and 
women (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 113), formal leadership (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 95) and 
states (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 125). Ecological evolutionism, in Wilson’s (2002: 45) 
terms, takes religion foremost as a by-product of inventions in subsistence. 
Technological advances, through their resultant of more abundant supply of life’s 
necessities, are thus viewed as directly contributing to a society’s reproductive success 
(Nolan & Lenski 2006: 57). In addition, societies supportive of technological 
inventions survive at the expense of those that resist them (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 55). 
This implies that insofar as religions encourage invention (Lenski 2005: 81), they 
contribute to what Wilson (2002: 45) calls ‘group selection’. Yet a religion on its own 
does not increase reproductive success; it does so only if a society’s subsistence 
technology allows for population growth. In chapter 2 we demonstrated that the belief 
in an all-powerful god does not have an independent effect on population density, 
independent of subsistence technology. 
3.2.2 Levels of technology and models of thought 
Topitsch (1954) holds that people reason by analogies. They thus fall back upon the 
things that are familiar in and crucial to their society. Topitsch (1958) shows that 
Western metaphysicians applied thought models also present in texts of archaic 
civilizations and stories from non-literate societies. Topitsch (1988) furthermore 
suggests social conditions under which the types of analogical thinking are practiced. 
In societies with biomorphic thinking, people explain the unknown as a 
reproductive act. In the Code of Manu of the Hindu, Brahma broke out of a golden egg, 
half of the shell becoming the sky and the other half the earth. In societies with 
sociomorphic analogies, people view the unknown as a result of social phenomena, 
such as leadership. The book of Genesis of the Israelites recounts that on each of the 
first five days of the creation, God commanded that there should be certain things, and 
they appeared immediately that day. Finally, people make technomorphic analogies. In 
that case, people account for the unknown by parallels with manual skills. On the sixth 
day of the creation, as recounted in Genesis, God took a mound of clay, shaped it and 
blew air into it. Those acts resulted in the first human being. 
We now propose general hypotheses about societal diversity in creation stories 
by stating at which level of technology particular thought models dominate. We expect 
biomorphic thinking about the unknown to be most frequent among hunters and 
gatherers and among fishers. In these societies people intervene in their surroundings 
to a limited extent and strongly depend upon the resources of their natural niche. Also, 
occupational and political specialization is almost absent. The known and important, 
for that reason, consists of vital processes like sexual reproduction. Biomorphism will 
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also be important in simple horticultural societies. At this stage people intervene more 
in nature, but they do not renew soil fertility, and they deplete natural resources 
(Nolan & Lenski 2006: 106). 
Although biomorphism persists in advanced horticultural societies, 
technomorphism begins to blossom there. These societies are even less dependent on 
nature, and full-time craft specialization has emerged (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 69). In 
agrarian and herding societies technomorphism gradually replaces biomorphism. 
Here people shape their environment even more: they plough and fertilize fields and 
they domesticate animals. The known in these societies comprises human inventions. 
Sociomorphism is expected to be present in all human societies, because every 
society is a group of people. However, in the course of history bonds between human 
beings change in two important ways, each leading to different analogies. To begin 
with, technological progress adds authority relations to kinship ties. Among hunters 
and gatherers, fishers and horticulturalists, the main links between persons are those 
of kinship. Although these relations persist in agrarian and herding societies, their 
populations also submit to armies, courts and offices. State-building commences in 
advanced horticultural societies (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 125), and agrarian and herding 
societies have soldiers, judges and rulers. They punish persons who trespass edicts 
and they reward loyalty (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 139). At higher levels of technology, 
ruler analogies steadily replace kinship analogies. 
The second change in social relations involves gender. Although women even in 
pre-industrial societies rank below men, the degree to which they do depends upon 
the subsistence technology used by these societies, with the rank of a gender 
proportionate to its contribution to the food supply. In hunting and gathering 
societies, women collect while men hunt highly appreciated meats (Nolan & Lenski 
2006: 90). In horticultural societies, men clear and women cultivate gardens. In 
herding societies, the basic economic activity, herding, is men’s work; women milk and 
process dairy. Ploughing is a male activity in agrarian societies, while women help 
with planting and harvesting (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 113). Since the female 
contribution to the food supply is largest in horticultural societies, in those societies 
analogies involving females are most likely to occur. 
We attach one rider to this list of thought models. Topitsch (1958: 18) remarked 
that biomorphism presupposes knowledge about human reproduction that is not 
always present at lower levels of technology. Malinowski (1929) showed that the 
Trobiands of Kiriwina Island of Papua New Guinea, who are simple horticulturalists 
and strongly depend upon fishing. did not see male ejaculation during intercourse as a 
condition for female pregnancy. Similar nescience prevailed among the Arunta and 
other hunters and gatherers of Central Australia (Montagu 1937), and among the 
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Lunga and other hunters and gatherers of Western Australia (Kaberry 1939) 8. Indeed, 
according to Cobb (2006: 10, 16), Aristotle from ancient Greece asserted the 
spontaneous creation of lower animals from decay, with medieval Arab and Chinese 
scholars being even more off the mark, and in 1664 London’s Royal Society of 
foremost scientists discussed how to generate vipers from dust. The finding of dim 
procreation beliefs in some societies at lower levels of technology calls for a detailed 
examination of biomorphism in creation stories. Lukas (1894: 242) wound up a 
review of creation stories with a narrative from Samoa. It recounts that the earth was 
filled with plants, and goes on to state that the first worms arose from their rotting 
stalks. The story finishes with a snipe picking the worms apart, making the first human 
beings appear. So, biomorphism can refer to both sexual reproduction models and 
spontaneous creation models. We expect spontaneous creation models to be most 
likely at lower levels of technology, with their importance declining as technology 
advances. 
Table 3.2 summarizes propositions. Horticulture turns out to be a bit of a 
transition stage, as technomorphism occurs next to biomorphism and ruler models 
occur alongside kinship models. Table 3.2 also contains simplifications, the main one 
being that our hypotheses bypass the stabilization of ideas by writing and printing. But 
then, table 3.2 does not deal with technological differences between agrarian societies, 
which applied these inventions, and it specifies some stability of biomorphism. 
Table 3.2 Hypothetical link between a pre-industrial society’s level of technology and its thought models 
A society’s level of subsistence technology The main thought models in a society’s creation stories 
Hunting and gathering – Spontaneous creation analogies, sexual reproduction analogies 
– Kinship analogies, female influence analogies 
Fishing – Spontaneous creation analogies, sexual reproduction analogies 
– Kinship analogies, female influence analogies 
Simple horticulture – Sexual reproduction analogies 
– Kinship analogies, female influence analogies 
Advanced horticulture – Sexual reproduction analogies 
– Technical analogies 
– Kinship and ruler analogies, female influence analogies 
Agriculture – Technical analogies 
– Ruler analogies, male dominance analogies 
Herding – Technical analogies 
– Ruler analogies, male dominance analogies 
 
                                                             
 
 
8 The virgin birth controversy initiated by Leach (1966) was infertile. At issue was not so much the 
veracity of field observations made by Malinowski and others. Leach adduced circumstantial 
evidence against these observations. However, Leach tried to devalue them by juxtaposing them 
with the idea prevalent in industrial societies that Mary gave birth to Jesus without having been 
fertilized by an ordinary man. After the debate was concluded, Monberg (1975) showed that before 
contact with the outside world, the Bellonese of one of the Solomon Islands held that men were not 
genitors. 
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3.3 Specific hypotheses about the content of creation stories 
From our general hypotheses linking technology to thought models, we derive specific 
ones about the relationship between subsistence technology and the content of 
creation stories. We first present propositions on the type of creative forces 
mentioned, and then on their designation as parents and as rulers. We follow with 
hypotheses about the gender assigned to creative entities, and finish with predictions 
on the character of an agent’s creative act. Quotes from creation stories lard this 
section. 
3.3.1 The creative entity 
One obvious proposition about creative forces recalls the familiarity and vital 
importance of animals for hunting and gathering societies as well as for fishing 
societies: Animals as creators are most common in creation stories from societies 
where hunting and gathering or fishing provide the main means of subsistence, and 
their prevalence declines with technological progress (H1). An example of a creation 
story featuring an animal is that of the Crow Indians of North America. In that account, 
a coyote does the trick (Leeming & Leeming 1994: 63). Of course, animals are also 
important for survival in agrarian and herding societies. However, the crucial 
difference is that the members of these latter societies domesticate animals, and use 
them for purposes like ploughing, transport and waging war, and also as a substitute 
for the energy of human muscles. The familiar in that case does not consist of the 
animals as such, but of human beings with techniques to discipline them. 
Now, if in simple horticultural societies animals lose their familiarity and 
importance for survival, and if simple horticulture yields few new potent thought 
models, then, given that the nearby earth on the face of it spontaneously brings forth 
life, origin stories will likely feature inanimate objects. So, our second concrete 
proposition reads: A natural trigger is most common in the creation stories of simple 
horticultural societies, but not much more common than in those of hunting and 
gathering societies and fishing societies, and creation stories featuring a natural 
trigger are less likely in stories from advanced horticultural societies, dropping even 
lower in stories from agrarian and herding societies (H2). The best-known example is 
the story of ancient Babylon, in which the trigger consists of two oceans: 
Apsu, the primordial freshwater ocean ‘commingled’ with the saltwater of Tiamat 
(Leeming & Leeming 1994: 25). 
Earlier, we stated that both personal kinship ties and formal ties involving state 
institutions yield sociomorphic analogies. A special case of a kinship tie is having an 
ancestor. An example of a creation story with an ancestor is that of the Ngurunderi in 
Australia: 
Analogical reasoning and the content of creation stories 
 
61 
 
The great ancestor Ngurunderi canoed down the Murray River in search of his two 
runaway wives. A giant fish swam ahead of the ancestor, creating the present river 
out of the tiny stream that it used to be. When Ngurunderi tried to spear the fish, 
he missed, but the spear became Lenteilin, the Long Island. Later, when the 
ancestor succeeded in spearing the fish, he cut it up, forming all the different fish 
the people find today (Leeming & Leeming 1994: 212). 
Another social bond in creation stories involves heroes from days gone by. These 
creators differ somewhat from ancestors. Stories about them provide a personal link, 
but the relations do not entail descent. In addition, there is nothing formal about these 
links, so they are in-between kinship ties and authority relations. An example is the 
culture hero Karusakaibo from the Munduruc Indians of Brazil, who discovers people 
in a hole in the ground (Leeming & Leeming 1994: 197). 
Given our general hypotheses, we expect ancestor-hero creators to be most 
likely in technologically less advanced societies, where kinship is the main bond. We 
have one emend. Seas are less likely to be overexploited than hunting grounds (Hewes 
1948), and as a result permanent settlements are more likely in fishing societies 
(Nolan & Lenski 2006: 174). They are even more likely in horticultural societies. So, 
fishers will remain in closer proximity to their dead family members than hunters and 
gatherers, and horticulturalists will have an even greater tendency to remain close. 
Nolan & Lenski (2006: 114) invoke Sheils (1975), who reported that ancestor worship 
is most probable in horticultural societies, and less so in hunting and gathering 
populations and agrarian societies. We therefore propose that a recent ancestor or old 
hero as creator is most common in horticultural societies, less so in fishing societies, 
and even less so in hunting and gathering societies. Given the availability of other 
thought models, ancestor and hero creators will be less frequently found in advanced 
than in simple horticultural societies, and even less in agrarian and herding societies 
(H3). 
States emerge in advanced horticultural societies, and in agrarian and herding 
societies kinship ties are no longer the prime bonds (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 165). State 
institutions oversee, tax and judge people. In those societies the creator may be less 
personal and more distant, even elusive. So: A distant human being as creator is most 
prevalent in stories from herding and agrarian societies, and least prevalent in 
creation stories from hunting and gathering societies and fishing societies (H4). 
3.3.2 Creators as parents and as rulers 
In several creation stories a mother and / or father bring(s) forth the world. According 
to the Zuni from New Mexico, the universe evolved from a union of Father Sky and 
Mother Earth (Leeming & Leeming 1994: 287). The idea that parents create the world 
will be likely in societies where kinship ties predominate, that is, in hunting and 
gathering, fishing, and simple horticultural societies. In advanced horticultural 
societies, where state formation is under way, we expect ruler analogies to gain 
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ground. Thus: A parental creator is most common in creation stories from hunting and 
gathering, fishing, and simple horticultural societies, and their prevalence declines 
with technological progress (H5). 
The analogy that people make in technologically more advanced societies is that 
like kings conquer territories and subject people, so too did commanders once make 
the world and steer it. Although state-building commenced under horticulture, 
sovereign leadership became standard in agrarian and even more pronounced in 
herding societies (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 177). This leads to the hypothesis: Ruler-
creators are most common in stories from agrarian and herding societies, and least 
frequent in those of hunters-gatherers, fishers and simple horticulturalists (H6). 
3.3.3 Female creators 
Our data shows that the idea of a male creator occurs in almost every pre-industrial 
society. We therefore present hypotheses about female creators only. Sullerot (1970) 
showed that female gods occur in societies with fewer gender inequalities and Sanday 
(1981) found that the larger the female contribution to food supply, the greater the 
chance of female creators. However, Sullerot and Sanday did not bring in the 
distinction between horticulture and agriculture. One of our propositions therefore 
reads: A female creator is most common in horticultural societies, less common among 
hunters-gatherers and fishers, and least likely in agrarian and herding societies (H7). 
This hypothesis is prompted by the assumption that an important female contribution 
to a society’s food supply yields sociomorphic analogies. Hope & Stover (1984) and 
Gray (1987) reported differences between hunting and gathering societies in female 
status and the idea of one god. If a large female contribution to a society’s food supply 
yields sociomorphic analogies, we also expect the following: The more hunting and 
gathering societies depend on hunting for subsistence, the less common female 
creators will be (H8). 
We present two contrary hypotheses about the presence of female creators at 
the end of the next section. They answer the question of whether people arrive at the 
idea of a female creator by way of sociomorphic or biomorphic analogies. 
3.3.4 Characteristics of the creative act 
Although we expect sexual reproduction models to be more common at lower 
technological stages, we exempt hunters, gatherers and fishers. As already stated, 
some hunters and gatherers do not regard ejaculation as necessary for pregnancy, and 
for these persons life in their environment sometimes seems to come out of nothing. 
Thus, our hypotheses read: Spontaneous creation is most likely in stories from hunting 
and gathering plus fishing societies, and its likelihood declines with technological 
progress (H9), as well as: Creation through sexual reproduction is less likely in 
hunting and gathering and fishing societies than in horticultural societies, and even 
less so in agrarian and herding societies (H10). 
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When setting apart spontaneous creation analogies, we presented a pertinent 
creation story from Samoa. The creation story of the Djanggawul in Australia invokes 
sexual reproduction: 
The prehuman ancestors of humans did exist, and these were called the 
Djanggawul. There were three of these beings – Djanggawul himself and his two 
sisters, Bildjiwraroiju and Miralaidj. Djanggawul had a very long uncircumcised 
penis decorated with notches. The sisters had long clitorises. The sex organs of all 
three dragged along the ground leaving sacred markings. Wherever the ancestors 
beached their canoe, they left children made by the brother and the older sister, 
and later the younger sister as well. They conceived the children in the normal way, 
but it was necessary for Djanggawul to lift the long clitorises of his mates to do so 
(Leeming & Leeming 1994: 69–70). 
In societies with full-time craft specialists, people will regard gods as artisans. This 
tendency commences in advanced horticultural societies and becomes even more 
widespread in agrarian societies (Nolan & Lenski 2006: 69). Of course, people in other 
societal types also make tools. However, strong specialization makes the difference 
here. A manual skill or technical achievement as the creative act is most common in 
agrarian societies, less so in advanced horticultural societies and herding societies, 
and least likely in simple horticultural societies, hunting and gathering societies and 
fishing societies (H11). The creation story of the Yuma Indians of Arizona features 
manual skills: 
Bakotahl was angry at his twin, but sat down next to him. Secretly he made a little 
human figure out of mud, but it was imperfect…. Kokomaht himself decided to 
make a new being, and he made a perfect man, who got up and walked. Then he 
made a perfect woman. Bakotahl continued his imperfect work as well and told his 
twin that what he made were people. Kokomaht pointed out the imperfections of 
his brother’s work – no hands, no feet. Bakotahl was so angry that he dove back 
into the depths and sent up storms, which Kokomaht stomped out, but not before 
sickness slipped into the world (Leeming & Leeming 1994: 300–301) 
The world can be created by an agent’s orders as well. This idea will be most likely in 
societies with agriculture and herding, where the analogy is provided by the directives 
of strong rulers. Creation by an agent’s command is most common in stories from 
agrarian and herding societies, and least likely in those from hunting and gathering 
societies and fishing societies (H12). 
Our final concrete hypothesis compares the effect of two phenomena on the 
presence of a female god. The first is the presence in a society of the idea of creation 
through sexual reproduction. The second is the female contribution to a society’s food 
supply. Although previous research tested hypotheses on sociomorphic analogies and 
female gods, we expect biomorphic analogies to be more important when accounting 
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for the presence of female gods as creators in origin stories. This leads to H13: In pre-
industrial societies the relationship between the idea of creation through sexual 
reproduction and the occurrence of a female creator is stronger than the relationship 
between the female contribution to the food supply and the presence of a female 
creator. 
3.4 Data 
3.4.1 The Standard Cross-Cultural Sample and the Human Relations Area Files 
To answer our questions, we use the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample, a subset of the 
Ethnographic Atlas now digitally available as World Cultures. It consists of 186 pre-
industrial societies specified at a particular place and time. To pre-empt diffusion 
questions, no two societies in this sample are neighbours (Murdock & White 1969). 
The sample is representative of the world’s societies known through reports by 
persons who lived in them for some time. Most reports are dated between 1800 and 
1950. Murdock (1962) converted the reports into codes. The dataset was expanded in 
later years. 
World Cultures did not code creation stories. However, the Human Relations 
Area Files (HRAF) (Ember & Ember 1988) provides field reports for 330 societies, and 
138 of them belong to the Standard Sample. For these societies, we retrieved from the 
HRAF the text pages for categories 773 and 776, where we found creation stories for 
116 societies. Table 3.3 presents the steps towards our sample, as well as frequencies 
for the pertinent codes of subsistence technology. 
Table 3.3 The construction of the dataset and absolute frequencies for the level of technology of 116 pre-
industrial societies 
 N 
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample 186 
   Of which also in Human Relations Area Files 138 
   Of which in addition creation story available 116 
  
Subsistence technology 116 
   Hunting and gathering 34 
   Fishing 8 
   Simple horticulture 13 
   Advanced horticulture 31 
   Agriculture 18 
   Herding 12 
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3.4.2 Measurements for subsistence technology 
To measure the level of subsistence technology for our 116 societies, we mainly 
followed Nolan & Lenski (2006: 366–367). In their exercise, societies that score 
equally high on two modes of subsistence were taken as missing. We coded these 
societies according to their technologically lowest mode. This allowed us to save all 
cases without overestimating the relation between technology and creation stories. 
Because the number of fishing societies turned out to be low, we added them to our 
hunting and gathering category. We also merged the herding and agrarian codes. We 
do not consider this problematic, since most of our hypotheses do not differentiate 
between the combined categories. 
To make table 3.6 about the effects of a society’s dependence upon fishing, we 
used v205 from the Standard Sample. We employed v203 on a society’s dependence 
upon hunting for table 3.9. For table 3.11, the female contribution to subsistence 
technology was measured with v890. This variable, which presents categories of 
percentages, was converted into a continuous variable by taking the mean score of 
each category. By dividing the variable by 100 we obtained proportional scores 
ranging from 0 to 1. Because there are no societies where women alone are 
responsible for subsistence, we adapted the variable in such a way that the maximum 
score in our dataset (0.70) equals 1. 
3.4.3 Coding creation stories 
This study’s author and three assistants independently scored creation stories 
according to a fixed scheme, reproduced in the appendix9. They did so without 
knowing the technology of the society from which a story stemmed. In case of 
disagreement, the first author assigned the final code. 
Our coding instructions for the content of creation stories stipulated multiple 
coding rather than exclusive coding. Multiple coding is the equivalent of allowing 
people to mark several boxes from one list in a questionnaire. Multiple coding was 
called for in this case since the world may have been created from several entities, by a 
man and a woman, and by way of at least two acts that differ in character but were 
performed by a single creator. In addition, some societies had long creation stories, 
with different creators being responsible for various phases of creation. We therefore 
applied our classifications to sub-stories: on the very first beginning, on the creation of 
the things in the world and on the creation of humankind. We then merged the three 
sheets into one sheet for each of the 116 societies. That sheet might contain multiple 
                                                             
 
 
9 We constructed our classification scheme after reading several substantive studies on creation 
stories and several popular collections of creation stories. Mainly for reason of the small numbers 
involved, in this chapter we do not use every bit of information yielded by applying our coding 
scheme. 
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codes. Also, when two or more stories pertaining to one society were available for, say, 
the creation of humankind, each story was coded, but the two sheets were merged 
once more into one sheet, possibly with multiple codes. 
Even if we allowed for multiple coding, our research units remained societies. 
We deemed this desirable, since a choice for (sub-)stories as research units would 
yield a dataset with interdependent observations. Conventional tests of statistical 
significance call for independent observations. The N for all of our tables (except the 
special table 3.6 and table 3.9) therefore is 116. 
We coded features of creative acts without difficulty. We distinguished several 
creative forces: an inanimate natural entity, an animal, a plant, an ancestor, a hero, a 
distant human being and a spirit. However, it turned out to be difficult to tell ancestors 
and heroes apart, so we merged these categories. 
Where the HRAF provided no information about a certain aspect of a society’s 
ideas about how the world was created, we took it that its inhabitants had no idea 
about it. Here, we assumed that ethnographers related a society’s creation story in as 
detailed a manner as possible. However, for 26 societies the HRAF portrays only a 
creator, and no details of their creative act(s). For this reason we tested H9 through 
H12 in two ways. Once we coded that in the creation stories of these societies all 
specific creative acts were absent, and once we excluded these societies wholesale. 
Table 3.4 presents frequencies for the pertinent codes for the content of the creation 
stories of our 116 societies. 
Table 3.4 Absolute frequencies for the content of creation stories of 116 pre-industrial societies 
Appearance of Yes No 
Creator(s)   
   Inanimate natural entity 21 95 
   Animal 20 96 
   Ancestor or hero 41 75 
   Distant human being 60 56 
   
Creator(s) as parent or ruler    
   Parent 33 83 
   Ruler 22 94 
   
Gender of creator(s)   
   Female 30 86 
   Male 105 11 
   
Creative act(s)    
   Spontaneous creation 22 94 
   Sexual reproduction 34 82 
   Technical achievement 37 79 
   Command 22 64 
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3.5 Results 
In this section, we show for each technological level the percentage of societies with 
particular substantive items in their creation stories. To obtain significance levels in 
table 3.5 to table 3.10, we applied Fisher exact probability tests. In all tests, we created 
two-by-two tables, comparing hunting and gathering plus fishing societies pair-wise 
with simple horticultural societies, advanced horticultural societies, and agricultural 
plus herding societies. The results show whether hunting and gathering plus fishing 
societies differ significantly from a society of a different technological type in the 
content of their creation stories. To give readers an idea of the small number of cases 
in the cells of table 3.5 to table 3.10, these tables present percentages as well as 
absolute numbers. 
Figure 3.1 provides a first impression. Creative forces are least diverse in 
agrarian/herding societies. These societies regard their creator as a distant human 
being, whereas technologically less developed societies also think of their creator as 
an animal, natural entity or ancestor/hero. 
Figure 3.1 The percentage of creation stories for societies with a particular subsistence technology mentioning a 
specific creative force 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that animals as creators are most common in creation stories from 
technologically least advanced societies, and that their prevalence declines with 
technological progress. Table 3.5 indeed demonstrates that the idea of an animal 
creator is most common among hunters-gatherers and fishers. The 36 percent for 
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these societies is significantly higher than the seven or eight percent for the other 
societal types, supporting H1. H2 is about a natural trigger for creation. Table 3.5 
shows that a natural trigger is most likely in simple horticultural societies, and least 
likely in agrarian and herding societies. Agrarian societies turn out to be significantly 
different from hunting and gathering societies. Although advanced horticultural 
societies do not differ significantly from hunting and gathering plus fishing societies, 
H2 is largely confirmed. H3 is about ancestor-hero creators. According to table 3.5, 52 
percent of hunting and gathering plus fishing societies portray their creator in this 
way, and 17 percent of agrarian plus herding societies do so. This difference is 
significant. Contrary to our expectation that the ancestor-hero creator would be most 
common in horticultural societies, it turns out to be so at the lowest level of 
technology. Hence, H3 is only partly confirmed. Lastly, H4 is about distant human 
creators. Table 3.5 shows that this idea is least widespread among hunters-gatherers 
and fishers. It is significantly more so in the other types. Additional analyses show that 
there are no significant differences in this regard between horticultural societies and 
agrarian plus herding societies. H4 is thus weakly corroborated. 
Table 3.5 Type of creative force mentioned in creation stories of 116 pre-industrial societies according to the 
subsistence technology of these societies, in percentages (absolute frequencies in brackets) 
Subsistence technology Animal Natural entity Ancestor-hero Distant human 
being 
N 
Hunting and gathering/fishing 36  (15) 24  (10) 52  (22) 31  (13) 42 
Simple horticulture 8 * (1) 31  (4) 38  (5) 69 ** (9) 13 
Advanced horticulture 7 ** (2) 16  (5) 29 * (9) 58 * (18) 31 
Agriculture/ herding 7 ** (2) 7 * (2) 17 ** (5) 67 * (20) 30 
+p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 (one-tailed), according to a Fisher exact test with hunting and gathering/fishing as reference 
category 
Table 3.6 shows results for the clause in H3 about hunting and gathering relative to 
fishing. Since we have only eight fishing societies, we did not contrast them with our 
34 hunting and gathering societies. Instead we compared the 23 societies that are less 
than 25 percent dependent on fishing with the 19 societies that are 25 percent or 
more dependent on fishing. In the latter societies the idea of an ancestral or heroic 
creator is not significantly more frequent. This finding refutes H3. 
Table 3.6 Presence of an ancestor-hero creator in creation stories of 42 hunting and gathering plus fishing 
societies according to dependence of these societies on fishing, in percentages (absolute frequencies in 
brackets) 
Dependence on fishing Ancestor-hero N 
Less than 25% fishing 48  (11) 23 
More than 25% fishing 58  (11) 19 
+p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 (one-tailed), according to a Fisher exact test with hunting and gathering/fishing as reference 
category 
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Table 3.7 shows that agriculturalists and herders portray creators as a parent 
significantly less frequently than do hunters-gatherers and fishers. This seems to 
support H5. Table 3.7 also shows that creators as rulers are most frequent in agrarian 
plus herding societies, and least likely in simple horticultural societies. However, this 
difference is not significant. Moreover, rulers-creators are unexpectedly frequent at 
the lowest level of subsistence technology. H6 is therefore not supported by the 
findings. 
Table 3.7 Presence of a creator who is a parent or ruler in creation stories of 116 pre-industrial societies 
according to the subsistence technology of these societies, in percentages  (absolute frequencies in 
brackets) 
Subsistence technology Parent Ruler N 
Hunting and gathering/fishing  41  (17) 17  (7) 42 
Simple horticulture 31  (4) 8  (1) 13 
Advanced horticulture 26  (8) 23  (7) 31 
Agriculture/herding 13 * (4) 23  (7) 30 
+p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 (one-tailed), according to a Fisher exact test with hunting and gathering/fishing as reference 
category 
Table 3.8 tests H7. Female creators are most likely among hunters-gatherers and 
fishers, but horticulturalists do not differ significantly from them. Female creators are 
significantly scarcest in agrarian and herding societies. All in all H7 is not upheld: 
female creators are not observed predominantly in horticultural societies. 
Table 3.8 Presence of a female creator in creation stories of 116 pre-industrial societies according to the 
subsistence technology of these societies, in percentages (absolute frequencies in brackets) 
Subsistence technology Female creator N 
Hunting and gathering/fishing 36  (15) 42 
Simple horticulture 23  (3) 13 
Advanced horticulture 29  (9) 31 
Agriculture/herding 10 * (3) 30 
+p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 (one-tailed), according to a Fisher exact test with hunting and gathering/fishing as reference 
category 
Table 3.9 pertains to hunting and gathering societies only and tests H8. For societies 
with a stronger dependence on hunting, we expected a lower likelihood of a female 
creator. We find the opposite, although the difference is not significant. H8 is thus 
rejected. This finding feeds the suspicion that a female creator has less to do with 
sociomorphism than with biomorphism. 
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Table 3.9 Presence of the idea of a female creator in 32 hunting and gathering societies, by dependence on 
hunting, in percentages  (absolute frequencies in brackets) 
Dependence on hunting Female creator  N 
Less than 25% hunting 17  (2) 12 
More than 25% hunting 27  (6) 22 
+p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 (one-tailed), according to a Fisher exact test with hunting and gathering/fishing as reference 
category 
In table 3.10, we test hypotheses H9 to H12 in two ways, because for 26 societies we 
do not have information about the creative act. In panel A we coded the creative act in 
the creation stories of these societies as absent, whereas in panel B we excluded these 
26 societies. First we look at panel A. Column 1 shows that the idea of spontaneous 
creation is least frequent in advanced horticultural societies. It occurs in these 
societies significantly less frequently than in hunter-gatherer and fishing societies. 
Although this corresponds with H9, the percentage for agrarian and herding societies 
is far too high to fully accept H9. Column 2 makes clear that the idea of creation 
through sexual reproduction occurs most in simple horticultural societies and least in 
agrarian and herding societies. The highest and lowest levels of technology differ 
significantly from one another. These findings correspond to H10. However, although 
biomorphism seems less frequent among hunters and gatherers than among simple 
horticulturalists, this difference is not statistically significant. Column 3 in table 3.10 is 
about creation by technical achievement. Technomorphism seems more likely in 
simple horticultural societies than in hunting and gathering societies, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. Otherwise the figures do not at all show the 
expected pattern. This leads us to reject H11. Column 4 reveals that, contrary to H12, 
creation by command is most frequent in simple horticultural societies. But the idea of 
creation by command is significantly less likely among hunters-gatherers than among 
simple horticulturalists. For this reason, H12 is partly supported. 
We now look at panel B of table 3.10. It bypasses societies with stories that 
provide no information on the type of creative act. The results turn out to be similar. 
Nonetheless, we see in the case of spontaneous creation that the difference between 
advanced horticultural societies and hunting and gathering plus fishing societies is no 
longer significant. 
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Table 3.10  Type of creative act in creation stories of pre-industrial societies according to the subsistence 
technology of these societies, in percentages (absolute frequencies in brackets) 
Subsistence technology Spontaneous 
creation 
Sexual 
reproduction 
Technical 
achievement 
Command N 
Panel A              
Hunting and gathering/fishing 21  (9) 33  (14) 33  (14) 14  (6) 42 
Simple horticulture 23  (3) 46  (6) 46  (6) 39 * (5) 13 
Advanced horticulture 10 + (3) 32  (10) 26  (8) 23 + (7) 31 
Agriculture/herding 23  (7) 13 * (4) 30  (9) 30 * (9) 30 
              
Panel B              
Hunting and gathering/fishing 26  (9) 40  (14) 40  (14) 17  (6) 35 
Simple horticulture 25  (3) 50  (6) 50  (6) 42 * (5) 12 
Advanced horticulture 16  (3) 53  (10) 42  (8) 37 * (7) 19 
Agriculture/herding 29  (7) 17 * (4) 38  (9) 38 * (9) 24 
+p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 (one-tailed), according to a Fisher exact test with hunting and gathering/fishing as reference 
category 
To finish, we present data bearing on H13: Are female creators more likely in societies 
where women contribute more to subsistence, and are they more likely if the creative 
act is sexual? 
Table 3.11 Logistic regression models for presence or absence of a female creator in creation stories of pre-
industrial societies 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE 
Constant –0.59 * 0.32 –1.33 + 0.69 –1.84 ** 0.48 –3.84 ** 1.11 
Subsistence technology             
   Hunting-gathering/fishing (ref.)             
   Simple horticultural –0.62  0.73 –0.74  0.75 –1.52 * 0.91 –1.61 * 0.92 
   Advanced horticultural –0.31  0.51 –0.44  0.53 –0.47  0.67 –0.75  0.70 
   Agricultural/herding –1.61 * 0.69 –1.59 * 0.69 –1.37 + 0.83 –1.35 + 0.88 
Female contribution to subsistence     1.50  1.22    3.68 * 1.68 
Creation by sexual reproduction       3.20 ** 0.58 3.55 ** 0.65 
Chi² 6.96    8.51    46.79    52.17    
Nagelkerke R2 .09   .10   .49   .53   
Number of cases 116    116    116    116    
+p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 (one-tailed). 
Table 3.11 shows multivariate logistic regression models. The first model confirms 
that in agrarian and herding societies a female creator is significantly less common 
than in technologically less developed societies. Model 2 adds the predictor ‘female 
contribution to subsistence’, and its parameter turns out to be insignificant. The effects 
of subsistence technologies remain unchanged. Model 3 adds to model 1 the predictor 
‘creation through sexual reproduction’. It turns out that societies in which sexual 
reproduction is the creative act, are more likely to have a female creator than societies 
in which this is not the case. We also see in this model a smaller difference between 
agrarian and herding societies and the reference category. Apparently, female creators 
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are less common in agrarian and herding societies, because the idea of creation 
through sexual reproduction is less likely in these societies. 
Model 4 adds to Model 1 the predictor ‘female contribution to subsistence’, as 
well as the predictor ‘creation through sexual reproduction’. Both parameters are 
significant and comparable in size. Thus, the findings does not support H13, which 
states that the relationship between the idea of creation through sexual reproduction 
and the occurrence of a female creator is stronger than the relationship between the 
female contribution to the food supply and the presence of a female creator. Female 
creators are indeed more common in societies in which women play a more important 
role in subsistence. Besides this, female creators are more likely in societies in which 
sexual reproduction is the creative act. 
3.6 Discussion 
In this chapter, we proposed a shift from questions about gods who now and then 
create to questions about the origin of the world, which sometimes involves a creative 
god. It is not surprising that ‘god questions’ were raised by scholars originating from 
societies where Christianity held sway and that these questions referred to a moral 
creator god. We argued that ‘origin questions’ are more to the point given general 
questions on diversity and encompassing theories like ecological evolutionism. 
As to the data collected and analyzed for this chapter, it is worth repeating that it 
proved doable to code creation stories for the presence of ideas prompted by 
particular analogies. Regarding our results, we may have found insignificant 
differences only because of the low number of cases. Therefore, a main task for future 
research will be to increase the number of pre-industrial societies. Since the Human 
Relations Area Files is weak on field reports in languages other than English, the 
addition of creation stories recorded in Dutch, French and German might help. 
Nonetheless, our number of societies was not low compared to other studies 
addressing similar questions, such as Wilson (2005). Unfortunately, our limited 
number of societies prevented us from estimating multivariate models, with one 
exception. 
Despite the low number of pre-industrial societies involved in our tests, our 
findings upheld several concrete hypotheses on the relation between subsistence 
technology and the content of creation stories. Moreover, the predictions that did not 
hold display a pattern. We mostly predicted that higher levels of technology lead to 
gradual changes, while we found several breaks. This indicates a weakness in our 
application of the thesis that in all societies people comprehend the unknown by 
analogies with things that are known, nearby and important for their survival. Exactly 
when is something known? We assumed that technomorphism would become 
important in advanced horticultural societies, since full-time craft specialization is 
infrequent in simple horticultural societies. However, part-time artisanship occurs in 
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the latter societies, and that phenomenon might already boost technomorphism, 
particularly in societies with few members, like simple horticultural societies. We also 
held that ruler analogies would be more common in agrarian than in advanced 
horticultural societies, because leadership in the latter societies is less formal. Yet 
perhaps informal leaders already make for sociomorphism. 
As to our general hypotheses, our concrete predictions indicate their 
fruitfulness. We also underline our finding that the presence in a society’s creation 
story of female creators is related to both women’s contribution to food production, 
sociomorphism, and to sexual reproduction, biomorphism. It is too early to say 
whether our itemization of Topitsch’s biomorphism into spontaneous creation models 
and sexual reproduction models yields important new predictions. 
We raised origin questions only for pre-industrial societies, and might be faulted 
for that decision. Our defence is not that the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample and the 
Human Relations Area Files pertain only to pre-industrial societies. Rather, our 
argument is that better data are available for addressing questions about the content 
of ideas on the origin of the world held by various members of industrial societies. 
Sociologists have interviewed random samples of the populations of all major 
industrial nations for decades now. They have not only studied these people’s notions 
about god (Norris & Inglehart 2004), recently they also looked into public acceptance 
of the idea that human beings arose through natural evolution, rather than by God’s 
creation. Miller, Scott & Okamoto (2006) report on the percentage of the population in 
32 European countries plus Japan and the United States who accept the idea of 
evolution as true, as false, and who are unsure. In chapter 4 we will study the godly 
images of people in 13 European countries. 
A worthwhile follow-up to this chapter’s origin question pertains to a society’s 
ideas on the future and human destiny. Here is a genuine gap to be filled. This lacuna 
need not involve people’s ideas about life after death and the end of time. Weber 
(1920: III–336) argued that the prophecy in ancient Judaism that the kingdom of peace 
is near, was prompted by the destruction of the Jewish temple in Jerusalem and the 
deportation of Jews to Babylon. Albert (2000: 154) added to the list of elements 
making up a religion, promises of protection and happiness during an adherent’s life. 
In chapter 5 we will study people’s perceptions of Heaven and Hell. 
In this study, we avoided the term ‘myth’, and raised questions about the content 
of ideas, and not their truth and coherence. It may now be clear why we did so. As 
Horton (1967) argued, many supposedly glaring inconsistencies in accounts given by 
members of pre-industrial societies lose that character once it is accepted that the 
people living in any society arrive at ideas about the unknown through analogies 
(Horton 1967: 64). We must also consider that pre-industrial societies do not have the 
means for testing that are available in industrial societies. These instruments comprise 
not only experimental methods (Horton 1967: 172), but also books. The oral 
transmission of ideas becomes less important with technological advancement, and 
the written diffusion of ideas more so (Horton 1967: 180). Simply stated, for a scholar 
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it is easier to spot inconsistencies when sitting in an armchair reading a book, leafing 
back and forth, than for a native listening in company to a storyteller. 
3.7 Ecological evolutionism and classical as well as contemporary 
scolars 
Topitsch (1988) mentions the philosopher Hume and the sociologists Durkheim and 
Weber as forerunners. To highlight the tenets of sociology’s ecological evolutionism, 
we here review pertinent sayings of those classical scholars. To this effect we also 
contrast our hypotheses on technologies and thought models with theories on mind 
and religion as presented to the general public by contemporary Darwinians like the 
biologists Wilson and Dawkins and the psychologist Pinker. 
Hume (1757: 17) pointed out the human propensity to see ‘faces in the moon, 
and armies in the clouds’, and proposed that human beings make gods in their own 
image. Considering people’s propensity to wage wars and manufacture things, Hume 
suggested that they attribute their own intentions to their gods. Hume’s notions 
became known as the anthropomorphism thesis. 
Durkheim (1897: 244–245) argued that the anthropomorphism thesis only is 
valid for societies with religions like Christianity, in which people have duties toward 
god, and succinctly stated that people are only capable of representing the world after 
the image of the small social world in which they live. Hume had welded the thesis that 
people reason by analogy with the known to the idea that the familiar consists of 
human intentions; Durkheim combined the analogy thesis with the notion that society 
is the great known. 
Durkheim (1912: 95) showed that the anthropomorphism thesis did not hold for 
the Arunta from Australia. These hunters and gatherers comprehended their origin as 
descending from animals and plants, and Durkheim added that human societies 
gradually discard their sanctity (Durkheim 1912: 212, 236). Durkheim (1912: 334–
335) also explained that most Arunta emblems are animals and plants. These animals 
and plants are the quintessence of Arunta livelihood, and animals are invoked as signs 
more frequently than plants, because plants are not cultivated and hunting yields close 
bonds. The finding that grounds where totemic animals and plants are widespread 
form meeting places for the Arunta corroborates this explanation, so says Durkheim. It 
is a moot point whether these analogies are biomorphic or sociomorphic. They are 
both, since they invoke not simply plants and animals, but a society’s food supply, that 
is to say, a relation between a society and its natural environment. Durkheim’s ideas 
about the small world in which people live are more detailed than Hume’s 
assumptions about the image people have of themselves. 
In charting religious evolution, Weber (1921: 249–250) listed regularities about 
societal features and the content of religions prompted by analogies with these 
features. For example, in durable communities a god no longer transfigures but 
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becomes one person; in societies that cultivate fields the goddess Mother Earth is 
more likely to occur; strong household leadership yields a tendency for ancestor 
worship; upon sedentary life deities become local; the relations between a pantheon’s 
gods are as unstable as the competencies of a state’s servants; and if a society’s lords 
are benign their subjects will praise their gods (Weber 1921: 250–258). So, Weber’s 
thoughts about the link between societal characteristics and the content of religions 
went beyond those of Durkheim. 
Weber also volunteered that in religious evolution analogies gradually make way 
for syllogisms. Weber’s explanation is not that the need to systematize is weaker 
among Australian hunters and gatherers than among Westerners. Durkheim (1912: 
237) had argued that way. Weber (1921: 279–284) holds that societies without 
writing lack an option to make notions more coherent. If religious specialists - persons 
who read and write - emerge, more implications are drawn from analogically obtained 
ideas, and so riddles arise, for instance how it is possible that the human world is full 
of want and sorrow and that god at the same time is almighty and good. Weber (1921: 
315) also pointed out that in questionnaires completed in around 1910, German 
workers stated that they did not believe in God because divine providence did not 
square with the world’s injustices.10 
Weber implied, and Topitsch stated, that in the course of time the analogies 
leading to various conundrums die off. Topitsch (1988: 242) also held that pre-
industrial thought models lose their nearness in industrial societies. Machines take 
over from artisans the production of goods, and democratic governments replace 
hereditable hierarchies. Yet Topitsch skipped the question of whether these new 
technologies and societal forms provide new analogies. 
While present-day Durkheimians tend to talk about religion in the singular, the 
Darwinian Wilson (2002: 177–179) holds that fruitful questions should not be pitched 
at such a high level of aggregation. The Durkheimian question is about the universality 
of religion, whereas Wilson’s questions tackle religions in the plural. According to 
sociology’s ecological evolutionism as well, the questions of the ‘sociology of religion’ 
should turn into questions about religious diversity. 
Wilson (2002: 45) distinguishes brands of Darwinian theories of religion. One 
major kind states that religions are adaptive, with one subtype for religions as 
contributing to individual survival and another for religions as contributing to group 
survival. The other main class takes religions as non-adaptive, with a subcategory 
                                                             
 
 
10 Weber refers to Levenstein (1912: 323–353). Of 8,000 questionnaires sent out to workers in the 
iron, mining and textile industry, 63% was returned. Of the 3,198 workers who replied to the 
question of whether they believe in God, 79% answered no. Of the 1,990 persons who replied to the 
open question of why they did not, 33% gave answers Levenstein abbreviated as ‘the properties 
assigned to God are incompatible with social reality’. 
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holding that religions were adaptive to past environments, and another saying that 
religions are by-products of otherwise adaptive traits. 
When detailing these theories, Wilson (2002: 52–55) states that according to 
Durkheim religions emerge because they contribute to group survival. However, so 
says Wilson, contemporary sociologists dismiss Durkheim’s explanation. They do so 
with the argument that it invokes later effects, whereas it should adduce prior causes. 
Wilson defends Durkheim against this charge by pointing out that Darwinian biology 
reasons in this way too. That counterargument seems weak, since classical sociologists 
and contemporary biologists might just commit similar mistakes. More importantly, it 
may be doubted whether Durkheim held that religion contributes to group survival. 
Durkheim (1912: 23) posited that meetings sanctify ideas, and that people who 
partake in rites later surpass their old selves in thinking and acting. So, religion 
supposedly fosters individual survival. 
In addition, Wilson does not list technologies people apply to survive. So, the 
idea of Lenski’s ecological evolutionism that in the course of history human 
intervention in nature increased, does not form a pillar of the cathedral Wilson seeks 
to erect on Darwinian foundations. Neither does the analogy thesis form a pillar of 
Wilson’s cathedral. When elaborating by-product explanations, Wilson (2002: 51) 
states that in some cases adaptive features of religions evolve by an ongoing process of 
blind variation and selective retention. However, the analogy thesis is an alternative 
for the idea of blind variation. In addition, the analogy thesis has been spotted by 
contemporary Darwinians. For instance, evolutionary psychologist Pinker (2002: 435–
439) argues that people are not born with a blank slate, and presents a list of human 
universals. One item states that reasoning in analogies is inherent to human nature. 
Given Durkheim’s rejection of anthropomorphism, it is worthwhile to out the hidden 
clause in Pinker’s proposition: Human beings, in any society whatsoever, reason by 
analogy. The follow-up task is to link types of subsistence to kinds of analogies. One 
arch in Darwin’s cathedral should connect the pillar that people reason in analogies 
and the pillar that populations differ in subsistence technologies. 
Dawkins (2006: 168–169) distinguishes proximate and ultimate explanations, 
and claims little interest in a proximate question of evolutionary psychologists. That is 
the question of where the ‘god centre’ in the human brain is located, if it exists – or, we 
add, the capacity to think in analogies. Dawkins’ question is rather an ultimate one: 
Which natural selection pressure brought about that centre? Dawkins also holds that 
sociological explanations like ‘religion is a tool used by the ruling class to subjugate 
the underclass’, are proximate, since they miss out on environmental factors. We beg 
to differ. Durkheim held that human beings necessarily think in analogies and cannot 
escape sociomorphism, because they by nature belong to societies and societies 
pressure them. That hypothesis invokes the link between the environment of 
individuals and the analogies they make, and therefore is ultimate. It is part of 
ecological evolutionism. 
Invoking the frequency of religious wars, Dawkins (2006: 172) rejects group 
survival explanations. He rewrites the question of the survival value of religion as the 
Analogical reasoning and the content of creation stories 
 
77 
 
possibly more helpful question of which phenomena with survival value yield religion 
as a by-product. Dawkins answers it with the thesis that religion is a by-product of 
misfiring modules in the human brain (Dawkins 2006: 179). These modules program 
people to impute intentions to entities that matter to them (Dawkins 2006: 183), and 
most of the time contribute to survival. Dawkins buttresses the assertion that people 
take an intentional stance with findings showing that children and members of 
societies at lower levels of technology impute intentions to the weather, waves and 
falling rocks.11 These Darwinian thoughts do not yet answer the question of the 
diversity in religions and creation stories. Anyway, sociology’s ecological evolutionism 
is richer. 
                                                             
 
 
11 Knight et al. (2004) go against the anthropomorphism thesis and maintain that children ascribe 
intentions to god before ascribing them to human beings, but Markis & Pnevmatikos (2007) show 
that they do so only upon acquiring the stable and robust understanding that human beings have 
intentions. 
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Appendix Content classification scheme as applied to stories about the very 
first beginning, about the creation of all things in the world and about 
the creation of human beings 
  Present Absent 
Which creator(s) are present in a story?      
   Nature: distant object (celestial body)      
   Nature: near object (earth, rocks, mountains, water)     
   Nature: plants     
   An animal     
   Human: an ancestor     
   Human: a culture hero     
   Human: an ancestor/culture hero     
   Human: distant/less personal     
   Spirit (personal force)     
   Impersonal force     
   Something else, namely …     
   Not mentioned     
Does this creator have a specific social role?     
   Parent     
   Ruler     
   Something else, namely …     
   Not mentioned     
What is this creator’s gender?     
   Male     
   Female     
   Hermaphrodite     
   No gender specified     
   Not mentioned     
How did this creation take place?     
   Transformation (spontaneous creation)     
   Sexual reproduction: only bearing     
   Sexual reproduction: having sex and bearing     
   Technological achievement: craftsmanship     
   Technological achievement: plan     
   Sowing/planting     
   Diving     
   By command     
   Something else, namely …     
   Not mentioned     
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Chapter 4  
After a personal god: an abstract 
one, atheism or agnosticism? 
This chapter proposes a shift from questions regarding who believes in God to questions 
regarding which god do people believe in. More specifically, it addresses the impact of 
industrialization and democratization on the adherence to the idea of a personal god, 
the idea of an abstract god, the idea that God is unknowable and the idea that God 
doesn’t exist. In answering this question, we combine Topitsch’s analogy argument, that 
ideas about the unknown are modeled on people’s experience of what is known and 
important to them, with Lenski’s ecological evolutionism, which states that a society’s 
subsistence technology determines what is known and important to its people. Using the 
European Values Surveys, wave 1999/2000, we studied ideas about god of people living 
in thirteen European countries who grew up in cohorts differing in political and 
economic condition. The findings show that ongoing industrialization negatively affect 
the belief in a personal god in favor of the belief in an abstract god, in agnosticism and 
atheism, on both the individual and the contextual levels. 
4.1 Introduction and research questions 
Although it is explicitly written in the Bible that God created the first human beings in 
Its own image and likeness (Genesis 1: 26 27), it is not allowed to depict god (Ex. 
20:4). In the Koran, it is written that there is nothing like a likeness of Allah (Koran 42: 
11). As a consequence, there is only a limited number of portrayals of the Christian 
and Islamic God. The few artists that did depict God, such as the Renaissance masters 
Michelangelo and Raffaello, pictured God as an elderly man with a gray beard. 
Armstrong (2005) noticed that in human history, people often portrayed their gods as 
humanlike figures. Moreover, she showed that in technologically less advanced 
societies people often shared the same characteristics with their gods, like jealousy or 
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vengefulness, whereas in agrarian societies gods became more distant and even 
elusive. This finding seems to suggest that people’s image of god in some way relates 
to the social context in which they live. 
In the contemporary sociology of religion, most attention goes to the fading 
away of God in industrial and post-industrial societies, whereas less studies aim to 
understand why different images of God prevail in different societies (Greeley 2003). 
In this chapter, we fill this gap and shift the focus from the question who believes in 
God to the question which god do people believe in. In accordance with Nisbet (1966), 
we study the influence of important societal processes – industrialization and 
democratization – on people’s ideas about God. Moreover, we try to sort out how these 
processes affected people’s ideas about God on both the individual and societal levels. 
It has been hypothesized that in modern societies the concept of a personal god 
is diminishing (Halman and De Moor 1993; Dobbelaere and Jagodzinski 1995) and is 
gradually being replaced by the concept of a more vague and general higher power, 
here characterized as an abstract god (Lenski 1970; Dobbelaere 1999; Lambert 1999). 
Quantitative research corroborates this hypothesis when it looks in detail at one 
country. For instance, Bruce (2002: 138) showed that in Great Britain, there has been 
a shift from the Christian notion of a personal god to a vague higher power, spiritual or 
life force. Also in the Netherlands, evidence is found that godly images become less 
traditional from a Christian perspective (De Graaf & Te Grotenhuis 2005; Bernts, 
Dekker & De Hart 2007). Whereas these studies focused on the decline of the 
traditional image of god, we will study in detail what substitutes the image of the 
personal god. It has been argued that the shift from a personal to an abstract god is a 
first step in the process of secularization (Lenski 1970; Lambert 1999; Bruce 2002; 
Marler and Hadaway 2002). Later on, Noland and Lenski (2006) stressed the 
transition from the belief in a god or higher power to agnosticism and atheism. 
Lambert (1999: 329) hypothesizes, but does not test the claim that agnosticism comes 
somewhere between the notion of an abstract god and atheism. 
In chapter 2, we reviewed research that suggests that ideas about gods differ a 
great deal from one pre-industrial society to another, and that the content of these 
ideas is linked with pivotal societal properties (Swanson 1960; Underhill 1974; 
Peregrine 1996; Snarey 1996). We then wanted to explain the presence or absence in 
pre-industrial societies of the belief in all-powerful creator gods. Questions that were 
not addressed in that chapter were how and why godly images change when societies 
shift from agrarian to industrial and post-industrial subsistence techniques. 
Dobbelaere (1987: 118) reasons that important structural changes that accompanied 
the process of industrialization have had an impact on people’s image of God. 
According to Nisbet (1966), democratization also has affected people’s ideas about 
God. In this chapter, we will follow his lead and examine the change in godly images in 
relation to the changes in societies’ economic and political climate in European 
countries in which Christianity is the largest and most important religion. In this way 
we compare the ideas of God within similar religions. 
  
 
Figure 4.1 The percentage belief in a personal god by a. the percentage of the labor force outside the agrarian sector (R2 .64)  
and b. the percentage left-wing voters (R2 .47) by country 
 
  
Figure 4.2 The percentage belief in a personal god by a. the percentage of the labor force outside the agrarian sector (R2 .55) 
and b. the percentage left-wing voters (R2 .34) by cohorts within countries 
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Norris and Inglehart (2004) demonstrate that the percentage of people who believe in 
God is highest in agrarian societies and lowest in post-industrial societies. 
Surprisingly, these differences between societal types are only small. In figure 4.1 we 
make use of the European Values Survey, wave 2000, and focus specifically on the 
belief in a personal god. Instead of a society’s dominant subsistence technology, we 
relate this belief to both levels of industrialization and democratization. A society’s 
level of industrialization is measured with the percentage of the labor force that is 
working outside the agrarian sector. A society’s level of democratization is measured 
with the percentage of left-wing voters. Hewitt (1977) demonstrated that democracy 
itself does not lead to equality, but that the presence of strong democratic parties will 
lead to social equality. Generally, the aggregated statistics in figure 4.1 show that the 
percentage of people who believe in a personal god is lower in societies with a higher 
percentage of the labor force working outside the agrarian sector, and is also lower in 
societies with a higher percentage of left-wing voters. Figure 4.1 refers to the 
economic and political situation of countries and does not distinguish between people 
who grew up under different conditions. However, Inglehart (1990) stated that 
people’s norms and values are mainly formed during their socialization period. For 
that reason, we study the relationship between the belief in a personal god and levels 
of democratization and industrialization for cohorts within countries. Figure 4.2 
shows that the belief in a personal god differs not only between countries but also 
within countries. Within countries, cohorts that are socialized with higher levels of 
industrialization believe relatively less often in a personal god. Nonetheless, this 
picture is less clear for the relationship between democratization and the belief in a 
personal god. For some countries, we find that cohorts that are socialized with higher 
levels of democratization believe relatively less often in a personal god, whereas for 
other countries this relationship is absent or even reversed. 
Different traditions can be distinguished in which sociologists answered pure 
micro questions (Kirkpatrick, 1997) or pure macro questions (Davie 1990, 2003; 
Norris & Inglehart 2004). We use a combination of these two approaches and study 
religious diversity with a multilevel design (Dobbelaere 1999). More specifically, we 
answer the question on which level industrialization and democratization influences 
people’s godly images. Earlier theorizing and empirical research indicate that the 
traditional idea of a personal god became less plausible when people lost their respect 
for authority and leadership (Nolan and Lenski 2006), when they became more 
egalitarian (Levenstein 1912), more individualistic (Halman and Ester 1995; 
Dobbelaere 1999), and higher educated (Lambert 1999; Bruce 2002). We hypothesize 
that industrialization and democratization may also have influenced people’s ideas 
about God on the contextual level, apart from individual characteristics. This leads to 
our research question: 
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1. How do individual and societal characteristics that refer to industrialization 
and democratization affect the adherence to the idea of a personal god, the 
idea of an abstract god, the idea that God is unknowable and the idea that 
God doesn’t exist, of individuals living in (post-)industrial societies in Europe? 
This question is answered by studying the godly images of people who live in different 
European countries and who grew up in cohorts differing in political and economic 
condition. Our answer to the above mentioned research question will add to the 
existing literature in four ways. First, we shift the attention from an explanation of the 
disappearing of the personal god to an explanation of the conditions under which 
certain images of God will prevail. Second, we examine how industrialization and 
democratization, as macro changes, lead to changes in individual beliefs: as a simple 
aggregation or as a contextual influence too. Third, we have both classic and modern 
measurements of industrialization and democratization. Classic measurements are 
people’s occupation and political orientation because with the shift from agriculture to 
industry, more people started working outside the agrarian sector, and as a result 
social classes emerged with more power to stand up for their rights.  However, Collins 
(1979) pointed out that ongoing industrialization gave rise to the ‘credential system’ 
in which diplomas became more important. For that reason, we also include modern 
measurements of industrialization and democratization, such as people’s educational 
level and also their detachment from traditional institutions. Fourth, we add 
Inglehart’s (1990) notion of formative years that are assumed to be crucial when it 
comes to the transmission of culture. This would imply that we find generational 
rather than age differences in images of God. We therefore relate people’s godly 
images to characteristics of the countries they lived in when growing up. 
4.2 Theory and hypotheses 
4.2.1 Reasoning in analogies 
Ecological evolutionism (Lenski 1970; Nolan and Lenksi 2006) states that changes in a 
society’s subsistence technology are the primary force driving cultural evolution. 
Advances in subsistence technology constitute a precondition for further major 
changes within societies, just like any significant increase in either size or complexity 
of any society (Nolan and Lenski 2006: 57). Ecological evolutionism argues that 
people’s godly images will reflect the most vital and visible features of the societal 
structure, and that this structure is dependent on the dominant subsistence 
technology. This implies that societal differences in godly images, to some extent, boil 
down to societal differences in subsistence technologies. According to Nolan and 
Lenksi (2006), the shift from agriculture to industry, industrialization, has affected 
people’s ideas about God. They state that the notion of a personal god, which was 
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comprehensible and recognizable in the agrarian era, appears unfamiliar to people 
socialized in (post-)industrial societies. This idea corresponds with the argument of 
Dobbelaere (1987: 118) that people develop an image of God directly from the model 
which their society provides. 
Ecological evolutionism considers technologies as exercising greater influence 
than ideologies on a society’s social organization (Lenski 2005). However, ideologies, 
especially political ideologies, are expected to have a stronger influence on a society’s 
social-cultural characteristics in technologically more advanced societies (Nolan and 
Lenski 2006: 59). An important ideological change that accompanied the process of 
industrialization is the transition from an authoritarian political regime to a more 
democratic regime implementing the idea that all people have a voice: 
democratization. Nisbet (1966) argues that industrialization together with democracy, 
caused the collapse of the old regime in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century (1966: 21). The Industrial Revolution, which started in England, and the 
French Revolution caused the breakup of the old order in Europe, an order based on 
family, local community, monarchy and social class. The Industrial Revolution brought 
forth economic changes, like the changed condition of labor, the transformation of 
property and urbanism, whereas the French Revolution caused political and 
ideological changes, such as egalitarianism and rationalism. According to Nisbet, an 
important consequence of these developments is the fading away of the traditional 
image of God. 
Nolan and Lenski (2006) argue that if people intervene more in nature for their 
living, gods intervene more in the lives of people. They implicitly say that humans 
reason in analogies (Lenski 1970: 415). This draws back on a literature ranging from 
Hume (1779) to Guthrie (1993) which states that people explain the unknown by 
drawing parallels with the known and important (Topitsch 1954). In this light, 
Topitsch (1972) claims that the belief in a supreme personal god is derived from the 
sociomorphic thought model that a strong ruler rewards loyal subjects and punishes 
those who trespass laws. The analogy argument is based on the idea that people’s 
experience with a new social structure leads to new ideas about God. In this chapter, 
we argue that the sociomorphic image of the personal god does not hold in (post-
)industrial societies, and this for three reasons. First, we argue that the notion of a 
personal god no longer applies in societies in which people are no longer acquainted 
with a dictatorial leader at the head of the state and an authoritarian father at the head 
of the family. Second, we assume that the transfer of analogies from older generations 
to new generations is hindered by people’s detachment from traditional institutions, 
such as the church, and the family and its strongholds. Finally, we call into question 
whether people in (post-)industrial societies still reason in analogies, or instead think 
logically and deductively. 
The analogy argument of Topitsch states that ideas about the unknown are 
modeled on people’s experience with the known, and for that reason refers to the 
contextual level. After all, people who live in the same country are familiar with the 
same political and social structure. However, we argue that the notion of a personal 
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god is more difficult for some people than for other people depending on their 
personal characteristics. People within countries can live under different conditions 
and can have other perspectives on the world in which they live. For this reason, we 
take into account both characteristics on the individual and contextual levels that refer 
to industrialization and democratization. 
4.2.2 The influence of industrialization and democratization as macro level 
aggregation of individual effects 
Norris and Inglehart (2004) showed that the belief in God is highest in agrarian 
societies and lowest in post-industrial societies. Nolan and Lenski add to this the 
expectation that the belief in a personal god will be replaced by the belief in an 
abstract god and in later stages by the belief that God is unknowable, agnosticism, and 
the belief that God doesn’t exist, atheism (Lenski 1970; Nolan and Lenski 2006). 
According to Lambert (1999), agnosticism comes somewhere between the notion of 
an abstract god and atheism. These expectations predict the macro-to-macro 
relationship between industrialization and godly images. However, in this chapter we 
will test the possibility that this macro-to-macro relationship is the result of 
aggregated micro-to-micro relationships. 
Occupation and people’s ideas about God 
When we translate the macro-expectations of Norris and Inglehart, and Nolan and 
Lenski directly to the individual level, we come to our first hypothesis about 
occupation: People who work outside the agrarian sector believe relatively less often 
in a personal god (H1a), believe relatively less often in an abstract god rather than not 
believing in God (H1b), and are relatively less often agnostic rather than atheist (H1c), 
compared to people employed in the agricultural sector. Norris and Inglehart (2004) 
assume a direct influence of people’s occupation on their ideas about God. They claim 
that people in (post-)industrial societies depend less on forces they cannot control, 
and for that reason are less likely to believe in a supernatural power that controls 
them. After all, manufacturing production depends mainly on human ingenuity, 
whereas agricultural production also depends on less controllable factors, such as 
seasonal change (2004: 20). From this perspective, the notion of a personal god can be 
considered more problematic than the belief in an abstract god whose influence is less 
persuasive or even absent. However, another possibility is that the influence of 
occupation on people’s ideas about God is mainly indirect. In general, people who 
work in the agrarian sector are more integrated in community and family life and are 
more conservative. This can also explain why farmers more often believe in the 
personal notion of god. This leads to our second hypothesis: The influence of 
occupation on people’s ideas about God is smaller, but still significant, when we take 
into account political attitudes and the level of integration in traditional institutions 
(H2). 
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Education and people’s ideas about god 
A process that accompanied the industrial and political revolution is the shift from a 
society based on supernatural explanations to an information society based on 
knowledge and scientific explanations. In the secularization literature, it is argued that 
the growth of scientific knowledge and rationalization is responsible for the 
undermining of religious authority (Bruce 2002: 30), although there is still discussion 
about its precise influence on ideas about God (Stark 1963; Campbell & Curtis 1996; 
Harrison 2006). Bruce (2002) claims that the growth of scientific knowledge 
diminished the need for a god or higher power, because science gave people insight 
and control in areas that were a mystery before. 
Bruce claims that the effect of scientific growth on ideas about God is primarily 
contextual. After all, the need for religion diminishes for all people in society, 
independently of their own scientific education. However, we argue that people’s 
educational level does influence their ideas about God (Need and De Graaf 1996; 
Geersing and Need 2007). In this case, the macro relationship between 
industrialization and godly images can also originate from a shift in the percentage of 
higher educated people. We expect the belief in a personal god to be most difficult to 
fit in with scientific knowledge. After all, the image of a personal god who is 
responsible for everything in the world does not go together with scientific evidence 
pointing towards other causes. However, we also expect a high education to clash with 
the belief in a more abstract god or higher power. Although this god is more remote 
and abstract, we expect that higher educated people find more difficulty in accepting 
an idea that cannot be proven. This leads to the following hypothesis: Higher educated 
people believe relatively less often in a personal god (H3a), believe relatively less often in 
an abstract god rather than not believing in God (H3b), and are relatively less often 
agnostic rather than atheist (H3c). 
Egalitarianism and people’s ideas about God 
As stated earlier, democratization, apart from industrialization, is expected to have 
affected people’s ideas about God. As a consequence of the increased need for skilled 
workers and the growth of urban communities, industrialization led to social classes 
with more power to back up their demands for a higher standard of living as well as a 
say in government. These organized groups of workers stood up for their rights by 
demanding universal suffrage. In industrial societies, for the first time in human 
history, the trend to inequality was reversed (Nolan and Lenski 2006: 270). Lenski 
(1970: 415) noticed that in industrial societies, power is much more impersonal with 
modern bureaucracies. Lambert (1999) considers the shift from a monarchical system 
to a democratic political system as the main challenge for religion. He specifically 
points out the influence of the so called ‘emergence of the masses’ and the socialist 
movement. 
On the individual level, we expect that people in higher industrialized societies 
have more egalitarian and less authoritarian political attitudes. We expect people in 
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higher industrialized societies to have more problems with the presence of a strong, 
dictatorial leader. Quantitative research showed that people’s attitudes concerning 
authoritarianism are related to aspects of orthodox beliefs (Photiadis & Johnson 1963; 
Kahoe 1977; Leak & Randall 1995). Furthermore, we expect that people in higher 
industrialized societies have more egalitarian views. The idea of a personal god who, 
for centuries, supported and maintained social inequality does not correspond to 
these egalitarian views. Our hypothesis reads: People with less authoritarian and more 
egalitarian political attitudes believe relatively less often in a personal god (H4a). Because 
we do not expect the belief in an abstract god to be conflicting with people’s 
egalitarian attitudes, we do not expect political attitudes to affect the ratio between 
believing in an abstract god and not believing in God (H4b) and between agnosticism 
and atheism (H4c). 
Individualism and people’s ideas about God 
In the secularization literature, individualization is often referred to as the process of 
functional differentiation or, the separation of individuals from communal and 
corporate structures (Wilson 1976, 1982; Luhmann 1977; Martin 1978). Nisbet 
(1966) even claims that individualization is the most fundamental process that 
embodied the two revolutions: people’s moral values became more detached from 
traditional institutions, such as religious institutions, community and family life. With 
respect to religion, Nisbet emphasizes that churches and religious institutions lost 
their power to the state and that their influence on people’s social life diminished. This 
goes with the finding that religion in modern societies is becoming more and more 
part of the private sphere (Dobbelaere 1999). Religion becomes a private matter and 
for that reason, people’s religious ideas are less prescribed and more diverse. 
As Nolan and Lenski noticed, the idea of a an all-powerful god does not 
correspond with the idea of people taking control of their own life. The personal 
notion of god is expected to be most problematic for people with individualistic 
attitudes, whereas atheism is expected to be least problematic. Furthermore, we argue 
that in (post-)industrial societies, the transfer of the traditional notion of the personal 
god from older generations to new generations is hindered. In (post-)industrial 
societies, people are more detached from religious institutions, community and family 
life and, therefore, feel more free to dissent from the traditional image of God and 
create their own. Our fifth hypothesis reads: people who attach more importance to 
personal freedom and who are more detached from traditional institutions believe 
relatively less often in a personal god (H5a), believe relatively less often in an abstract 
god rather than not believing in God (H5b), and are relatively less often agnostic 
rather than atheist (H5c). 
4.2.3 The influence of industrialization and democratization as contextual effects 
So far, in deriving our hypotheses we assumed that the shift from agriculture to 
industry changed people’s characteristics and attitudes, and for that reason people 
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start to think about God differently. However, we think that there is another 
possibility. Topitsch’s (1954) argument that people reason in analogies and explain 
the unknown with the known implies a contextual influence from a society’s social 
structure on people’s ideas about God, separate from their own characteristics. 
When we assume that people reason in analogies, it is important to incorporate 
processes of social change that resulted from the Industrial Revolution and Political 
Revolution. This societal change is expected to have influenced all people’s ideas about 
God. For this reason, we will study the effects of democratization and industrialization 
on the contextual level. Just like Inglehart (1977), we assume that people’s godly 
images are mainly formed during their socialization period. Quantitative research 
supports this assumption to the extent that differences in religiosity through time are 
particularly the result of generational replacement (Dobbelaere 1999; Need and Evans 
2001; Voas and Crockett 2005). De Graaf, Need and Ultee (2000) demonstrated with 
life history data that people leave church at an early age. 
We expect industrialization to have influenced people’s ideas about God not only 
on the individual level, but also on the contextual level. The Industrial Revolution set 
in motion the processes of individualization and rationalization. Because of this 
revolution, people drifted to the city and became less visible to family and church. This 
is what Nisbet (1966) called the transition from community to society. 
Industrialization, especially the shift from industry to services, also required higher 
skilled and educated people (Blau and Duncan 1967). We expect the belief in a 
personal god to be most difficult to fit in with individualism and scientific knowledge. 
After all, the belief in a personal god does not concord with the experience that people 
determine their own fate and the experience that there are scientific answers for 
existential questions. To a lesser extent, this also applies to the belief in a more 
abstract god. The next hypothesis reads: People socialized in societies with higher levels 
of industrialization believe relatively less often in a personal god (H6a), believe relatively 
less often in an abstract god rather than not believing in God (H6b) and are relatively 
less often agnostic rather than atheist (H6c). 
We also expect democratization to have influenced people’s ideas about God on 
the contextual level, apart from people’s political attitudes. In this light, Topitsch 
(1972) claims that the belief in a supreme personal god is derived from the 
sociomorphic thought model that a strong ruler rewards loyal subjects and punishes 
those who trespass laws. Nolan and Lenski (2006) claim that the sociomorphic image 
of the personal god no longer applies, because the human experience of human power 
has changed with the shift from agriculture to industry. People in (post-)industrial 
societies are no longer acquainted with a strong political leader. This is in keeping 
with Bruce’s statement (2002: 9), that people in agrarian societies tended to have a 
hierarchically structured religion, which reflected the hierarchical structure in a 
society of king, nobles, gentry and peasants. We expect the dehierarchization of 
political power to have influenced people’s godly images, independently of their own 
political ideas. Because people in (post-)industrial societies are no longer acquainted 
with a strong political authority, the personal notion of God is expected to have lost its 
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plausibility and familiarity. Apart from that, we do not expect the dehierarchization of 
political power to have played a role in determining people’s ideas about God. After all, 
the belief in an abstract god or higher power does not clash with the experience that 
the political power in societies is more equally divided. This leads to our seventh 
hypothesis: People socialized in societies with higher levels of democratization believe 
relatively less often in a personal god (H7a). This does not affect the choice between 
believing in an abstract god and not believing in God (H7b) and between agnosticism 
and atheism (H7c). 
Figure 4.3 represents our expectations in a schema. It relates the processes of 
industrialization and democratization to the changes in people’s ideas about God. 
Moreover, the figure indicates which factors on the individual level and which 
contextual characteristics are expected to be responsible for the transition in belief. Of 
course this scheme is only a simple representation of our expectations. Religious 
change, as our previous chapters showed, is a process in which beliefs will gradually 
replace each other but also coexist. 
Figure 4.3 Schematic representation of hypotheses 
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that Nisbet has possibly overlooked. In Europe, besides the Industrial Revolution and 
Political Revolution, a religious revolution took place. The Atlas of European Values 
(2005) shows that national differences in godly image partly coincide with national 
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personal god is generally less likely in Protestant countries than in Catholic countries. 
In his schematic representation of the secularization paradigm, Bruce (2002) begins 
 
• % Workforce working in 
services/industry 
• % Socialist party votes  
• Contextual level 
• Individual level 
• Industrial and political 
revolution 
• Working in services / 
industry 
• Educational level  
• Disrespect leadership 
• Egalitarianism 
• Importance personal 
freedom 
• Belief in (personal) god 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
After a personal God: an abstract one, atheism or agnosticism? 
 
91 
 
with the Protestant reformation, which led to industrial capitalism, individualism and 
rationalism. Also Lambert (1999) stresses the point that Protestantism was the first 
widespread religion with a clear emphasis on liberty and freedom. After all, the 
Protestant reformation brought along a less hierarchical denomination with a more 
personalized faith in which there is direct contact between people and God. A 
possibility is that the differences we found in godly images between European 
countries are a direct consequence of the differences in religious tradition. Because 
Protestantism can have influenced both the rise of industrialism and a change in 
religious beliefs, we take into account people’s denomination. Another reason to 
include denomination in our analysis is that we expect industrialization to directly 
influence people’s ideas about God, and not only indirectly, via church membership. 
Therefore our final hypothesis reads: The direct effect of industrialization on ideas about 
God will decline, but not disappear, when denomination is taken into account (H8). 
4.3 Data and operationalization 
4.3.1 Data 
To answer our question about godly images, we make use of the European Values 
Surveys, wave 1999/200012. This survey follows earlier surveys from 1980 and 1990. 
Researchers from the participating countries were responsible for the translation and 
the distribution of the questionnaire. The interviews were conducted face-to-face by 
interviewers trained for this purpose. In the questionnaire, adults were asked 
questions around four central themes of human life: religion and morality, politics, 
work and leisure. We use the European Values Surveys for obtaining data about 
people’s ideas about God, their educational level, marital status, denomination, church 
attendance, occupation, and their attitudes concerning leadership, egalitarianism and 
individualism. 
In this chapter, we assume that godly images are mainly formed during people’s 
socialization period: the period between the tenth and twentieth year of life. For 
testing our hypotheses about generational differences, we thus need information 
about the economic and political situation in which the respondents were socialized. 
Although we acknowledge that godly images can also change during people’s life 
course, we were not able to take into account possible age effects. Information about a 
society’s level of industrialization is gathered from the Cross-National Time-Series, 
which contains longitudinal data for all countries in the international community. The 
statistics that we use for measuring industrialization relate to the period between 
                                                             
 
 
12 We thank Ruud Luijkx for his help with the European Value Surveys 
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1919 and 1980. After 1980, we used additional data from the Worldbank. We obtained 
statistics about a society’s level of democratization from the historical data handbook 
‘The Societies of Europe’ (Caramani 2000). This handbook contains the systematic and 
standardized collection of general election results at the level of single constituencies 
for 18 Western European countries since the nineteenth century. 
We managed to obtain data at both the individual and societal levels for thirteen 
countries in Northern, Western and Southern Europe, namely: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Great Britain and West Germany. These countries all have a Christian tradition, and for 
that reason have the same starting point. European countries that underwent long 
periods of obliged atheism were excluded from our dataset. These countries will 
receive ample treatment in the next chapter. 
4.3.2 Measurement of individual characteristics 
People’s ideas about God were measured by asking respondents which of the 
following categories best approaches their godly image: 1. belief in a personal god; 2. 
belief in a spirit or life force; 3. don’t know what to believe; 4. do not believe in a god, 
spirit or life force. The title of this chapter, ‘After a personal god: an abstract one, 
atheism or agnosticism?’ alludes to this question. People who chose the second answer 
category are considered to believe in an impersonal or abstract god. People who do 
not know what to believe are regarded as agnostic. It is important to notice that this 
answer category is autonomous and differs from the missing category ‘don’t know’. 
People who state that they do not believe in a god, spirit or life force are considered to 
be atheist. 
A person’s occupation is measured on the basis of two questions. “In which 
profession / industry do you or did you work?” and “What is / was your job here. On 
the basis of this information we constructed four categories: 1. agricultural worker; 2. 
manual worker; 3. non-manual worker; 4. no job. 
The respondent’s educational level is measured by taking the highest completed 
level of education. The country specific codes in the European Values Survey were 
converted into three general codes: low, middle and high. 
People’s political attitudes are measured by their egalitarian and anti-
authoritarian attitudes. To what degree do people have an egalitarian attitude is 
derived from the political left-right scale (10 points) that the respondents filled in 
themselves. We assume that people who place themselves on the left side of this scale 
are more egalitarian than people placing themselves more on the right (Noelle-
Neumann 1998). We created a zero point by subtracting the scores of the scale with 1. 
To prevent losing respondents without an opinion we decided to give them the 
average score on the scale. In our analyses, we included an extra dichotomous variable 
which indicated whether the original score was missing or not. In this way, we 
prevented unnecessary information without the requirement of placing respondents 
within the scale at any price. We measured people’s opinion about strong leadership 
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with the question on what respondents think of ‘having a strong leader who does not 
have to bother with parliament and elections’ on a four-point scale. We dichotomized 
this variable in 0 ‘good’ and 1 ‘bad’. 
Individualism refers to the importance people attach to personal freedom. 
Respondents were asked to rank four ‘aims’ in order of importance: 1. maintaining 
order; 2. protecting freedom of speech; 3. fighting rising prices and 4. giving people 
more say. Together, these items form the four-item materialism-postmaterialism scale 
of Inglehart (1977). People who ranked aim 2 or 4 on the first position (as most 
important) received a score of 1 and people who did not rank one of these items on the 
first position received a score of 0. 
The level of detachment from traditional institutions was measured by people’s 
church attendance, their family values and their marital status. Church attendance was 
measured by asking respondents how often, apart from weddings, funerals and 
christenings, they currently attend religious services. We recoded the answer 
categories into the number of church visits per year. The range of the newly 
constructed variable goes from 0 (never) through 104 (more than once a week). 
Moreover, we expect people who are less integrated in traditional family life to believe 
less often in the traditional god of their parents. Respondents were asked whether 
they agreed or disagreed with the statement that a child needs a home with both a 
father and a mother to grow up happily. This variable is dichotomous with categories 
0 ‘traditional family values’ and 1 ‘modern family values’. We expect people living on 
their own to be less integrated in community life than people living with a partner and 
/ or with their children. The variable ‘single’ is dichotomous (0-1). Respondents who 
are not married or cohabiting, and who do not have any children still living at home 
are considered as ‘singles’ and received a score of 1. 
The respondent’s denomination was measured with two questions. First the 
respondents were asked whether or not they belonged to a religious denomination. 
Uppon answering ‘yes’, respondents were required to specify their denomination. We 
distinguished between four categories: 1. Roman Catholic; 2. protestant; 3. other 
denomination and 4. no denomination. People who answered ‘don’t know’ on the 
second question received a score of 4 (no denomination). 
With respect to people’s attitudes concerning strong leadership, family ties and 
individual freedom, respondents could choose the categories ‘don’t know’ and ‘no 
answer’. In the European Values Survey these categories are considered missing 
values. Because we do not want to force these respondents in a valid category, we 
decided to include additional ‘missing’ categories in our analyses to prevent losing 
respondents. However, including the missing categories did not have significant 
consequences for our findings. Because we have no theoretical interest in these 
categories, we do not show their effects in the regression analysis. 
Chapter 4 
 
94 
 
4.3.3 Measurement of contextual characteristics 
Just like Lenski (1970), we hold on to one measurement of industrialization, namely 
the percentage of the labor force that is working in the industrial or services sector. In 
contrast to Norris and Inglehart (2004) we do not categorize this variable, but treat 
industrialization as an ongoing process. We take into account the economic situation 
in which people grew up (at age 15). In the Cross-National Time-Series data about 
industrialization is available till the year 1980. For later years, from 1980, we used 
additional data from the Worldbank. This additional data is corrected with a difference 
score between statistics from both datasets in the year 1980. Missing values were 
filled in on the basis of linear interpolation. 
The level of democratization is measured by the percentage of votes for socialist 
parties in national elections. This percentage represents the extent to which groups of 
people who were first excluded from voting are now standing up for their rights. 
Moreover, this percentage gives an indication for the leveling tendency present in a 
society on a certain moment in time (Hewitt 1977). This is not to say that current non-
socialist parties are undemocratic, but that they hindered the foundation and rise of 
socialist parties. Because we are interested in the political situation in which people 
were socialized, we look at the average percentage of votes for socialist parties in the 
period between the tenth and twentieth year of the respondent’s life. This percentage 
indicates the degree to which workers made use of their new achieved political power. 
Several societies in our dataset, like Italy and Spain, had a dictatorial regime for a 
certain period. In the years that a society’s regime cannot be considered democratic, 
this society receives a score of 0. 
  
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of individual characteristics by country 
  
Personal god Abstract god Agnostic Atheistic Farmer Education Strong leader  Political scale  
(0 no, 1 yes) (0 no, 1 yes) (0 no, 1 yes) (0 no, 1 yes) (0 no, 1 yes) (1-3) (0 good, 1 bad) (0-9) 
 mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD mean  SD mean SD mean SD 
Austria 0.31 0.46 0.53 0.50 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 1.60 0.70 0.84 0.37 4.40 1.48 
Belgium 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.01 0.12 2.13 0.73 0.67 0.47 4.24 1.67 
Denmark 0.25 0.43 0.38 0.49 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.02 0.15 1.74 0.88 0.86 0.35 4.50 1.93 
Finland 0.47 0.50 0.34 0.47 0.11 0.32 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.23 1.60 0.72 0.74 0.44 4.70 1.96 
France 0.22 0.41 0.32 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.40 0.03 0.16 1.65 0.83 0.65 0.48 3.94 1.95 
Germany West 0.38 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.11 1.58 0.65 0.84 0.36 4.43 1.60 
Great Britain 0.31 0.46 0.40 0.49 0.18 0.38 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.06 1.72 0.70 0.74 0.44 4.09 1.46 
Ireland 0.67 0.47 0.23 0.42 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.27 1.68 0.78 0.73 0.44 4.61 1.51 
Italy 0.71 0.45 0.20 0.40 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 1.71 0.71 0.84 0.36 4.34 1.95 
Netherlands 0.23 0.42 0.49 0.50 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.03 2.04 0.80 0.73 0.44 4.08 1.70 
Portugal 0.79 0.41 0.15 0.36 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.27 1.58 0.67 0.63 0.48 4.25 1.93 
Spain 0.49 0.50 0.28 0.45 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.21 1.71 0.70 0.77 0.42 3.91 1.83 
Sweden 0.16 0.37 0.54 0.50 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.06 2.09 0.72 0.79 0.41 4.37 2.05 
Total 0.41 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.31 0.03 0.18 1.77 0.76 0.76 0.43 4.28 1.80 
  
Ind. freedom  Church attendance  Family values Living alone Roman catholic Protestant Other church No church 
(0 no, 1 yes) (0-104) (0 trad, 1 modern) (0 no, 1 yes) (0 no, 1 yes) (0 no, 1 yes) (0 no, 1 yes) (0 no, 1 yes) 
 mean SD mean  SD mean  SD mean  SD mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
Austria 0.56 0.50 16.24 24.96 0.12 0.32 0.23 0.42 0.80 0.40 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.10 0.14 0.35 
Belgium 0.48 0.50 13.42 26.25 0.18 0.38 0.25 0.44 0.56 0.50 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.26 0.36 0.48 
Denmark 0.40 0.49 3.39 11.29 0.34 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.01 0.09 0.87 0.34 0.02 0.13 0.11 0.31 
Finland 0.37 0.48 5.46 17.39 0.41 0.49 0.29 0.45 0.01 0.11 0.84 0.37 0.03 0.17 0.12 0.33 
France 0.38 0.49 5.85 18.03 0.13 0.34 0.28 0.45 0.55 0.50 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.41 0.49 
Germany West 0.43 0.50 12.65 22.54 0.10 0.30 0.26 0.44 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.05 0.21 0.14 0.35 
Great Britain 0.26 0.44 11.44 27.40 0.37 0.48 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.35 0.58 0.49 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.34 
Ireland 0.44 0.50 43.90 34.49 0.32 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.89 0.31 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.26 
Italy 0.56 0.50 28.51 33.53 0.08 0.27 0.31 0.46 0.82 0.39 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.18 0.38 
Netherlands 0.53 0.50 11.29 25.17 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.22 0.41 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.33 0.55 0.50 
Portugal 0.38 0.48 26.15 32.11 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.86 0.34 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.31 
Spain 0.43 0.50 19.22 30.98 0.12 0.32 0.35 0.48 0.82 0.38 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.37 
Sweden 0.52 0.50 3.31 11.86 0.41 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.02 0.14 0.69 0.46 0.04 0.19 0.25 0.43 
Total 0.46 0.50 15.96 28.04 0.22 0.41 0.28 0.45 0.52 0.50 0.22 0.41 0.04 0.19 0.22 0.42 
Source: European Values Survey, wave 1999; Cross-National Time-Series; Historical data handbook ‘The Societies of Europe’
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Table 4.1 and table 4.2 present respectively the micro and macro descriptive statistics 
for each country included in our analysis. Although Table 4.1 reveals a distinction 
between northern and southern European countries, this is certainly not always the 
case. In all thirteen countries, we see that a majority of the people believe in God or in 
a supernatural power. The personal notion of God is most common in Portugal, Italy 
and Ireland, whereas the abstract or impersonal notion of God is most common in 
Sweden, France and the Netherlands. Agnosticism and atheism are relatively highest 
in France, Denmark and Belgium. Furthermore, we see that in all countries, the 
percentage of people working in the agrarian sector is below ten percent. The highest 
percentages of farmers can be found in Austria, Finland, Ireland and Portugal, while 
the lowest percentages of farmers can be found in Sweden, the Netherlands and Great 
Britain. With regard to people’s educational level the same pattern can be found, with 
the percentage of high educated people to be highest in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Sweden. With respect to people’s political attitudes table 4.1 demonstrates that 
country differences in anti-authoritarian attitudes do not always overlap with country 
differences in egalitarian attitudes. People in Denmark, Austria, West Germany and 
Italy have the least respect for strong leadership, whereas people in Spain and France 
are politically the most left-oriented. We can say that generally, individualism is 
relatively high in Sweden and the Netherlands. In a striking manner, attention for 
individual freedom does not automatically accompany higher levels of detachment 
from traditional institutions. For example, in Finland, people attach less importance to 
individual freedom while they are relatively less integrated in traditional institutions. 
This is the other way around for people in Italy. Finally, table 4.1 shows that there are 
predominantly roman-catholic countries, such as Ireland, Italy, Poland and Spain and 
predominantly protestant countries, such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden.  The 
percentage of people who do not belong to a denomination is highest in the 
Netherlands, France and Belgium. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of contextual characteristics on the cohort level by country 
 % of people who work 
outside the agrarian sector 
% votes for socialists N 
 (1920-1999) (1920-1999)  
 mean % SD mean % SD  
Austria 80.99 8.52 43.27 11.19 1,483 
Belgium 93.39 4.19 30.82 6.06 1,778 
Denmark 85.55 8.84 43.14 5.75 909 
Finland 76.95 16.13 42.24 3.90 956 
France 82.38 11.37 43.61 6.69 1,516 
Germany West 87.42 8.20 31.48 14.75 982 
Great Britain 96.77 1.06 39.47 5.46 847 
Ireland 69.98 11.74 13.75 3.59 959 
Italy 75.74 13.69 37.90 11.99 1,957 
Netherlands 90.39 4.58 31.13 5.19 996 
Portugal 64.46 12.14 16.54 20.19 979 
Spain 68.83 15.83 20.41 21.49 1,123 
Sweden 89.25 7.22 50.73 2.33 983 
Total 81.70 14.00 34.68 15.06 15,468 
Source: European Values Survey, wave 1999; Cross-National Time-Series; Historical data handbook ‘The Societies of 
Europe’ 
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the contextual characteristics on the 
cohort level by country. We see that in the period 1920-1999, the percentage of people 
working outside the agrarian sector is highest in Great Britain, Belgium and the 
Netherlands (above 90%). The level of industrialization is lowest in Portugal, Spain 
and Ireland (around 65%). In general, we find that the standard deviatian is highest in 
countries with a high level of industrialization and lowest in countries with low levels 
of industrialization. For the period 1920-1999, this implies a distinction between 
industrialized societies and industrializing societies. Furthermore, we see that the 
percentage of votes for socialist parties is highest in Sweden (50%) and after that in 
France, Austria, Denmark and Finland (above 40%). In the period 1920-1999 socialist 
parties were weakest in Portugal and Ireland (below 20%). 
4.4  Analyses 
In order to answer our research question, we performed a multinomial logistic 
regression analysis with four categories: the belief in a personal god, the belief in an 
abstract god, agnosticism and atheism. The first step in our analysis is to disentangle 
in what manner industrialization and democratization affected the decline in the belief 
of a personal god. A second step is to examine what alternative people choose when 
they do not believe in the personal god. In the literature, it is argued that the belief in 
an abstract god will follow upon the belief in a personal god, and that atheism is the 
final stage. Agnosticism is expected to come somewhere between believing in an 
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abstract god and atheism (Lambert 1999). Although this sequence seems logical it has 
not been demonstrated until now. For this reason, we look at all combinations, 
although we have no different hypotheses on the distinction between an abstract god 
and agnosticism on the one hand, and between an abstract god and atheism on the 
other hand. We base our findings on 15.468 respondents. 
Because of the hierarchical structure of our dataset, we performed a multilevel 
analysis in which individuals are nested in one-year cohorts within countries (N=912). 
Because of the limited number of countries in our research (N=13) we decided to 
include dummy variables representing the countries, instead of taking country as the 
highest level in our multilevel analysis. The variables concerning a society’s level of 
industrialization and democratization refer to the cohort level, and demonstrate 
whether or not these affected people’s ideas about God, within societies. In table 4.3, 
we present the variance on the cohort level in the null model, in which we only include 
the dummy variables representing countries. We see that there is indeed variance on 
the cohort level, except for the contrast between the belief in an abstract god and 
atheism. This implies that one-year cohorts within countries differ from each other 
with regard to their ideas about God. 
Table 4.3 Level 2 variance (cohort) in the null model, (N level 1 = 15,468,  N level 2 = 912) 
  Level 2 variance (cohort) 
Personal god – abstract god 0.159 *** 
Personal god – agnosticism 0.090 *** 
Personal god – atheism 0.167 *** 
Abstract god – agnosticism 0.042 ** 
Abstract god – atheism 0.004  
Agnosticism - atheism 0.050 * 
Source: European Values Survey, wave 1999; Cross-National Time-Series; Historical data handbook ‘The Societies of 
Europe’; controlled for country; *** = p ≤ .001, ** = p ≤ .01, * = p ≤ .05 
In table 4.4 to table 4.6, we compare the different ideas people have about God in 
pairs: the belief in a personal god versus the notion of an abstract god, agnosticism and 
atheism, the belief in an abstract god versus agnosticism and atheism, and finally 
agnosticism versus atheism. For each contrast we computed four subsequent models. 
In model 1 we include people’s occupation and educational level. After all, as a direct 
consequence of the Industrial Revolution and Political Revolution, people started 
working in sectors outside the agrarian sector which required higher skilled and 
educated people (Blau and Duncan 1967). Moreover, model 1 shows that the variance 
on the cohort level is no longer significant except for the contrast between the belief in 
a personal god and the belief in an abstract god. This implies that generational 
differences in godly images mainly come down to compositional differences between 
generations in occupation and educational levels. In model 2, we add to model 1 
people’s political attitudes, the importance they attach to personal freedom and the 
level of detachment from traditional institutions, such as the church, and the family 
and its strongholds. In this model, we answer the question whether the influence of 
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occupation on people’s ideas about God is mainly direct or has its effect on godly 
images via other characteristics, and is thus indirect. In model 3, we include church 
membership to answer the question to what extent the relationship between 
industrialization and godly images on the individual level can be explained by 
differences in church membership. Finally, in model 4, we add to model 3 contextual 
characteristics on the cohort level: the percentage of people working outside the 
agrarian sector and the percentage of votes for socialist parties. 
4.4.2 People’s occupation 
Models 1a to 1c demonstrate that people working outside the agrarian sector believe 
relatively less often in a personal god than believing in an abstract god or being 
agnostic or atheist. The influence of occupation is strongest on the ratio between the 
belief in a personal god and atheism. Model 1c shows that the odds for being an atheist 
instead of believing in a personal god are more than twice higher for manual workers 
than for agricultural workers (exp(1.235)). Furthermore, we see in model 1d that 
occupation has no effect on the ratio between believing in an abstract god and 
agnosticism. Models 1e and 1f demonstrate that people working outside the agrarian 
sector, especially non-manual workers, are relatively more likely to be atheists than 
believing in an abstract god or being agnostic. Hypothesis 1 about the influence of 
occupation on godly images for the largest part is supported by these findings. 
In model 2, we add to model 1 individual characteristics relating to 
egalitarianism and individualism, all consequences of the Industrial Revolution and 
Political Revolution. We see that the influence of occupation on people’s ideas about 
God decreases with about forty percent when we take into account people’s political 
attitudes, the importance attached to individual freedom and the level of detachment 
from traditional institutions. For some contrasts, the effect of occupation is no longer 
significant (models 2e and 2f). This implies that the influence of occupation on 
people’s ideas about God is for a large part indirect. Apparently, people working 
outside the agrarian sector are relatively less likely to believe in a personal god 
because they are politically more left-oriented. They also attach more importance to 
individual freedom and are more detached from religious institutions and strong 
families. For this reason, hypothesis 2 is largely supported by our data. The influence 
of occupation on people’s ideas about God decreases, but does not disappear when we 
take into account political attitudes and the level of integration in traditional 
institutions. 
  
Table 4.4 Multinominal logistic regression of people’s ideas about God on individual characteristics and contextual characteristics during a person’s socialization period 
personal god vs abstract god and personal god vs agnosticism (N level 1 = 15.468,  N level 2 = 912) 
  Personal god – abstract god Personal god – agnosticism 
  Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b 
 b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE 
Individual characteristics                         
Occupation                          
   Farmer (ref.)                         
   Manual worker 0.442 *** 0.118 0.180  0.125 0.159  0.127 0.106  0.122 0.768 *** 0.169 0.434 * 0.195 0.381  0.196 0.368 * 0.177 
   Non-manual worker 0.431 *** 0.117 0.274 * 0.125 0.256 * 0.126 0.220  0.121 0.323  0.170 0.147  0.194 0.098  0.194 0.090  0.177 
   No job 0.242 * 0.121 0.104  0.129 0.095  0.131 0.025  0.125 0.338 * 0.173 0.141  0.197 0.104  0.196 0.085  0.181 
Educational level                         
   Low (ref.)                         
   Mid 0.407 *** 0.048 0.245 *** 0.053 0.239 *** 0.054 0.173 ** 0.054 0.169 ** 0.063 0.031  0.070 0.020  0.071 -0.010  0.071 
   High 0.448 *** 0.060 0.285 *** 0.066 0.262 *** 0.067 0.207 ** 0.067 -0.097  0.082 -0.191 * 0.095 -0.227 * 0.097 -0.251 ** 0.091 
Strong leader                         
   Good (ref.)                         
   Bad    0.126 * 0.056 0.128 * 0.056 0.121 * 0.053    -0.040  0.075 -0.041  0.076 -0.043  0.068 
Political left-right scale (0-9)    -0.070 *** 0.012 -0.058 *** 0.013 -0.057 *** 0.012    -0.120 *** 0.017 -0.100 *** 0.018 -0.099 *** 0.016 
Church attendance (0-104)    -0.027 *** 0.001 -0.024 *** 0.001 -0.023 *** 0.001    -0.045 *** 0.002 -0.038 *** 0.002 -0.038 *** 0.002 
Individual freedom                         
   Less important (ref.)                         
   Important    0.194 *** 0.048 0.176 *** 0.049 0.164 *** 0.045    0.054  0.062 0.025  0.063 0.019  0.060 
Family                         
   Traditional (ref.)                         
   Modern    0.367 *** 0.060 0.348 *** 0.061 0.320 *** 0.057    0.191 * 0.076 0.155 * 0.077 0.145  0.074 
Living alone (0-1)    0.236 *** 0.050 0.231 *** 0.051 0.140 ** 0.053    0.324 *** 0.066 0.318 *** 0.068 0.285 *** 0.069 
Denomination                         
   Protestant (ref.)                         
   Roman catholic       -0.243 ** 0.084 -0.240 ** 0.087       -0.463 *** 0.114 -0.466 *** 0.115 
   Other       -0.724 *** 0.124 -0.738 *** 0.122       -1.458 *** 0.222 -1.460 *** 0.209 
   Not belonging       0.674 *** 0.093 0.684 *** 0.093       0.863 *** 0.116 0.866 *** 0.116 
Contextual characteristics                         
Industrialization (0-100)          0.014 *** 0.003          0.003  0.004 
% votes for socialists (0-100)          -0.003  0.002          0.002  0.003 
Level 2 variance (cohort) 0.100*** n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Source: European Values Survey, wave 1999; Cross-National Time-Series; Historical data handbook ‘The Societies of Europe’; controlled for country and for missing values on the variables; 
*** = p ≤ .001, ** = p ≤ .01, * = p ≤ .05 
  
Table 4.5 Multinominal logistic regression of people’s ideas about God on individual characteristics and contextual characteristics during a person’s socialization period 
personal god vs atheism and abstract god vs agnosticism (N level 1 = 15.468,  N level 2 = 912) 
  Personal god – atheism Abstract god – agnosticism 
  Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c Model 4c Model 1d Model 2d Model 3d Model 4d 
 b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE 
Individual characteristics                         
Occupation                          
   Farmer (ref.)                         
   Manual worker 1.235 *** 0.256 0.735 * 0.301 0.488  0.305 0.455  0.268 0.325  0.179 0.254  0.206 0.222  0.207 0.262  0.182 
   Non-manual worker 0.996 *** 0.255 0.676 * 0.296 0.455  0.301 0.433  0.267 -0.108  0.179 -0.127  0.206 -0.158  0.206 -0.129  0.182 
   No job 0.725 ** 0.260 0.356  0.301 0.125  0.306 0.075  0.273 0.096  0.183 0.038  0.210 0.009  0.210 0.060  0.186 
Educational level                         
   Low (ref.)                         
   Mid 0.412 *** 0.072 0.190 * 0.085 0.161  0.090 0.124  0.084 -0.237 *** 0.062 -0.214 ** 0.067 -0.219 ** 0.069 -0.182 * 0.067 
   High 0.490 *** 0.085 0.250 * 0.100 0.164  0.105 0.133  0.099 -0.545 *** 0.079 -0.476 *** 0.090 -0.488 *** 0.091 -0.458 *** 0.084 
Strong leader                         
   Good (ref.)                         
   Bad    0.258 ** 0.083 0.247 ** 0.089 0.242 ** 0.083    -0.167 * 0.072 -0.169 * 0.073 -0.164 * 0.065 
Political left-right scale (0-9)    -0.208 *** 0.018 -0.155 *** 0.020 -0.154 *** 0.019    -0.050 ** 0.016 -0.042 * 0.017 -0.042 ** 0.015 
Church attendance (0-104)    -0.063 *** 0.002 -0.040 *** 0.002 -0.040 *** 0.003    -0.018 *** 0.002 -0.015 *** 0.002 -0.015 *** 0.002 
Individual freedom                         
   Less important (ref.)                         
   Important    0.193 ** 0.074 0.086  0.076 0.080  0.069    -0.140 * 0.059 -0.151 * 0.059 -0.145 ** 0.056 
Family                         
   Traditional (ref.)                         
   Modern    0.370 *** 0.080 0.292 *** 0.084 0.273 *** 0.081    -0.176 * 0.070 -0.193 ** 0.071 -0.175 ** 0.067 
Living alone (0-1)    0.413 *** 0.075 0.363 *** 0.078 0.305 *** 0.077    0.088  0.066 0.087  0.067 0.145 * 0.063 
Denomination                         
   Protestant (ref.)                         
   Roman catholic       -0.558 *** 0.134 -0.551 *** 0.129       -0.220 * 0.112 -0.226 * 0.106 
   Other       -0.827 *** 0.246 -0.829 *** 0.225       -0.734 *** 0.218 -0.726 *** 0.208 
   Not belonging       2.056 *** 0.121 2.067 *** 0.119       0.189  0.106 0.182  0.099 
Contextual characteristics                         
Industrialization (0-100)          0.009 * 0.004          -0.011 *** 0.003 
% votes for socialists (0-100)          -0.006  0.004          0.005  0.003 
Level 2 variance (cohort) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Source: European Values Survey, wave 1999; Cross-National Time-Series; Historical data handbook ‘The Societies of Europe’; controlled for country and for missing values on the variables; 
*** = p ≤ .001, ** = p ≤ .01, * = p ≤ .05 
  
Table 4.6 Multinominal logistic regression of people’s ideas about God on individual characteristics and contextual characteristics during a person’s socialization period 
abstract god vs atheism and agnosticism vs atheism (N level 1 = 15.468,  N level 2 = 912) 
  Abstract god – atheism Agnosticism – atheism 
  Model 1e Model 2e Model 3e Model 4e Model 1f Model 2f Model 3f Model 4f 
 b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE 
Individual characteristics                         
Occupation                          
   Farmer (ref.)                         
   Manual worker 0.792 ** 0.260 0.555  0.299 0.329  0.305 0.349  0.269 0.468  0.285 0.301  0.320 0.107  0.330 0.086  0.291 
   Non-manual worker 0.565 * 0.260 0.402  0.294 0.198  0.301 0.213  0.269 0.673 * 0.285 0.529  0.311 0.357  0.320 0.342  0.291 
   No job 0.483  0.264 0.252  0.300 0.029  0.307 0.050  0.274 0.388  0.289 0.215  0.320 0.020  0.330 -0.010  0.297 
Educational level                         
   Low (ref.)                         
   Mid 0.005  0.071 -0.055  0.079 -0.078  0.082 -0.048  0.078 0.244 ** 0.080 0.159  0.089 0.141  0.093 0.134  0.087 
   High 0.042  0.081 -0.035  0.089 -0.098  0.093 -0.074  0.091 0.588 *** 0.097 0.441 *** 0.113 0.390 *** 0.117 0.384 *** 0.105 
Strong leader                         
   Good (ref.)                         
   Bad    0.131  0.081 0.120  0.085 0.120  0.078    0.298 ** 0.093 0.289 ** 0.095 0.285 *** 0.086 
Political left-right scale (0-9)    -0.138 *** 0.018 -0.097 *** 0.019 -0.098 *** 0.018    -0.088 *** 0.020 -0.055 ** 0.021 -0.055 ** 0.020 
Church attendance (0-104)    -0.036 *** 0.002 -0.016 *** 0.003 -0.017 *** 0.003    -0.018 *** 0.003 -0.001  0.003 -0.001  0.004 
Individual freedom                         
   Less important (ref.)                         
   Important    -0.001  0.067 -0.091  0.069 -0.084  0.064    0.139  0.076 0.061  0.079 0.061  0.073 
Family                         
   Traditional (ref.)                         
   Modern    0.003  0.074 -0.056  0.078 -0.047  0.072    0.179 * 0.087 0.138  0.089 0.128  0.084 
Living alone (0-1)    0.177 * 0.071 0.132  0.072 0.166 * 0.070    0.088  0.081 0.045  0.083 0.021  0.080 
Denomination                         
   Protestant (ref.)                         
   Roman catholic       -0.315 * 0.128 -0.311 * 0.130       -0.094  0.144 -0.086  0.138 
   Other       -0.102  0.248 -0.091  0.223       0.631 * 0.300 0.635 * 0.277 
   Not belonging       1.382 *** 0.106 1.383 *** 0.101       1.193 *** 0.122 1.202 *** 0.120 
Contextual characteristics                         
Industrialization (0-100)          -0.004  0.004          0.006  0.005 
% votes for socialists (0-100)          -0.003  0.004          -0.008 * 0.004 
level 2 variance (cohort) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Source: European Values Survey, wave 1999; Cross-National Time-Series; Historical data handbook ‘The Societies of Europe’; controlled for country and for missing values on the variables; 
*** = p ≤ .001, ** = p ≤ .01, * = p ≤ .05
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4.4.3 People’s educational level 
In accordance with hypothesis 3, we find that higher educated people are relatively 
less likely to believe in a personal god than believing in an abstract god or being 
agnostic or atheistic. Model 1a shows that the odds for believing in an abstract god 
instead of a personal god are 57 percent higher for high educated people than for low 
educated people (exp(0.448)). Against our expectation, we see in model 1d that higher 
educated people are relatively less likely to be agnostic than to believe in an abstract 
god. Moreover, model 1f demonstrates that the odds for being atheist rather than 
agnostic are 80 percent higher for high educated people than for low educated people 
(exp(0.588)). People’s educational level does not affect the ratio between atheism and 
the belief in an abstract god (model 1e). Model 2 demonstrates that the influence of 
educational level on ideas about God is for a large part mediated by people’s political 
attitudes, individualism and the detachment from traditional institutions. Surprisingly, 
we see in model 2b that the influence of educational level on the contrast between the 
belief in a personal god and agnosticism turned out negative: higher educated people 
are relatively less likely to be agnostic than to believe in a personal god. On the basis of 
these findings, hypothesis 3 is only partly supported by the data. Our findings suggest 
that higher educated people have a rather clear opinion about God. They are relatively 
least likely to be agnostic and relatively more likely to believe in an abstract god or 
being atheists. 
4.4.4 People’s political attitudes 
With respect to people’s political attitudes, we expect people who consider a strong 
leader as a bad thing to believe relatively less often in a personal god. In model 2a we 
indeed find that people who reject a strong leader are relatively less likely to believe in 
a personal god than in an abstract god. Moreover, model 2c shows that the odds of 
being an atheist instead of believing in a personal god are almost 30 percent higher for 
people rejecting strong leadership than for those accepting it (exp(0.258)). However, 
we do not find an effect of strong leadership on the ratio between the personal notion 
of god and agnosticism. Against our expectation, people’s opinion about a strong 
leader does affect the ratio between the abstract notion of God, agnosticism, and 
atheism. People who reject strong leadership are relatively more likely to believe in an 
abstract god, or are atheists rather than agnostics. A possible explanation is that 
people who reject strong leadership are relatively critical and consequently have a 
clear opinion about God. Although hypothesis 4 is only partly supported by our 
findings, we can conclude that the notion of a personal god is problematic for people 
rejecting strong leadership. 
Relating to egalitarianism, models 2a to 2c demonstrate that people who are 
politically more left-oriented believe relatively less often in a personal god. The 
influence of the political left-right scale is strongest on the ratio between the belief in a 
personal god and atheism. In model 2c, we see that with one step upwards on the 
political left-right scale, the odds of being an atheist instead of believing in a personal 
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god decrease by almost 19 percent (exp(-0.208)). However, our findings also indicate 
that people’s left-right orientation affect the ratio between believing in an abstract 
god, agnosticism and atheism. This is against our expectation that the belief in an 
abstract god is not conflicting with people’s egalitarian attitudes, and for that reason 
hypothesis 4 is only partly supported. We see that left-oriented people are relatively 
more likely to be agnostic or atheist rather than believing in an abstract god. Also, they 
are relatively more likely to be atheist rather than agnostic. 
4.4.5 People’s individualistic attitudes and detachment from traditional institutions 
Models 2a and 2c demonstrate that people who attach more importance to individual 
freedom believe relatively less often in a personal god rather than believing in an 
abstract god or being atheists. Our findings show that the odds for believing in an 
abstract god instead of believing in a personal god are around 20 percent higher for 
people who attach more importance to individual freedom than for people who 
consider this to be less important (exp(0.194)). Moreover, we find in models 2a to 2c 
that people who attend church less often, people with modern family values, and 
people living on their own believe relatively less often in a personal god than believing 
in an abstract god or being agnostics or atheists. In model 2c, we find that the odds for 
being an atheist instead of believing in a personal god decrease with factor 0.94 with 
each church visit a year (exp(-0.063)). These findings support hypothesis 5. 
Although individualism especially affects the ratio between the belief in a 
personal god and its alternatives, it also influences the ratio between the belief in an 
abstract god and not believing in God. In accordance with the individualism 
hypothesis, we see in models 2d and 2e that people who attend church less often are 
relatively less likely to believe in an abstract god than being agnostics or atheists. 
Against our expectation, we find that people who attach more importance to personal 
freedom and people with modern family values are relatively more likely to believe in 
the abstract notion of god rather than being agnostic (model 2d). A possible 
explanation is that these people make reasoned decisions and therefore have a clear 
idea about God. Furthermore, model 2f indicates that people who attend church less 
often, as well as people with modern family values are relatively more likely to be 
atheists than being agnostics. Hypothesis 5 is largely supported by our findings, 
although agnosticism seems to be less compatible with individualism than the belief in 
an abstract god. 
4.4.6 People’s church membership 
In models 3a to 3f we take into account people’s denomination to control for the 
possibility that differences in godly images between people amount to differences in 
church membership. After all, the protestant reformation brought along a less 
hierarchical faith with a clear emphasis on personal freedom. In models 3a to 3c, we 
indeed see that Catholics believe relatively more often in a personal god than in an 
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abstract god or being agnostics or atheists, compared to Protestants. Model 3c 
demonstrates that the odds for being an atheist instead of believing in a personal god 
are more than 40 percent lower for Catholics than for Protestants (exp(-0.558)). 
Compared to Protestants, Catholics also believe relatively more often in an abstract 
god instead of being agnostics or atheists (models 3d and 3e). These findings support 
the assumption that personal freedom in faith matters is more emphasized by 
Protestants than by Catholics. However, differences between Protestants and Catholics 
appear to be insignificant in comparison with differences between Protestants and 
people who do not belong to a denomination. In models 3a to 3c, we find that people 
who do not belong to a denomination are relatively less likely to believe in a personal 
god instead of believing in something else. This influence is strongest on the contrast 
between the belief in a personal god and atheism: the odds for being an atheist instead 
of believing in a personal god are almost seven times higher for people not belonging 
to a denomination than for Protestants. Models 3e and 3f show that people who do not 
belong to a denomination are relatively more likely to be atheists than believing in an 
abstract god or being agnostic. In general, our data supports hypothesis 8: the direct 
effect of industrialization on ideas about God decreases, but does not disappear, when 
denomination is taken into account. However, we do find that for some contrasts, the 
influence of individualism disappears when we take into account denomination. This 
implies that people who are detached from traditional institutions are relatively less 
likely to believe in a god or supernatural power, because they do not belong to a 
denomination. 
4.4.7 The influence of industrialization and democratization on the cohort level 
In models 4a to 4f, we add to model 3 the society level of industrialization and 
democratization on the cohort level. Although there is no variance left on the cohort 
level after we took into account the individual characteristics in model 2, we do find 
that there is a contextual influence of industrialization and democratization. An 
additional test demonstrates that this is probably due to the strong intra-cohort 
correlation of the educational level. For this reason, the effects of industrialization and 
democratization were already ‘captured’ in the effect of educational level. 
With respect to industrialization, we see that people who are socialized in 
societies with a larger non-agricultural sector believe relatively less often in a personal 
god than in an abstract god or being atheists. Model 4a shows that the odds for 
believing in an abstract god instead of a personal god increase by around 32 percent 
when the agrarian sector in people’s socialization period is 20 percent smaller 
(exp(0.014)20). The level of industrialization at age 15 does not affect the ratio 
between the belief in a personal god and agnosticism (model 4b). Against our 
expectation, we find that people who grew up in societies with a larger non-
agricultural sector believe relatively more often in an abstract god rather than being 
agnostic. Furthermore, models 4e and 4f show that the level of industrialization at age 
15 does not affect the ratio between the belief in an abstract god and atheism, or the 
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ratio between agnosticism and atheism. All in all, we did not find the sequence in 
people’s ideas about God as suggested by Lambert (1999). Compared with 
agnosticism, we find that the belief in an abstract god is relatively becoming more 
important with the process of industrialization. Our findings also do not support the 
expectation that agnosticism falls somewhere between the notion of an abstract god 
and atheism. Hypothesis 6 is for the largest part rejected by our data, although the 
popularity of the personal god is declining with ongoing industrialization. 
Model 4f shows that people who grew up in societies with stronger socialist 
parties are relatively less likely to be atheists than being agnostic. Regarding the other 
contrasts, democratization does not directly affect people’s ideas about God. 
Hypothesis 7 has to be rejected on the basis of these findings. When we take into 
account the influence of industrialization on both the individual and the contextual 
level, there is no contextual influence of democratization on people’s ideas about God. 
4.5 Conclusion and discussion 
In this chapter, we focused on the consequences of the Industrial Revolution and 
Political Revolution in Europe on people’s ideas about God. We answered the question 
how do individual characteristics and contextual characteristics, referring to 
industrialization and democratization, affect the adherence of individuals living in 
(post-)industrial societies in Europe to the idea of a personal god, the idea of an 
abstract god, the idea that God is unknowable and the idea that God doesn’t exist? 
Fist, we examined in what manner industrialization and democratization affect 
the belief in a personal god on the individual level. Our findings indicate that with 
ongoing industrialization, the belief in a personal god is replaced by the belief in an 
abstract god, agnosticism and atheism. More specifically, we found that people 
working outside the agrarian sector, who have more egalitarian political attitudes and 
who are more detached from religious institutions and strong families believe 
relatively less often in a personal god than in an abstract god, or being agnostics or 
atheists. The influence of occupation on godly images runs for the largest part via the 
other individual characteristics, and thus is mainly indirect. Regarding people’s 
educational level, we found that higher educated people believe relatively less often in 
a personal god than believing in an abstract god or being atheists. 
A second step was to examine how people think about God when they do not 
believe in a personal notion of God. In the literature, it is suggested that with ongoing 
industrialization, the belief in a personal god is first replaced by the belief in an 
abstract god, and in a later stage, by atheism (Nolan and Lenski 2006). Agnosticism is 
expected to occur somewhere between the belief in an abstract god and atheism 
(Lambert 1999). Our findings both support and reject this sequence in people’s ideas 
about God. We do find that people who are politically left-oriented and people who 
attend church less often are relatively less likely to believe in an abstract god and 
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relatively more likely to be atheists than agnostic. This implies that more conservative 
people are most likely to believe in an abstract god and least likely to be atheists. 
However, we also found that higher educated people and people who are more 
detached from family and community life are relatively less likely to be agnostic than 
believing in an abstract god or being atheists. This contradicts the assumption that 
agnosticism occurs somewhere between the belief in an abstract god and atheism. 
Furthermore, our findings indicate that the belief in an abstract god and atheism are 
rather popular among highly educated and individualistic people. However, a large 
difference between both groups is that people who believe in an abstract god attend 
church more often and are politically more right-oriented than atheists. 
We can conclude that the shift in focus from a macro-level perspective to a 
micro-level perspective contributed to our knowledge about the relationship between 
ongoing industrialization and people’s ideas about God. We not only showed that ideas 
about God change with the process of industrialization, but also that factors on the 
individual level can be held responsible for this change. We demonstrated that there is 
not one specific factor that can account for the relationship between ongoing 
industrialization and ideas about God. On the individual level, we found that the 
educational level, egalitarian attitudes and individualism are important predictors for 
people’s ideas about God. Moreover, we demonstrated that the influence of these 
characteristics is mainly direct, irrespectively of people’s church membership. 
Based on Inglehart’s (1990) notion of formative years, we expected people’s 
godly images to be mainly formed during their socialization period. We indeed found 
that within countries, cohorts differ in their ideas about God. However, when we took 
into account individual characteristics that relate to industrialization and 
democratization, the variance on the cohort level disappeared. This implies that 
generational differences in godly images amount to compositional differences between 
generations in, for example, the educational level and the church attendance. To 
further test the notion of formative years, we took into account the economic and 
political situation in people’s socialization period. Irrespective of people’s individual 
characteristics, we found that people who grew up in societies with a larger non-
agricultural sector are less likely to believe in a personal god than believing in an 
abstract god or being atheists. This corresponds with the finding of Norris and 
Inglehart (2004) that the belief in the traditional Christian notion of God is declining 
with the shift from agriculture to industry. With regard to the level of democratization 
in people’s socialization period, we did not found a clear influence of the strength of 
socialist parties in a society on ideas about God. Apparently the political situation in 
the formative years do not affect people’s ideas about God, irrespectively of their 
political attitudes. 
Summarizing, our findings offer some support for the analogy argument of 
Topitsch (1954), that people reason in analogies, and explain the unknown in terms of 
what’s known and important to them. We found that people with more egalitarian 
attitudes, and who reject strong leadership have more difficulties in accepting the 
sociomorphic notion of a personal god. However, after controlling for people’s political 
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attitudes, the political situation in which people grew up did not directly affect their 
ideas about God. This implies that people’s own attitudes are more important in 
determining their image of God than their experience with the political structure of 
their society. Our findings also offered support for our claim that the transfer from 
analogies from one generation to another is complicated by people’s detachment from 
traditional institutions, such as the church, and the family and its strongholds. Finally, 
we saw that higher educated people have more problems with believing in God, 
supporting the idea that people in (post-)industrial societies rather think logically and 
deductively instead of reasoning in analogies. 
4.5.1 Some last remarks 
We measured the level of democratization by taking the average percentage of votes 
for socialist parties in national elections between the tenth and twentieth year of the 
respondents’ life. Nonetheless, this measurement has some difficulties. A first difficulty 
is that the countries’ political systems are not always strictly comparable. Some 
countries have religious parties and a multi-party system whereas other countries 
have no religious parties and a two-party system. These differences in the political 
system can cause differences between countries in the percentage of votes for socialist 
parties, which have nothing to do with egalitarian tendencies. However, also in 
countries without religious parties, the interests of religious people are best 
represented by right-wing parties. Another difficulty is that socialist parties are less 
necessary in countries where there is a certain level of equality between people. In this 
case, the leveling of incomes can become a less important political issue. Although our 
measurement of democratization is not perfect, it is difficult to come with a better 
measurement that is not collinear with our measurement of industrialization. 
In this chapter, we found that people’s political attitudes and their attitudes 
regarding family life and individual freedom affect their ideas about God. However, an 
alternative explanation for these findings is that people’s ideas about God affect their 
attitudes in other aspects of life. After all, people who believe in God will be more 
integrated in a religious community and for that reason, will have more conservative 
attitudes. However, we made this second possibility less likely by also taking into 
account church membership and church attendance. In this way, differences in godly 
images do not automatically correspond with differences in religious integration. With 
regard to people’s political attitudes, we can also argue that democratization preceded 
secularization. After all, on the societal level, socialism emerged before the decline in 
the traditional image of the Christian God. 
This chapter also took into account the economic and political situation during 
people’s formative years. We indeed found that higher levels of industrialization 
during people’s formative years make the belief in a personal god less likely. Now the 
question arises whether the economic and political situation in the context in which 
people now live also affect their religious ideas. In the next chapter we will answer this 
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question by taking into account the contextual situation in both people’s formative 
years and in the year the interview occured. 
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Chapter 5  
Ongoing industrialization and 
people’s belief in Heaven and Hell 
This chapter proposes a shift from questions regarding which god do people believe in to 
questions about what characteristics people attribute to their gods. More specifically, it 
addresses the question of how individual and societal characteristics that refer to 
industrialization and democratization affect the belief in Heaven and Hell of individuals 
living in agrarian, industrial and post-industrial societies. We test the argument of Norris 
and Inglehart that human security decreases people’s religiosity against Topitsch’s 
analogy argument which stipulates that ideas about the unknown are modeled on what’s 
known and important to people. Using the European Values Surveys and the World 
Values Studies (wave 1999/2000), we studied people’s belief about Heaven and Hell: the 
belief that both Heaven and Hell exist, the belief that only Heaven exists, and the belief 
that none exist. The findings show that ongoing industrialization has a negative impact 
on people’s belief in Heaven and Hell, especially on people’s belief in Hell. 
5.1 Introduction 
According to an age-old Catholic belief, baptism is necessary for salvation because it 
purifies people from original sin. As a consequence, unbaptized infants may not reach 
Heaven. They are also not destined to Hell because they have not committed personal 
sins. Instead, when unbaptized infants pass away, they enter an afterlife condition 
between Hell and Heaven called the Limbo of Infants. In April 2007, Pope Benedictus 
XVI uttered the expectancy that unbaptized infants who die in infancy may attain 
Heaven instead of going to the Limbo. His statement followed an advice from the 
International Committee of Theologians, who concluded that the exclusion of innocent 
infants from Heaven does not concur with the special love God cherishes for the 
youngest children (The Daily Telegraph, 21/11/2007). This incident not only implies 
that over time, people’s image of God has changed, but their ideas about phenomena
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 related to god God might also have evolved. In this chapter, we shift the focus from the 
question of which god people believe in to the question of which phenomena feature in 
people’s ideas about God. More specifically, we focus on people’s belief in Heaven and 
Hell. 
Quantitative research for pre-industrial societies showed that people’s godly 
images are modelled on important characteristics of the societal structure (Swanson 
1960; Davis 1971; Underhill 1974; Peregrine 1996). In chapter 2, we demonstrated 
that the belief in a supreme personal god concerned with human morality dominated 
in the agrarian era, when societies were governed by a hereditary king or dictatorial 
ruler (Nolan & Lenski 2004; Moor, Ultee & Need 2007). However, it is argued that this 
notion of a personal god is gradually being replaced by the idea of a more vague and 
general higher power (Dobbelaere 1999; Lambert 1999). In chapter 4, we indeed 
showed that people in Western Europe who grew up in more industrialized societies 
believe relatively less often in a personal god and relatively more often in an abstract 
god. In this chapter, we will examine to what extent ongoing industrialization affect 
beliefs relating to the notion of a personal god. For this purpose, we investigate 
people’s beliefs in Heaven and in Hell in 42 countries, both inside and outside Europe. 
Miller, Scott & Okamoto (2006) relate the belief in a personal god to people’s 
ideas about evolution. They report on a percentage of the population in 32 European 
countries, plus Japan and the United States, that accepts the idea of evolution as true, 
false, or as unsure. Their findings indicate that the concept of evolution is accepted 
more often in Japan and Northwestern Europe and less often in the United States and 
Southeastern Europe. Subsequently, Miller et al. hypothesize that the concept of 
evolution is more problematic for people who believe in a personal god, because the 
concept of the evolution of humans from earlier forms of life implies at least a more 
distant or less personal god. Indeed, they show that people holding a strong belief in a 
personal god have more difficulties with the concept of evolution. This relationship 
was strongest in the United States. 
We argue that the notion of a personal god is not only related to people’s ideas 
about the origin of humanity, but also to their ideas about death and the afterlife. After 
all, the personal god rewards his loyal subjects by sending them to Heaven and 
punishes those who trespass law by sending them to Hell. This would imply that the 
belief in Heaven and Hell decreases alongside the belief in a personal god. In chapter 4, 
we demonstrated that the shift from agriculture to industry resulted in a decrease in 
the personal notion of God. In this chapter, we will examine to what extent the process 
of industrialization affected people’s belief in Heaven and Hell in a similar way. 
Norris and Inglehart (2004) suggest that decreasing societal and personal risks 
in (post-)industrial societies are the major reasons why people in these societies no 
longer need comfort beliefs, such as the belief in God or in an afterlife. They state that 
the presence of societal and personal risks is the most important force driving people’s 
religiosity. For this reason, they expect religiosity to be most prominent among 
vulnerable populations, especially when people are exposed to personal and survival-
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threatening risks (2004: 18). In this light, Norris and Inglehart (2004) show the 
percentage of people who believe in God, Heaven and Hell by type of society. 
Table 5.1 Religious beliefs by type of society (in percentages) 
Religious beliefs Agrarian Industrial Post-industrial Eta Sig 
Belief in Heaven 63 45 44 .094 * 
Belief in Hell 59 36 26 .228 *** 
Belief in God 78 72 69 .016 n.s. 
Source: Norris and Inglehart 2004; WVS 1981-2001, 74 societies; ***=.001 **=.01 *=.05 
In table 5.1 the percentages of people who believe in god, in Heaven and in Hell are 
highest in agrarian societies and lowest in post-industrial societies. Norris and 
Inglehart interpret these figures as confirming their hypothesis that human security, 
which is lowest in agrarian societies and highest in post-industrial societies, decreases 
people’s religiosity. We notice that the percentages differ according to whether people 
believe in God, Heaven or Hell. After a closer examination of table 5.1, four things catch 
our attention. 
First, in all three societal types, the percentage of people who believe in God is 
higher than the percentages of people who believe in Heaven and in Hell. Norris and 
Inglehart (2004) primarily focus on the belief in God and do not pay further attention 
to people’s ideas about Heaven and Hell. Considering the statistics in table 5.1, this is 
not an obvious choice. It appears that ongoing industrialization has a stronger 
influence on people’s beliefs in Heaven and Hell than on their belief in God. In this 
chapter, we specifically focus on the decreasing beliefs in Heaven and Hell, as well as 
examine in what way ongoing industrialization can be held responsible. 
Second, we see that in all three societal types the percentage of people who 
believe in Hell is lower than the percentage of people who believe in Heaven. 
Apparently, the concept of Heaven is more plausible for people than the concept of 
Hell. This demonstrates that the belief in Heaven and the belief in Hell not always form 
a fixed combination; people who believe in Heaven do not automatically believe in 
Hell. 
Our third observation is that the belief in Hell decreases more rapidly than the 
belief in Heaven. We see that the decline in the belief in Heaven stagnates in the post-
industrial societies, whereas the belief in Hell continues to decline. In this chapter, we 
take into consideration the possibility that ongoing industrialization affect people’s 
beliefs in Heaven and Hell in different ways. 
Our fourth observation is that table 5.1 is incomplete since it provides no 
information about the combinations occuring between the belief in Heaven and the 
belief in Hell. For this reason, we constructed table 5.2, which is also based on the 
World Values Surveys. This table gives additional information regarding the 
percentage of people believing in both Heaven and Hell, in Hell only or Heaven only, or 
in neither. Our calculations show that there exists a large group of people who believe 
in Heaven but not in Hell. Remarkably, the reverse is not true. Although table 5.1 
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demonstrated that the belief in Heaven and Hell not always go together, it appears that 
people who believe in Hell also believe in Heaven. We see that the percentage of 
people believing in both Heaven and Hell is highest in agrarian societies and lowest in 
post-industrial societies. The opposite is true for the percentage of people who believe 
in neither Heaven nor Hell: this percentage is lowest in agrarian societies and highest 
in post-industrial societies. Furthermore, we see that the percentage of people who 
believe in Heaven, but not in Hell does not differ between agrarian and industrial 
societies, yet is considerably higher in post-industrial societies. 
Table 5.2 Belief in Heaven and Hell by type of society (in percentages) 
Belief in Heaven and Hell Agrarian Industrial Post-industrial 
Belief in both Heaven and Hell 74.3 44.6 31.7 
Belief in Heaven, not in Hell 9.1 11.4 18.6 
Belief in Hell, not in Heaven 0.6 0.7 0.5 
Belief in neither 16.0 43.3 49.2 
N 48.293 81.061 74.093 
WVS 1981-2001, 78 societies; Chi2 = 22823.497**; ***=.001 **=.01 *=.05 
Regarding their book ‘Sacred and Secular’, we have two further comments on the work 
of Norris and Inglehart. First, we notice that Norris and Inglehart in explaining 
people’s religiosity only take into account the process of industrialization. In chapter 4, 
we already argued that the shift from agriculture to industry is also associated with 
the process of democratization. Nolan and Lenski (2006) showed that the 
technological advancement in pre-industrial societies brought along higher levels of 
social inequality. However, this trend to increasing social inequality was reversed 
during the industrial era, where secular ideologies emerged that focused on the 
interests of the common people. According to Nisbet (1966), the decline in religiosity 
is a direct consequence of the Industrial Revolution and Political Revolution. For this 
reason, we take into account both the influence of industrialization and 
democratization on people’s belief in Heaven and Hell. More specifically, we will test 
which aspects of industrialization and democratization affected people’s beliefs in 
Heaven and Hell. In this regard, we will take into consideration the processes of 
increasing human security (Norris and Inglehart 2004), rationalization (Bruce 2002), 
and individualization (Wilson 1976; Martin 1978). 
Second, we observed that Norris and Inglehart only study the relationship 
between industrialization and the belief in Heaven and Hell on the macro level. Most 
cross-cultural research in the sociology of religion focuses on macro-to-macro 
relations (Davie 1990, 2003; Norris & Inglehart 2004). We argue that it is important to 
derive macro-to-macro relations from micro-to-micro relations. Consequently, we 
examine in what manner industrialization and democratization affected people’s belief 
in Heaven and Hell on the individual level. Furthermore, we will test whether 
industrialization and democratization also affected people’s belief in Heaven and Hell 
on the contextual level, independent of people’s personal characteristics. In this 
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regard, Norris and Inglehart (2004: 18) argue that people’s demand for religion will 
strongly depend on the conditions of human security during people’s formative years, 
although they only take into account current conditions of human security. Therefore, 
we take into account both the contextual situation in which people grew up and the 
situation in which people now live. 
Table 5.1 and table 5.2 relate to the association between a society’s dominant 
subsistence technology and people’s belief in Heaven and Hell. In this regard, Norris 
and Inglehart (2004) argue that people who are more exposed to personal and societal 
risks will believe more often in a compassionate god who sends his subjects to Heaven 
after they die. In this case, the belief in Heaven is used for consolation and is the 
counter-image of people’s situation in everyday life. However, this theory cannot 
explain why people also believe in Hell and why this belief is decreasing more rapidly 
than the belief in Heaven. Therefore, we revert to a theory by Topitsch which states 
that people reason in analogies and explain the unknown in terms what’s known and 
important to them. If this is the case, people’s belief in Heaven and Hell will resemble 
their situation in everyday life: some people live under worse conditions than others 
and this image of society is projected in the afterlife. Also, if the general standard of 
living rises and abject poverty decreases, the belief in Hell decreases more than the 
belief in Heaven. Here, the afterlife mirrors life. In this chapter, these theories will be 
elaborated and tested. This leads to our research question: 
1. How do individual characteristics and societal characteristics that refer to 
industrialization and democratization affect the belief in Heaven and the 
belief in Hell of individuals living in agrarian, industrial and post-industrial 
societies? 
This question is answered by studying the belief in Heaven and Hell of people growing 
up and living in societies with different levels of industrialization and democratization. 
5.2 Theory and hypotheses 
5.2.1 The shift from agriculture to (post-) industry and religious change 
Norris and Inglehart’s most important assumption is that the absence of human 
security is critical for religiosity (2004: 14). People who are in danger of premature 
death are expected to have a heightened need for religiosity, especially with regard to 
believing in an afterlife. In this view, religion functions as a compensator for societal 
and personal risks people face. 
The idea of religion as a compensator can also be found in the deprivation theory 
of Glock and Stark (1965), which considers religion as a compensator that meets the 
needs of deprived people who are unable to fulfill their needs in non-religious ways. 
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This idea is not new in the sociology of religion and can be traced back to the classical 
works of Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx. According to Feuerbach (1830; 1841), 
religion, Christianity specifically, is in fact a comforting and distracting delusion that 
people use in the face of the sorrow existing in the world. Marx (1867) sees religion as 
the opium of the people. He stated that God is a projection of human worries and that 
religion exists as a compensation for human sorrow and social injustice. In this 
respect, Lanternari (1963) showed that messianic movements among the “oppressed 
people” - people under colonial regimes - focus on both a painful present and an 
afterlife condition free from Evil and trouble. According to him, messianic movements, 
both in primitive and highly developed societies, emerge from a crisis situation and 
offer spiritual redemption (1963: 309). 
We argue that Norris and Inglehart mainly stress the emotional function of 
religion in explaining the relationship between human security and religion. However, 
theories that focus on the idea of religion as a compensator cannot explain why people 
also believe in Hell and why the belief in Hell decreases more rapidly than the belief in 
Heaven. After all, increasing levels of human security are expected to affect the belief 
in Heaven as a comfort belief, not so much the belief in Hell. We argue that theories 
that focus more on the cognitive function of religion can offer an explanation for the 
rapid decline in the belief in Hell. Here, it is argued that people’s religious ideas are 
modelled on aspects of the world in which they live (Hume 1779; Guthrie 1993). 
Topitsch (1954) specified the hypothesis that people reason in analogies and stated 
that in explaining the unknown, people fall back upon the things that are familiar and 
crucial to their society. On the basis of this idea, we come to the prediction that beliefs 
in Heaven and Hell decrease with industrialization because the sharp contrast 
between good and miserable conditions people live in will become less relevant. The 
belief in Hell will decrease more rapidly than the belief in Heaven because in 
industrialized societies, abject poverty is no longer present. 
Nolan and Lenski (2006) claim that the shift from agriculture to industry greatly 
expanded the range of what people know and what they are able to do. This is 
expected to have influenced people’s religious beliefs, because the traditional beliefs 
which were comprehensible and recognizable in the agrarian era, will appear 
unfamiliar to people in industrialized societies. The shift from agriculture to industry 
not only embodied the increase in levels of human security. Nisbet (1966) argues that 
the shift from agriculture to industry is characterized by two important processes: 
industrialization and democratization. Together, these processes caused the break-up 
of the old agrarian era order, which was based on family, local community, monarchy 
and social status. Industrialization and democratization had repercussions on the 
different domains of human life. In this respect, Nisbet mentions the transition from 
community to society, from social authority to political power, from status to class, 
from alienation to progress and finally from sacred to secular. In the secularization 
literature, these social processes are expected to have caused the decreasing 
popularity of traditional beliefs, such as the beliefs in God, Heaven and Hell, and 
religiosity in general. From this perspective, societal differences in religious beliefs can 
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be explained by differences in rationalization (Bruce 2002), equalization (Lambert 
1999), the dehierarchization of political power (Nolan and Lenski 2006) and 
individualization (Wilson 1976; Martin 1978). 
On the basis of the analogy argument, we can understand why industrialization 
affected people’s belief in Heaven and Hell on the micro-level: people’s experience of a 
new social structure leads to new ideas about the supernatural. We argue that two 
important aspects in the social structure of (post-)industrial societies make the beliefs 
in Heaven and Hell less plausible. First, we already discussed that the acute 
contrasting living conditions of people are less common in (post-)industrial societies 
than in agrarian societies. Second, we argue that in (post-)industrial societies, the 
beliefs in Heaven and Hell do not concord with people’s view on political power. 
According to Topitsch (1972), the sociomorphic notion of an all-powerful god who 
sends his people to Heaven and Hell is derived from the presence of a strong ruler in 
agrarian societies who rewards loyal subjects and punishes those trespassing laws. 
We expect that this sociomorphic notion is problematic for people who live in 
democratically governed societies. Furthermore, we assume that people in (post-
)industrial societies are more detached from traditional institutions like the church, 
and the strongholds of traditional families, and therefore are less imprinted with 
traditional analogies. Finally, we expect that people in (post-)industrial societies no 
longer reason in analogies but rather think logically and deductively. After all, people 
in (post-)industrial societies are more highly educated than people in agrarian 
societies, and as a result acquire stronger cognitive abilities and think more critically 
(De Graaf, Need and Ultee 2000). 
Topitsch seems to suggest that the influence of ongoing industrialization on the 
beliefs in Heaven and Hell is mainly contextual. After all, people’s ideas about the 
supernatural will be based upon their experience with the social world, irrespective of 
their own characteristics. However, we argue that people’s experience with the 
societal structure can also depend on their own situation. In this chapter, we examine 
to what extent the macro-level relationship between industrialization and the beliefs 
in Heaven and Hell are the result of aggregated micro-level relations. Furthermore, we 
research to what extent industrialization affect people’s beliefs in Heaven and Hell on 
the contextual level. 
5.2.2 The compositional and contextual influence of industrialization 
The theories of Nolan and Lenski and of Nisbet are formulated solely on the macro 
level. They argue that industrialization, alongside democratization, brought forth 
changes in the societal structure, and as a consequence, also modified prevailing 
religious beliefs. However, we argue that the mechanisms behind these macro-
relations can be traced back to the micro-level. In this chapter, we try to sort out the 
influence of industrialization and democratization on people’s belief in Heaven and 
Hell on the micro level. In this respect, we argue that societal differences in the 
percentage of people believing in Heaven and in Hell are the result of compositional 
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differences between societies. Among others, we study the influence of the educational 
level, political attitudes and the detachment from traditional institutions on people’s 
belief in Heaven and in Hell. 
Industrialization and democratization can also affect people’s belief in Heaven 
and Hell on the contextual level, independent of their individual characteristics. For 
this reason, we will not only study micro-to-micro relations, but also macro-to-micro 
relations. In addition to Norris and Inglehart (2004), we not only consider the 
contextual situation in which people currently live, but also that in which they grew 
up. 
In short, the macro association between ongoing industrialization and the beliefs 
in Heaven and Hell can be explained at the individual level as the result of societal 
differences in the composition of the population and as the result of societal 
differences in the context in which people are living. In table 5.3, we give an overview 
of our hypotheses relating to the influence of industrialization, democratization and 
related processes on the belief in Heaven and Hell on the micro- and macro-level. In 
the following paragraphs we will derive these hypotheses from our theory. 
Table 5.3 Hypotheses about the compositional and contextual influence of industrialization, democratization and 
related processes on the belief in Heaven and in Hell. 
  Compositional Contextual 
Industrialization H1, H3a H2, H3b 
Rationalization H4 H5 
Democratization H6 H7, H8 
Individualization H9 H10 
Increasing human security H11 H12 
Denomination H13   
 
5.2.3 Industrialization and the belief in Heaven and Hell 
When we seek to derive the macro-to-macro relation between industrialization and 
people’s belief in Heaven and Hell from a micro-to-micro relation, we come to our first 
hypothesis about people’s occupation. We argue that people in societies with higher 
levels of industrialization more often work outside the agrarian sector. In the 
literature, it is argued that people who work in the agrarian sector are more 
dependent on natural forces they cannot always control and, as a consequence, believe 
more often in a supernatural power (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Our first hypothesis 
reads: People who work outside the agrarian sector are less likely to believe in Heaven 
and Hell (H1). 
Nolan and Lenski (2006) argued that religious ideas that emerged in the 
agrarian era are no longer comprehensible and recognizable for people in industrial 
societies. This argument implies that industrialization affects all people’s belief in 
Heaven and Hell on the contextual level, regardless of their occupation. People who 
live (H2a)/ grew up (H2b) in societies with higher levels of industrialization are less 
likely to believe in Heaven and Hell. 
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More can be said about the mechanisms underlying the effects of occupation on 
the individual level, and industrialization on the contextual level on people’s belief in 
Heaven and Hell. We argue that the influence of occupation and industrialization on 
people’s belief in Heaven and in Hell is mainly indirect. Regarding people’s occupation, 
we argue that farmers will have a stronger belief in Heaven and Hell, because they are 
politically more right-oriented and are more integrated in traditional community and 
family life. On the basis of the secularization literature (Bruce 2002), we have different 
explanations for the macro relation between industrialization and the belief in Heaven 
and Hell. After all, the shift from agriculture to industry was accompanied by the 
process of democratization and consists in itself of several processes, such as 
rationalization and individualization. This leads to our third hypothesis: The influence 
of a. occupation and b. industrialization on the belief in Heaven and Hell decreases, but 
does not disappear, when we take into account other characteristics on the individual 
and contextual levels (H3). 
5.2.4 Rationalization and the belief in Heaven and Hell 
A traditional version of the secularization theory emphasizes the negative influence of 
rationalization on people’s religiosity. In his work ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism’, Weber (1904) argues that a rational worldview will gradually replace 
the belief in the supernatural, mysterious and magical. In this respect, Weber speaks 
about ‘die Entzauberung der Welt’, the disenchantment of the world. In the second half 
of the twentieth century, many sociologists pointed to the role of rationalization in the 
secularization process (Berger 1967; Martin 1978). However, research remains 
inconclusive about the manner in which scientific knowledge influences people’s 
religious beliefs. A first possibility is that scientific knowledge directly clash with 
people’s religious beliefs because it challenges religious teachings, like the belief in 
God, Heaven and Hell. However, Stark, Iannaccone and Finke (1996) dispute the 
existence of a fundamental incompatibility between scientific and religious 
worldviews. They quote earlier research findings, mainly on the individual level, that 
conflict with the statement that science and religion are incompatible. Nonetheless, 
whether or not science and religion are incompatible, the relationship between 
people’s educational level and religiosity is negative, not positive. 
Ongoing industrialization, especially the shift from industry to services, required 
more highly skilled and educated people (Blau and Duncan 1967). De Graaf, Need and 
Ultee (2000) focused on the relationship between the educational level and church 
membership on the individual level and tested two explanations. Based on the work of 
Weber, they expected that higher educated people have more technical knowledge 
than lower educated people, and consequently hold a more ‘mechanical’ worldview. 
This technical consciousness would then be incompatible with the idea that God is 
responsible for everything in the world. In this regard, a higher educational level is 
associated with a higher level of (technical) knowledge. A second explanation states 
that higher educated people obtain more cognitive abilities and, as a result, become 
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more critical thinkers (Inglehart 1977). The research findings of De Graaf et al. (2000) 
show that the acquired manner of thinking is more important in determining people’s 
church membership than the actual knowledge people have. On the basis of this 
reasoning, we expect higher educated people to have more difficulties with the belief 
in Hell and Heaven. Our hypothesis reads: Higher educated people are less likely to 
believe in Heaven and Hell (H4). 
Bruce (2002) does not assume that science and religion directly clash with each 
other. Instead, he argues that the growth of scientific knowledge diminishes the need 
for religiosity because science gave people insight into, and control over areas which 
were a mystery before. In other words, religion’s cognitive function became 
redundant. Bruce argues that the effect of scientific growth on religiosity is mainly 
contextual. According to him, the need for religion diminishes for all people in society. 
In this case, rationalization affects people’s belief in Heaven and Hell, independent of 
their own educational level. Thus: people who live (H5a)/ grew up (H5b) in higher 
educated societies are less likely to believe in Heaven and Hell. 
5.2.5 Democratization and the belief in Heaven and Hell 
We expect that the decline of authoritarian rule and the rise of democratization have 
challenged the sociomorphic image of an all-powerful god who rewards people with 
Heaven and punishes them with Hell. Although democratization cannot be considered 
as a direct consequence of industrialization, Nolan and Lenski state that the Industrial 
Revolution made the democratic trend possible (2006: 244). More specifically, they 
claim that the process of industrialization required more skilled an educated workers 
who would be less likely to be politically indifferent and obedient, and also armed with 
more bargaining power. This gave rise to a more powerful and demanding lower class. 
A new, more egalitarian political system emerged, in which political parties 
represented the interests of both the elite and the masses. According to Nolan and 
Lenski, political power in dictatorial regimes is mainly used for the benefit of the 
governing class, whereas political power in democratic systems is used for the benefit 
of all. They illustrated this with the information that in agrarian societies of the recent 
past, ordinary people were called ‘subjects’, while in advanced industrial societies 
ordinary people became ‘citizens’ (2006: 242). 
We argue that democratization has changed people’s idea of human power. 
People in (post-)industrial societies are expected to have more problems with 
accepting the rule of a dictatorial leader. As a result, the belief in an almighty 
moralizing god will no longer coincide with people’s idea that political power should 
be equally divided. Moreover, we hypothesize that people with egalitarian views have 
more problems with a dictatorial god who sends his subjects to Hell, and who for 
centuries supported and maintained social inequality. Although we expect 
equalization to have negatively affected the sociomorphic image of an all-powerful 
god, we expect the belief in Hell to be more problematic for people with egalitarian 
views than the belief in Heaven. After all, people with egalitarian views will have more 
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difficulties with a punishing god than with a god who rewards people, on the condition 
that everyone has equal chances to obtain this reward. Thus we hypothesize that 
people who are politically more left-oriented are less likely to believe in Heaven and 
Hell (H6a). This negative effect of people’s political attitudes is expected to be stronger 
on their belief in Hell than on their belief in Heaven (H6b). This could explain our 
earlier finding that with ongoing industrialization, the belief in Hell is decreasing more 
rapidly than the belief in Heaven. 
We argue that democratization also affects people’s belief in Heaven and in Hell 
on the contextual level, independent of their political attitudes. We expect that people 
living in more democratic societies are less acquainted with a dictatorial political 
leader and therefore have more problems with an all-powerful god sending people to 
Heaven and Hell. Moreover, we assume that the belief in Hell especially, where people 
are condemned for eternity, will appear unlikely to people living in societies where 
human rights are protected by law, and where political leaders do not have the power 
to dispose of citizens’ lives. We like to bring in the presence of the death penalty as an 
indicator for the power of decision of the political elite to end someone’s life. In 
societies where the death penalty is absent, the state does not punish citizens by 
ending their lives, and therefore we expect people in those societies to view a 
punishing god, who sends his subjects to Hell, as problematic. Our hypothesis reads: 
people who live (H7a)/ grew up (H7b) in societies where the death penalty is 
abolished are less likely to believe in Heaven and Hell. This negative effect of the 
abolition of the death penalty is expected to be stronger on the belief in Hell (H7c). 
In some societies, the growing labor movement and the more central position of 
the proletariat resulted in a communist regime instead of a social-democratic one. 
Communism can be defined as a political movement that pursues an egalitarian and 
classless society, with an economic system based on common ownership and control 
of the means of production. This ideology served as a guideline for the political elite 
until the year 1990, despite practices to the contrary. The most important religious 
practice for the purpose of our study was atheism. In communist societies, the state 
considered religion as ‘the opium of the people’ and for that reason abolished it (Need 
and Evans 2001). Although the countries in our dataset all abandoned communist rule, 
we expect people who grew up in communist societies to be less likely to believe in 
Heaven and Hell (H8). 
5.2.6 Individualization and the belief in Hell and Heaven 
Another version of the secularization theory emphasizes the negative influence of 
individualization on traditional religious belief. In this respect, sociologists often speak 
of the functional differentiation process, which is the separation between the different 
domains of society (Luckman 1967; Wilson 1976; Martin 1978). Nisbet (1966) 
considers individualization as an important consequence of the Industrial Revolution 
and Political Revolution and emphasizes the separation of individuals from communal 
and corporate structures. Because secular institutions took over the traditional role of 
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the church in performing welfare tasks, people’s moral values became more detached 
from religious institutions. Imprinting church members with knowledge residing 
within religion became problematic. 
People distanced themselves not only from religious institutions, but also from 
other traditional institutions, such as the family and its strongholds. Nolan and Lenski 
stressed that specialized organizations of various kinds have replaced the traditional 
role of the family and that industrialization undermined the traditional authority 
structure of the family. They argue that the conduct of children in (post-)industrial 
societies is less controlled by their parents than in agrarian societies (2006: 278). 
Kelley and De Graaf (1997) indicate that family religiosity strongly shapes children’s 
religious beliefs. Religious parents shape their children’s views of life and teach them 
religious beliefs and rituals (Myers 1996). Nonetheless, people nowadays are more 
independent from religious institutions and family ties. This goes with the finding that 
religion in modern societies belongs more and more to the private sphere (Dobbelaere 
1999). 
We expect this decline of church membership and of the strongholds of the 
family on people’s religious beliefs to occur both on the contextual and individual 
levels. On the individual level, we take into account a person’s church attendance and 
integration in the community as well as in family life. Here, we assume that people 
who are less integrated in religious organizations, community life and family life, hold 
less traditional beliefs. For this reason, we expect individualism to negatively affect the 
belief in both Heaven and Hell. This leads to the following hypothesis: people who are 
less integrated in traditional institutions are less likely to believe in Heaven and Hell 
(H9). 
On the contextual level, we expect people who live in more individualized 
societies to have less traditional beliefs. After all, people who live in these societies are 
more stimulated to make their own decisions in life, independent of their own level of 
integration in the community and family life. We assume that in higher urbanized 
societies there is a stronger tendency for making one’s own decisions in life and to be 
independent of other people. This leads to the following hypothesis: people who live 
(H10a)/ grew up (H10b) in higher urbanized societies are less likely to believe in 
Heaven and Hell. 
5.2.7 Existential security and the belief in Hell and Heaven 
According to Norris and Inglehart (2004), the traditional versions of the secularization 
theory mentioned above need updating. Following Stark and Finke (2000), they argue 
that a proper theory about religious change should account for religious variation, not 
only for religious decline. This is why Norris and Inglehart came up with a new version 
of the secularization theory that postulates a shift from existential insecurity to 
existential security. Their most important assumption is that existential insecurity is 
critical for religiosity (2004: 14). People living in insecure conditions are expected to 
have a heightened need for religiosity, especially with regard to the belief in Heaven. 
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Still, the belief in Heaven can be considered as a comfort belief: people can hope for a 
better life in the hereafter. This effect of security on the belief in Heaven is expected to 
occur both on the contextual level and the individual level (2004: 18). According to 
Norris and Inglehart, the process of industrialization improved the basic conditions of 
human security. The shift from agriculture to industry brought forward improvements 
in the basic standards of living, like healthcare, nutrition and sanitation, as well as 
reduced societal risks such as poverty and infant mortality. 
According to Petersen and Roy (1985), religious comfort beliefs, like the belief in 
Heaven, give people optimism when facing personal problems and tragedies. Indeed, 
Osarchuk and Tatz (1973) found that belief in afterlife is negatively correlated to the 
fear of death. Although the relationship between religiosity and death anxiety is 
examined by many researchers, the research findings are contradictory. Some 
researchers detected a positive relationship between religiosity and anxiety, whereas 
others found a negative association (Hoelter and Eply 1979; Nelson and Cantrell 
1980). This is probably due to the reciprocity of the relationship. In this regard, Fufel 
and Heller (1962) pointed to the possibility that religion is chosen by those 
experiencing above-average fear. Although some researchers try to overcome this 
possibility of spuriousness by taking into account factors such as age, marital status 
and health, the findings remain inconclusive. For this reason, we look both at people’s 
subjective level of happiness and people’s actual insecurities. People facing personal 
problems are less likely to believe in Heaven and Hell than people who do not face 
these problems (H11a). On the basis of the emotional approach of Norris and 
Inglehart, we cannot differentiate between the belief in Heaven and the belief in Hell. 
Because the beliefs in Heaven and Hell are considered a fixed combination, the belief 
in Hell will decrease alongside the belief in Heaven. On the basis of the cognitive 
approach, we expect people to project their daily experiences in their beliefs in God 
and the hereafter. From this perspective, we argue that the influence of personal 
insecurity on the belief in Heaven and Hell is stronger for people’s belief in Hell 
(H11b). 
Norris and Inglehart (2004: 18) assume that the influence of existential security 
on religiosity operates at both the societal and personal level, and they suspect that 
the former is more important. However, they give no arguments why societal 
insecurity will affect religiosity, irrespective of people’s own insecurities. They argue 
that poor societies face more epidemics, hunger and poverty crises, and that people 
living in these societies have a higher demand for religious reassurance and 
consolation. This macro-relationship between societal insecurity and religiosity comes 
down to the micro-association between people’s own fears and insecurities and 
religiosity. On the basis of the Topitsch’s cognitive approach, we can understand why 
insecurity affects people’s belief in Heaven and Hell on the contextual level. When 
people model their ideas of the unknown on their experiences of what’s known to 
them, we expect that the belief in Heaven and Hell will decrease when the contrast 
between people living under extremely good conditions and people living under abject 
conditions disappears. We expect that increasing security will especially affect the 
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belief in Hell since the number of people living in extremely poor conditions has 
considerably decreased in (post-)industrial societies. Our hypotheses read: people 
who live (H12a)/ grew up (H12b) under more secure conditions are less likely to 
believe in Heaven and Hell. We expect this negative effect of existential security to be 
stronger on the belief in Hell (H12c). 
5.2.8 Denomination 
In paragraph 5.2.3 to paragraph 5.2.7 we argue that ongoing industrialization and 
related processes make the belief in Heaven and Hell less plausible. However, on the 
basis of the secularization theory, one could raise the objection that industrialization 
not so much affects people’s belief in Heaven and Hell, but the belief in the 
supernatural in general. Research already demonstrated that industrialization brought 
about the process of secularization (Bruce 2002). More and more people in 
industrialized societies distance themselves from religious institutions and no longer 
consider themselves as church members. We acknowledge that ongoing 
industrialization can indirectly influence people’s belief in Heaven and Hell via church 
membership. However, we hypothesize that ongoing industrialization also affect the 
belief in Heaven and Hell, irrespective of people’s church membership. Therefore, our 
final hypothesis reads: the direct effect of industrialization on the belief in Heaven and 
Hell will decline, but not disappear, when church denomination is taken into account 
(H13). 
5.3 Data 
5.3.1 The European Values Study and the World Values Survey 
For answering our research question, we use individual level data from the European 
Values Studies and the World Values Surveys, wave 1999/2000. The European Value 
Systems Study Group initiated the European Values Study, a large-scale, cross-national 
and longitudinal survey research program on basic human values. The European 
Values Studies are clustered around four themes of human life: religion and morality, 
politics, work and leisure. The face-to-face interviews were conducted by interviewers 
trained for this purpose. The first wave was conducted in 1981 and contains 
information about thirteen European countries. About twenty years later 
(1999/2000), the third wave was launched in almost all European countries. The 
European Values Studies aroused interest in North and South America, The Middle and 
Far East, Australia, and South-Africa. In several countries, affiliated groups were 
established to administer a similar questionnaire: the World Values Surveys. The first 
wave was launched in 1990 and is a replication of the European Values Studies. In 
1999/2000, the World Values Surveys conducted a third wave in 32 countries outside 
Europe. The questionnaires of the two research groups display many similarities. 
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5.3.2 Measurement of individual characteristics 
Respondents were asked whether or not they believe in Heaven and/or Hell. We 
distinguish between people 1. who believe in both Heaven and Hell, 2. who believe 
only in Heaven, and 3. who believe in neither Heaven nor Hell. Because table 5.2 shows 
that very few people believe in Hell but not in Heaven, we decided to exclude this 
category from our analyses. 
A person’s occupation is measured on the basis of two questions. “In which 
profession / industry do you or did you work?” and “What is / was your job here?”. On 
the basis of this information we constructed three categories: 1. agricultural worker, 2. 
non-agricultural worker, and 3. never had a job. 
The respondent’s educational level is measured by taking the age at which 
people did (or expect to) complete their fulltime education. People who did complete 
their fulltime education within twelve years received score zero. People who did (or 
expect to) complete their fulltime education in more than twelve years received the 
required number of years minus twelve. 
People’s democratic attitudes are derived from the political left-right scale (10 
points) the respondents filled in themselves. We assume that people placing 
themselves on the left side of this scale are more egalitarian and less anti-
authoritarian than people who place themselves on the right side (Noelle-Neumann 
1998). We created a zero point by subtracting the scores of the scale with 1. 
We measured people’s level of integration in traditional institutions with four 
variables. First, church attendance was measured by asking respondents about how 
often, apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, they currently attend religious 
services. We recoded the answer categories into the number of church visits per year. 
The range of the newly constructed variable goes from 0 (never) through 104 (more 
than once a week). Second, we take into account the sizes of the town in which people 
are living. People residing in a village or city of less than 100,000 inhabitants received 
score 0 and people living in a city of 100,000 and more received score 1. Third, the 
level of integration in family life is derived from people’s opinion about traditional 
family life. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
statement that a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up 
happily. This variable is dichotomous with categories 0 ‘traditional family values’ and 
1 ‘modern family values’. Fourth, we expect people who live on their own to be less 
integrated in community life than people who live with a partner and / or with their 
children. The variable ‘marital status’ is dichotomous: 0. partner and / or children, 1. 
single. 
Insecurity on the individual level is measured with four variables: ‘low income’, 
‘unemployment’, ‘widowed’ and ‘level of happiness’. Country-specific income levels 
were classified in three categories: low, medium and high. In this chapter, we 
distinguish between people with a medium or high income and people with a low 
income. The variable ‘happiness’ is a dichotomous variable. Happy people received 
score 0 and people considering themselves unhappy received score 1. 
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The respondent’s denomination is measured on the basis of two questions. They 
were first asked whether or not they belong to a religious denomination and if so, 
which one. We distinguished between five categories: 1. Roman Catholic, 2. Protestant, 
3. Islamic, 4. other denomination, and 5. no denomination. 
The number of missing values is relatively high for the variables ‘occupation’, 
‘educational level’, ‘political left-right scale’, ‘church attendance’ and ‘low income’. For 
the dummy variables ‘occupation’ and ‘low income’, we constructed a special category 
for people with missing values on these variables. For the interval variables 
‘educational level’, ‘political left-right scale’ and ‘church attendance’, we filled in the 
missing values with the mean score and included an additional variable that indicates 
whether or not the respondent scored missing on the original variable. In this way, we 
prevented losing respondents. Because we have no theoretical interest in these 
missing values categories (variables) we do not show their effects in our tables. 
Including the missing categories did not make a difference in our findings. 
5.3.3 Measurement of contextual characteristics 
We contend that ongoing industrialization affects people’s belief in Heaven and Hell on 
the contextual level, independent of their personal characteristics. We consider both 
the situation in which people live and the situation in which people grew up. As in 
chapter 4, we argue that people’s beliefs in Heaven and Hell are for a large part formed 
during their socialization period, but also can be adjusted in the course of people’s life. 
A country’s level of industrialization is measured by the percentage of the labor 
force working in the industrial or services sector. In contrast to Norris and Inglehart 
(2004), we do not categorize this variable, but instead treat industrialization as an 
ongoing process. The Cross-National Time-Series data about industrialization is 
available until the year 1980. For years after 1980, we also used data from the 
Worldbank. This additional data is corrected with a difference-score between statistics 
from both datasets in the year 1980. We take into account the level of industrialization 
in both the year of socialization (at age 15) and the year of interview. 
Data on the abolition of the death penalty originates from the human rights 
organization Amnesty International. The variable ‘abolition death penalty’ is a 
dichotomous variable which indicates whether or not the death penalty was abolished 
for common citizens in the year of socialization (at age 15) and in the year of 
interview. On the cohort level, we also take into account whether or not a person was 
socialized under a communist regime (between 10-20 years). People who grew up in a 
communist regime received score 1 and people who grew up in another regime 
received score 0. 
For measuring a society’s level of rationalization, we used data from the Cross-
National Time-Series. We defined rationalization by the number of people that went to 
university, per capita. This data about university enrolment refers both to the year of 
socialization (at age 15) and to the year of interview. 
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Urbanization is defined by the number of people living in cities of 100.000 
inhabitants and over, per capita. To obtain this, we again used data from the Cross-
National Time-Series. We take into account a society’s level of urbanization in both the 
year of socialization (at age 15) and the year of interview. 
On the country level, societal insecurity is measured by the GDP per capita, 
infant mortality per 1000 live births and the average life expectancy at birth in years. 
These variables were all obtained from the Worldbank. By dividing each variable into 
five categories, we constructed a scale that runs from score 1 (low insecurity) to score 
5 (high insecurity). The Cronbach’s alpha of this scale is 0.926. On the cohort level, 
societal insecurity is measured by people’s war experience. According to Inglehart 
(1990), experiencing war is such a traumatic event that all people will be affected by it, 
independent of their age. For that reason, the variable ‘war’ does not refer to a war 
experience only during one’s socialization period, but is extended to a war experience 
during one’s entire life. Data about inter- intra and extra-state wars were obtained 
from the Correlates of War project, which started at the University of Michigan. Only 
wars in which one in ten thousand people died were taken into account. 
Missing values on the contextual variables for intermediate years were filled in 
on the basis of linear interpolation. Missing values on the beginning or ending of the 
series were filled in on the basis of extrapolation for at most twenty years. 
We managed to collect data for 42 countries worldwide. Table 5.4 and table 5.5 
present the mean scores on respectively the micro level and macro level variables per 
country. To get a better understanding of our data, we presented the mean scores on 
all variables for three clusters of countries: Western countries, former communist 
countries and the remainder countries. Table 5.4 demonstrates that there are large 
differences between the three clusters of countries with regard to individual level 
characteristics. In general, we can conclude that Western countries have the highest 
percentages of people believing in Heaven only (18%) and people with modern family 
values (21%), and the lowest percentages of farmers (4%) and unemployed (5%). 
People in former communist countries belong relatively least often to a denomination 
(65%) and are relatively most often unhappy (33%) and widowed (11%). The 
remainder countries in our dataset are the most religious: 92 percent of the people 
believe in both Heaven and Hell and 95 percent belong to a denomination. In these 
remainder countries, 68 percent of the people consider themselves as Islamites. With 
regard to the macro level data, we see a clear pattern. Western countries generally 
have the highest levels of industrialization, rationalization and securities, while the 
remainder countries contain the lowest levels. Whereas almost every Western country 
has abolished the death penalty, none of the remainder countries did so. Although 
there are large differences between the three clusters of countries, large differences 
significantly exist within these clusters. 
  
Table 5.4 Mean scores on the individual level variables, per country (N between brackets) 
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Western countries                    
Austria (1,378) 0.18 0.22 0.59 0.08 0.81 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.13 4.41 16.51 0.27 0.34 0.12 4.85 0.91 0.07 0.03 0.14 
Belgium (1,668) 0.18 0.14 0.68 0.01 0.55 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.37 4.19 13.35 0.17 0.41 0.18 6.47 0.92 0.08 0.09 0.14 
Canada (1,796) 0.50 0.26 0.24 0.02 0.43 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.26 4.49 20.27 0.47 0.40 0.29 6.66 0.96 0.09 0.08 0.22 
Denmark (925) 0.08 0.09 0.82 0.03 0.01 0.87 0.00 0.01 0.10 4.50 3.40 0.15 0.46 0.33 4.68 0.95 0.06 0.04 0.19 
Finland (833) 0.28 0.29 0.43 0.08 0.01 0.86 0.00 0.02 0.12 4.81 5.79 0.26 0.38 0.40 6.81 0.90 0.06 0.09 0.21 
France (1,389) 0.19 0.13 0.69 0.03 0.53 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.43 3.83 5.79 0.48 0.45 0.13 5.60 0.92 0.08 0.06 0.29 
Germany, West (916) 0.22 0.12 0.66 0.02 0.41 0.42 0.02 0.01 0.15 4.45 12.60 0.64 0.39 0.10 4.36 0.84 0.12 0.04 0.18 
Iceland (882) 0.16 0.39 0.45 0.04 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.04 0.04 4.80 3.92 0.41 0.51 0.28 7.13 0.97 0.06 0.01 0.17 
Ireland (840) 0.51 0.34 0.15 0.14 0.90 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.06 4.70 44.56 0.13 0.37 0.30 4.91 0.97 0.08 0.05 0.07 
Italy (1,695) 0.48 0.10 0.41 0.05 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 4.35 29.30 0.23 0.42 0.08 4.90 0.80 0.07 0.04 0.26 
Luxembourg (996) 0.19 0.13 0.67 0.03 0.66 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.30 4.33 13.50 0.00 0.46 0.16 5.82 0.94 0.06 0.01 0.26 
Malta (852) 0.79 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 4.77 59.50 0.00 0.31 0.08 4.07 0.87 0.02 0.04 0.13 
Netherlands (946) 0.14 0.22 0.63 0.00 0.22 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.55 4.11 11.31 0.37 0.45 0.34 6.58 0.95 0.07 0.01 0.04 
Northern Ireland (531) 0.69 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.42 0.44 0.00 0.01 0.13 4.68 36.06 0.02 0.42 0.30 4.58 0.97 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Spain (2,002) 0.35 0.15 0.50 0.07 0.81 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.17 3.73 19.93 0.41 0.40 0.14 4.19 0.87 0.08 0.08 0.20 
Sweden (637) 0.10 0.22 0.68 0.01 0.02 0.76 0.00 0.01 0.22 4.32 3.62 0.65 0.40 0.38 7.15 0.93 0.03 0.04 0.10 
United States (1,105) 0.73 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.25 0.32 0.00 0.21 0.21 4.83 36.08 0.58 0.44 0.36 7.88 0.94 0.05 0.06 0.15 
Total Western countries (19,391) 0.34 0.18 0.48 0.04 0.51 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.22 4.37 19.38 0.32 0.41 0.21 5.64 0.91 0.07 0.05 0.18 
                    
Former communist countries                    
Albania (647) 0.38 0.07 0.54 0.24 0.27 0.02 0.58 0.01 0.12 4.42 15.55 0.22 0.26 0.01 5.42 0.62 0.03 0.17 0.07 
Belarus (667) 0.30 0.06 0.63 0.19 0.53 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.46 4.72 6.13 0.40 0.40 0.06 5.84 0.69 0.12 0.06 0.15 
Bulgaria (748) 0.27 0.03 0.70 0.11 0.61 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.30 4.86 8.53 0.33 0.34 0.03 6.05 0.48 0.15 0.14 0.34 
  
 
Croatia (801) 0.54 0.07 0.39 0.03 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.13 4.12 22.53 0.25 0.39 0.14 6.76 0.82 0.07 0.10 0.16 
Czech Republic (1,641) 0.13 0.08 0.79 0.02 0.28 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.67 4.94 6.29 0.27 0.39 0.13 5.49 0.86 0.11 0.05 0.32 
Estonia (747) 0.15 0.04 0.81 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.76 4.91 4.55 0.41 0.46 0.04 7.14 0.68 0.10 0.08 0.23 
Germany East (938) 0.10 0.04 0.86 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.01 0.67 4.00 4.54 0.49 0.50 0.09 4.60 0.78 0.13 0.16 0.29 
Hungary (894) 0.19 0.09 0.72 0.05 0.39 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.43 4.07 7.57 0.29 0.40 0.04 4.85 0.73 0.12 0.07 0.20 
Latvia (721) 0.26 0.07 0.67 0.02 0.35 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.41 4.79 6.49 0.39 0.48 0.07 6.61 0.59 0.15 0.13 0.48 
Lithuania (470) 0.58 0.07 0.35 0.07 0.77 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.19 4.68 14.40 0.00 0.37 0.18 6.89 0.75 0.11 0.13 0.24 
Macedonia, Republic of (950) 0.46 0.04 0.50 0.07 0.59 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.12 4.19 20.15 0.22 0.27 0.03 5.43 0.75 0.07 0.23 0.21 
Poland (958) 0.61 0.16 0.23 0.13 0.95 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 4.43 39.08 0.28 0.37 0.03 5.53 0.73 0.15 0.08 0.25 
Republic of Moldova (667) 0.67 0.04 0.29 0.20 0.97 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.81 15.05 0.21 0.30 0.03 6.23 0.50 0.12 0.17 0.29 
Romania (883) 0.69 0.06 0.25 0.14 0.92 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 4.82 19.04 0.33 0.34 0.05 5.39 0.48 0.10 0.08 0.19 
Russian Federation (1,684) 0.35 0.02 0.63 0.05 0.44 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.51 3.90 3.97 0.47 0.48 0.05 6.37 0.48 0.17 0.11 0.17 
Slovakia (1,075) 0.44 0.10 0.46 0.07 0.65 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.24 4.18 31.81 0.14 0.37 0.05 5.78 0.72 0.09 0.11 0.22 
Slovenia (890) 0.20 0.08 0.73 0.03 0.67 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.31 4.01 12.40 0.00 0.41 0.12 6.05 0.79 0.08 0.09 0.20 
Ukraine (783) 0.38 0.03 0.59 0.08 0.43 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.45 4.38 9.04 0.48 0.34 0.03 6.80 0.47 0.12 0.10 0.40 
Total former communist (16,164) 0.36 0.06 0.58 0.08 0.53 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.35 4.42 13.45 0.30 0.39 0.07 5.90 0.67 0.11 0.11 0.24 
                    
Other countries                    
Bangladesh (1,364) 0.96 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.07 0.00 6.60 49.83 0.15 0.22 0.01 6.34 0.76 0.01 0.09 0.10 
Indonesia (994) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.93 0.01 0.00 5.62 51.39 0.25 0.25 0.11 6.11 0.95 0.08 0.01 0.05 
Jordan (1,209) 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 4.98 38.33 0.35 0.33 0.02 5.32 0.83 0.03 0.18 0.37 
Mexico (1,200) 0.70 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.73 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.21 5.49 38.84 0.45 0.36 0.14 4.99 0.92 0.05 0.04 0.24 
Morocco (1,005) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 5.05 37.77 0.65 0.49 0.01 5.24 0.85 0.04 0.13 0.10 
Philippines (1,160) 0.89 0.08 0.03 0.16 0.77 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.11 5.42 41.20 0.63 0.25 0.03 5.04 0.89 0.04 0.17 0.15 
Turkey (1,189) 0.93 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.02 4.95 28.55 0.49 0.31 0.03 3.35 0.59 0.04 0.12 0.38 
Total other countries (8,121) 0.92 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.23 0.02 0.68 0.02 0.05 5.55 40.86 0.42 0.31 0.05 5.21 0.82 0.04 0.11 0.21 
                    
Total (43,676) 0.45 0.11 0.43 0.07 0.46 0.13 0.15 0.02 0.24 4.58 21.20 0.33 0.38 0.13 5.67 0.80 0.08 0.08 0.21 
Source: European Values Studies & World Values Surveys, wave 1999/2000 
  
Table 5.5 Mean scores on the contextual level variables, per country (N between brackets) 
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Western countries            
Austria (1,378) 93.89 81.10 1.00 0.85 27.80 10.88 286.00 309.98 1.00 0.15 0.00 
Belgium (1,668) 98.04 93.38 1.00 0.02 27.60 11.48 218.00 188.47 1.00 0.28 0.00 
Canada (1,796) 97.10 89.62 1.00 0.39 32.40 22.51 457.00 265.93 1.00 0.32 0.00 
Denmark (925) 96.54 85.75 1.00 0.97 34.50 14.64 211.00 231.84 1.33 0.00 0.00 
Finland (833) 91.32 75.93 1.00 0.90 48.50 19.03 243.00 192.08 1.00 0.24 0.00 
France (1,389) 95.90 82.27 1.00 0.27 34.70 13.25 151.00 171.20 1.00 0.64 0.00 
Germany, West (916) 97.20 87.49 1.00 0.11 25.50 9.63 308.00 317.40 1.00 0.43 0.00 
Iceland (882) 89.15 77.85 1.00 1.00 29.00 12.46 393.00 109.85 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Ireland (840) 90.77 70.09 1.00 0.09 38.50 11.03 307.00 229.03 1.33 0.00 0.00 
Italy (1,695) 94.00 76.01 1.00 0.89 32.40 12.68 223.00 249.16 1.00 0.34 0.00 
Luxembourg (996) 98.36 91.35 1.00 0.41 14.20 4.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.00 
Malta (852) 97.83 93.61 1.00 0.50 18.00 4.53 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.25 0.00 
Netherlands (946) 96.30 90.47 1.00 1.00 29.90 14.67 323.00 292.52 1.00 0.29 0.00 
Northern Ireland (531) 98.53 96.54 1.00 0.39 33.30 9.73 916.00 566.37 1.00 0.97 0.00 
Spain (2,002) 93.46 69.20 1.00 0.39 43.10 13.28 404.00 314.60 1.33 0.27 0.00 
Sweden (637) 97.60 89.17 1.00 1.00 31.80 13.59 281.00 227.81 1.00 0.00 0.00 
United States (,1105) 97.70 93.66 0.00 0.00 48.20 37.55 254.00 268.16 1.33 0.68 0.00 
Total Western countries (19,391) 95.46 83.97 0.94 0.51 32.72 14.28 284.20 231.16 1.11 0.30 0.00 
            
            
  
 
Former communist countries            
Albania (647) 42.18 39.75 1.00 0.00 10.50 7.51 96.00 78.18 3.33 0.10 0.93 
Belarus (667) 77.94 64.38 0.00 0.00 35.80 17.97 467.00 321.57 4.33 0.30 0.15 
Bulgaria (748) 74.23 52.28 1.00 0.00 32.10 10.67 346.00 180.45 3.33 0.41 0.89 
Croatia (801) 83.40 54.78 1.00 0.18 20.20 12.87 233.00 145.98 2.67 1.00 1.00 
Czech Republic (1,641) 94.79 77.20 1.00 0.11 20.90 7.88 216.00 160.91 2.00 0.01 0.88 
Estonia (747) 92.00 63.75 1.00 0.00 30.60 15.25 353.00 302.52 2.33 0.33 0.97 
Germany, East (938) 97.20 87.44 1.00 0.14 25.50 8.22 308.00 258.62 1.00 0.41 0.85 
Hungary (894) 92.90 68.85 1.00 0.12 20.90 7.06 290.00 240.36 3.00 0.58 0.93 
Latvia (721) 83.38 60.67 1.00 0.00 30.30 14.29 388.00 299.12 3.67 0.40 0.98 
Lithuania (470) 80.68 62.39 1.00 0.00 27.10 15.43 418.00 305.66 3.00 0.35 0.97 
Macedonia, Republic of (950) 76.05 53.41 1.00 0.17 15.50 12.34 169.00 137.54 3.33 1.00 0.97 
Poland (958) 81.90 58.62 1.00 0.00 30.90 9.28 299.00 210.03 2.67 0.35 0.91 
Republic of Moldova (667) 50.35 60.79 1.00 0.10 30.80 17.07 173.00 284.24 4.67 0.22 0.91 
Romania (883) 57.58 48.35 1.00 0.16 18.30 6.59 321.00 178.84 4.00 0.33 0.94 
Russian Federation (1,684) 85.00 62.32 0.00 0.00 30.50 16.02 454.00 300.92 4.67 1.00 1.00 
Slovakia (1,075) 92.61 79.48 1.00 0.15 21.10 8.95 128.00 156.86 2.67 0.01 0.88 
Slovenia (890) 89.18 52.56 1.00 0.18 20.30 12.21 135.00 114.38 1.67 1.00 0.97 
Ukraine (783) 79.48 62.35 1.00 0.00 38.50 15.90 386.00 296.78 4.67 0.33 1.00 
Total former communist (16,164) 81.51 63.02 0.85 0.08 25.27 11.68 286.56 217.32 3.13 0.47 0.91 
            
Other countries            
Bangladesh (1,364) 43.95 31.64 0.00 0.00 0.90 2.87 142.00 57.08 5.00 0.60 0.00 
Indonesia (994) 48.42 35.11 0.00 0.00 11.80 3.28 200.00 111.84 4.67 0.68 0.00 
Jordan (1,209) 95.88 79.20 0.00 0.00 24.20 12.75 418.00 329.39 4.00 0.57 0.00 
Mexico (1,200) 79.00 59.93 0.00 0.00 18.20 10.22 534.00 345.32 3.33 0.05 0.00 
Morocco (1,005) 54.46 47.58 0.00 0.00 1.50 2.79 327.00 287.05 4.67 0.95 0.00 
Philippines (1,160) 67.40 50.27 0.00 0.00 28.90 19.91 145.00 137.97 4.33 1.00 0.00 
Turkey (1,189) 62.40 43.76 0.00 0.00 21.90 9.30 471.00 269.42 3.67 0.00 0.00 
Total other countries (8,121) 64.76 49.73 0.00 0.00 15.41 8.84 319.60 218.02 4.23 0.54 0.00 
            
Total (43,676) 84.59 69.85 0.73 0.25 26.74 12.31 291.65 223.59 2.44 0.41 0.34 
Source: Cross-National Time-Series; the Worldbank; Amnesty International; Correlates of War project
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5.4 Results 
In order to test our hypotheses, we performed two successive logistic regression 
analyses. In the first analysis, we distinguished between people who believe in both 
Heaven and Hell or only in Heaven, and people who do not believe in Heaven nor Hell. 
To summarize, we speak of people who believe in an afterlife and people who do not. 
In the second analysis, we differentiate within the group of people believing in an 
afterlife, between people who believe in both Heaven and Hell, and people who believe 
only in Heaven. Because of the hierarchical structure of our data, we performed our 
analyses in a multilevel structure in which individuals are nested in one-year cohorts 
and countries. In discussing our hypotheses, we do not always keep to the numerical 
order. We will first test the hypotheses that relate to the compositional influence of 
industrialization and subsequently the hypotheses that relate to the contextual 
influence of industrialization. 
For each analysis we computed six models, as demonstrated in table 5.6 and 
table 5.7. The null model demonstrates that there is variation on the cohort level for 
the contrast between not believing in an afterlife and believing in an afterlife. Thus, 
one-year cohorts within countries differ from each other with regard to their ideas 
about Heaven and Hell. For the contrast between the belief in both Heaven and Hell 
and the belief in only Heaven, we do not find variance on the cohort level. There is 
variation for both contrasts on the country level. This indicates that people living in 
different countries differ in their ideas about Heaven and Hell. The variance on the 
country level is much larger than the variance we find on the cohort level. In models 
1a to 1c we consecutively take into account individual characteristics relating to 
ongoing industrialization. In model 1a we include ‘occupation’ and ‘education’. As a 
direct consequence of industrialization, more people work in sectors outside the 
agrarian sector, which require better skills and a higher education (Blau and Duncan 
1967). Model 1a demonstrates that occupation and education together explain 35 
percent (0.049 - 0.075 / 0.07513) of the variance at the cohort level, whereas it does 
not decrease the variance at the country level. In model 1b we add to model 1a the 
individual characteristics pertaining to egalitarianism, individualism and personal 
insecurity. In this model, we examine to what extent the influence of occupation on 
people’s beliefs in Heaven and Hell runs via other characteristics, and is thus indirect. 
Model 1c includes ‘denomination’. In this model, we answer the question whether 
individual characteristics that refer to industrialization negatively affect the belief in 
Heaven and Hell, irrespective of people’s church membership. 
                                                             
 
 
13 The change in variance can be computed with the following formula = ((variance model b – 
variance model a) / variance model a ) * 100). 
  
 
Table 5.6 Logistic regression analysis for people’s ideas about Heaven and Hell on individual and contextual characteristics that relate to ongoing industrialization 
  Belief in an afterlife – not believing in an afterlife Belief in Heaven and Hell – belief in Heaven 
  Model 1: individual characteristics Model 1: individual characteristics 
 Model 0 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 0 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c 
 b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE b  SE 
Occupation                          
   In agrarian sector (ref.)                         
   Outside agrarian sector    0.34 *** 0.05 0.22 *** 0.05 0.18 *** 0.06    0.26 *** 0.06 0.23 *** 0.07 0.24 *** 0.07 
   No job    -0.07  0.06 -0.19 ** 0.07 -0.21 ** 0.08    0.17 * 0.08 0.14  0.08 0.16  0.09 
Educational level    0.07 *** 0.00 0.05 *** 0.00 0.05 *** 0.00    -0.01  0.01 -0.01  0.01 -0.01  0.01 
Political left-right scale (0-9)       -0.08 *** 0.01 -0.07 *** 0.01       -0.03 *** 0.01 -0.03 *** 0.01 
Church attendance (0-104)       -0.03 *** 0.00 -0.02 *** 0.00       -0.01 *** 0.00 -0.01 *** 0.00 
Living in a large city (0-1)       0.11 *** 0.02 0.09 *** 0.03       0.02  0.04 0.02  0.04 
Modern family values       0.17 *** 0.03 0.12 *** 0.03       0.01  0.05 -0.01  0.05 
Living alone (0-1)       -0.02  0.03 -0.09 *** 0.03       -0.04  0.04 -0.06  0.04 
Unemployed (0-1)       0.07  0.04 0.04  0.04       0.04  0.06 0.05  0.06 
Low income (0-1)       -0.14 *** 0.03 -0.13 *** 0.03       0.03  0.04 0.04  0.04 
Widowed (0-1)       -0.16 *** 0.05 -0.07  0.05       0.01  0.06 0.02  0.07 
Being unhappy       0.07  0.03 0.08  0.03       -0.04  0.04 -0.04  0.05 
Denomination                         
   Roman Catholic (ref.)                         
   Protestant          0.04  0.05          -0.07  0.06 
   Islamic          -0.96 *** 0.09          -1.00 *** 0.11 
   Other          -0.17  0.09          -0.16  0.11 
   Not belonging          1.16 *** 0.03          0.16 ** 0.06 
Variance cohort level 0.075 *** 0.049 *** 0.055 *** 0.056 *** 0.020  0.017  0.005  0.003  
Variance country level 3.841 *** 3.707 *** 3.033 *** 1.858 *** 2.590 *** 2.593 *** 2.511 *** 1.713 *** 
N 43.676 24.704 
N cohort 2.789 2.696 
N country 42 42  
Source: European Values Studies & World Values Surveys, wave 1999/2000; Cross-National Time-Series; the Worldbank; Amnesty International; Correlates of War project; Controlled for 
missing values on the variables; *** = p ≤ .001, ** = p ≤ .01
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In models 2 to 5, we add to model 1c contextual characteristics on both the country 
and cohort levels. In model 2 we take into account the level of industrialization of 
countries in which people currently live. In model 3 we add to model 1c 
‘rationalization’, ‘democratization’, ‘individualization’ and ‘societal insecurity’ on the 
country level. Because of the problem of collinearity, it is not possible to 
simultaneously include industrialization and the other country characteristics in the 
same model. In models 4 and 5 we test whether industrialization and related 
processes affect people’s belief in Heaven and Hell on the cohort level. 
5.4.2 Industrialization and the belief in Heaven and Hell on the individual level 
In models 1a to 1c we test the hypotheses that relate to the compositional influence of 
industrialization, as shown in table 5.6. Model 1a demonstrates that people working 
outside the agrarian sector are relatively more likely to disbelieve in an afterlife than 
people who work in the agrarian sector. The odds for not believing in an afterlife are 
40 percent higher for people working outside the agrarian sector than for those 
working within the agrarian sector (exp(0.34)). This corresponds with our 
expectation. Furthermore, we find that people who work outside the agrarian sector 
are relatively more likely to believe only in Heaven than believing in both Heaven and 
Hell, compared to people working in the agrarian sector. Our findings confirm 
hypothesis 1. In accordance with hypothesis 4, we found that people’s educational 
level only affects the contrast between believing and not believing in an afterlife. The 
odds for not believing in an afterlife increase by 7 percent with each year of education 
(exp(0.07)). 
In model 1b we see that for the contrast between believing and not believing in 
an afterlife, the effect of occupation diminishes by 35 percent, yet remains highly 
significant. As for the contrast between believing in both Heaven and Hell and 
believing in Heaven only, the effect of occupation remains unchanged. Apparently, the 
influence of occupation on the belief in Heaven and Hell is partly mediated by other 
individual characteristics, yet is also direct, as assumed in hypothesis 3a. People who 
work outside the agrarian sector are less likely to believe in Heaven and Hell than 
people working within that sector, irrespective of their political orientation and 
incorporation in traditional communities. 
Model 1b demonstrates that after controlling for people’s political orientation, 
their integration in traditional institutions, and their personal insecurities, the 
variance in believing in an afterlife on the country level decreases by 18 percent. For 
the contrast between believing in both Heaven and Hell and only believing in Heaven, 
the variance on the country level remains almost constant. As we expected in 
hypothesis 6a, we found that people who are politically more left-oriented are 
relatively less likely to believe in an afterlife. We also found that the odds for believing 
in Heaven only, rather than believing in both Heaven and Hell, decrease by almost 3 
percent with one step upwards on the political left-right scale (exp(-0.03)). This means 
that people who are politically more left-oriented are relatively more likely to believe 
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in only Heaven than believing in both Heaven and Hell. This supports our hypothesis 
6b. The negative effect of people’s politically left orientation is stronger on their belief 
in Hell. This can explain our finding that with ongoing industrialization, the belief in 
Hell is decreasing more rapidly than the belief in Heaven. Furthermore, model 1b 
shows that the detachment from traditional institutions especially affects the contrast 
between not believing and believing in an afterlife. We found that people who attend 
church less often, people who live in large cities and people who have modern family 
values are relatively less likely to believe in an afterlife. The odds for not believing 
instead of believing in an afterlife are almost 12 percent higher for people living in a 
large city than for people who live in a village or small city (exp(0.11)) and are around 
18 percent higher for people with modern family values than for people with 
traditional values (exp(0.17)). However, people who live on their own do not 
significantly differ from people living with a partner or with children. Our data largely 
supports hypothesis 9. For the contrast between believing in both Heaven and Hell 
and believing in only Heaven, we found that the odds for believing in Heaven only 
decrease by almost one percent with every church attendance (exp(-0.01)). The other 
individualism variables do not affect this contrast. Regarding personal insecurity, the 
data partly confirm our hypothesis 11a. We see that people with a low income and 
widowed people are more likely to believe in an afterlife. This supports the 
expectation that the belief in Heaven functions as a comfort belief. However, we did 
not find that unemployed people and unhappy people are more likely to believe in 
Heaven than employed people and happy people. Personal insecurity does not affect 
the contrast between believing in both Heaven and Hell and believing in only Heaven, 
which contradicts hypothesis 11b. 
In model 1c we added to model 1b people’s denomination to control for the 
possibility that differences in beliefs about Heaven and Hell come down to differences 
in church membership. We found that Islamites believe relatively more often in an 
afterlife compared to Catholics, and they believe relatively less often in Heaven only 
than believing in both Heaven and Hell. Protestants do not significantly differ from 
Catholics. Logically, people who do not belong to a denomination believe relatively 
less often in Heaven and Hell. Moreover, model 1c shows that the odds for believing in 
Heaven only, instead of believing in both Heaven and Hell are 17 percent higher for 
people who do not belong to a denomination than for Catholics (exp(0.16)). With 
regard to people’s belief in an afterlife, the variance on the country level decreases by 
almost 39 percent when we take the denomination into account. The variance on the 
cohort level remains almost constant. For the contrast between believing in both 
Heaven and Hell and believing in Heaven only, the variance decreases with more than 
30 percent. In other words, denomination appears to be an important predictor for 
people’s belief in Heaven and Hell. The effects of the other individual characteristics 
slightly decrease, yet also remain significant. This implies that ongoing 
industrialization also affects people’s belief in Heaven and Hell on the individual level, 
irrespective of church membership. This supports hypothesis 13. Unexpectedly, we 
see that people who live on their own are more likely to believe in an afterlife when 
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we control for denomination. A possible explanation is that people who live on their 
own more often feel lonely and therefore turn to religion for comfort. 
Table 5.7 Logistic regression analysis for people’s ideas about Heaven and Hell on individual and contextual 
characteristics that relate to ongoing industrialization (continuation of table 5.6) 
  belief in an afterlife –  belief in Heaven and Hell –  
not believing in an afterlife belief in Heaven 
  Model 2: model 1c + industrialization on the country level 
 b SE b SE 
Industrialization 0.03 * 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 
Variance cohort level 0.056 ***  0.004   
Variance country level 1.526 ***  1.117 ***  
 Model 3: model 1c + other variables  on the country level 
 b SE b SE 
Abolition death penalty (0-1) 1.71 *** 0.44 0.32  0.35 
% to university 0.01  0.02 0.00  0.01 
% in cities ≥ 100.000 -0.00  0.00 -0.00  0.00 
Insecurity scale (1-5) -0.03  0.14 -0.57 *** 0.11 
Variance cohort level 0.056 ***  0.024  
Variance country level 0.894 ***  0.551 ***  
 Model 4: model 1c + industrialization  on the cohort level 
 b SE b SE 
Industrialization -0.01 *** 0.00 -0.00  0.00 
Variance cohort level 0.050 ***  0.024  
Variance country level 2.054 ***  1.736 *** 
 Model 5: model 1c + other variables  on the cohort level 
 b SE b SE 
Abolition death penalty (0-1) -0.05  0.05 0.08  0.06 
Socialized under communist regime (0-1) 0.18 * 0.08 0.04  0.11 
% to university -0.01 *** 0.00 -0.01 *** 0.00 
% in cities ≥ 100.000 0.00  0.00 -0.00  0.00 
Experienced a war (0-1) 0.10 * 0.04 -0.01  0.05 
Variance cohort level 0.042 *** 0.014  
Variance country level 1.831 *** 1.697 *** 
N 43.676 24.704 
N cohort 2.789 2.696 
N country 42 42 
Source: European Values Studies & World Values Surveys, wave 1999/2000; Cross-National Time-Series; the Worldbank; 
Amnesty International; Correlates of War project; Controlled for missing values on the variables; *** = p ≤ .001, ** = p ≤ .01 
5.4.3 Industrialization and the belief in Heaven and Hell on the contextual level 
In models 2 and 3 of table 5.7, we test our hypotheses that relate to the contextual 
influence of industrialization on the country level. In model 2 we examine whether 
people living in countries with different levels of industrialization have different 
beliefs about Heaven and Hell, apart from their individual characteristics. In 
accordance with hypothesis 2a, we found that people living in more industrialized 
societies are relatively less likely to believe in an afterlife. The odds for not believing 
rather than believing in an afterlife increase by more than 82 percent when the 
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agrarian sector decreases with 20 percent (exp(0.03)20). Moreover, we found that the 
odds for believing in Heaven only rather than believing in both Heaven and Hell 
increase by more than 120 percent when the agrarian sector decreases by 20 percent 
(exp(0.04)20). 
Another question arises: why does a country’s industrialization level affect 
people’s beliefs in Heaven and Hell? In model 3 we try to answer this question by 
examining whether people living in countries with no death penalty, living with higher 
levels of rationalization and individualization, and living with lower levels of 
existential insecurity have less traditional ideas about Heaven and Hell. First of all, we 
see that people living in countries with no death penalty are relatively less likely to 
believe in an afterlife. This supports our hypothesis 7a. Nonetheless, the absence of the 
death penalty does not affect the contrast between believing in both Heaven and Hell 
and believing in Heaven only. This finding contradicts hypothesis 7c, that the negative 
influence of no death penalty is stronger for people’s belief in Hell. Furthermore, we 
found that people living in countries with higher levels of insecurity believe relatively 
more often in both Heaven and Hell than in Heaven only. Although existential 
insecurity does not affect the belief in Heaven and Hell in general (H12a), it does affect 
the belief in Hell. This corresponds with hypothesis 12c. Increasing security on the 
country level results in a growing number of people who only believe in Heaven. Apart 
from people’s educational level and detachment from traditional institutions, 
rationalization and individualization do not affect people’s beliefs in Heaven and Hell. 
For that reason, our data do not support hypotheses 5a and 10a.  
To avoid the problem of collinearity, we did not include industrialization (model 
2) and other country characteristics (model 3) in the same model simultaneously. To 
test the extent to which the relationship between industrialization and the belief in 
Heaven and Hell is mediated by other processes, we performed an additional analysis. 
In table 5.8 we show the effect of industrialization on people’s belief in Heaven and 
Hell, when we alternately consider other significant predictors at the country level (in 
model 3). Table 5.8 indicates that the influence of a society’s level of industrialization 
on the contrast between not believing instead of believing in an afterlife is partly 
mediated (44%) by the absence of the death penalty. The influence of industrialization 
on the contrast between believing in both Heaven and Hell instead of believing in only 
Heaven is fully explained by human insecurity. People living in more industrialized 
countries are relatively more likely to believe in Heaven only rather than believing in 
both Heaven and Hell because they experience less human insecurity. These findings, 
about the indirect effect of industrialization, support hypothesis 3b. In model 3, the 
variance on the country level decreases by 52 percent for the contrast between not 
believing in an afterlife and believing in an afterlife, and by 68 percent for the contrast 
between believing in both Heaven and Hell and believing in Heaven only. 
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Table 5.8 The effect of industrialization on people’s belief in Heaven and Hell, controlled for other significant 
predictors at the cohort and country level 
  Not believing in an afterlife – 
 belief in an afterlife 
 Belief in Heaven and Hell –  
belief in Heaven 
 b  SE b  SE 
Influence industrialiation on country level 0.025 * 0.012 0.036 *** 0.010 
   controlled for absence of death penalty 0.014 * 0.010 -0.008  0.012 
   controlled for insecurity       
       
Influence industrialization on cohort level -0.007 *** 0.001  n.s.  
   controlled for socialized under communist regime -0.008 *** 0.001    
   controlled for % to university -0.002  0.001    
   controlled for war experience -0.005 *** 0.001      
Source: European Values Studies & World Values Surveys, wave 1999/2000; Cross-National Time-Series; the Worldbank; 
Amnesty International; Correlates of War project; Controlled for the individual characteristics in table 5.5; *** = p ≤ .001, ** 
= p ≤ .01 
In models 4 and 5 of table 5.7, we tested the hypotheses relating to the contextual 
influence of industrialization on the cohort level. In model 4, we added to model 1c the 
level of industrialization on the cohort level. Apart from people’s individual 
characteristics, we found that people who grew up in more industrialized societies are 
more likely to believe in Heaven and Hell. This finding is opposed to our hypothesis 2b, 
which refers to a negative influence of industrialization. Model 5 shows another 
unexpected relationship: people who grew up in higher educated societies are more 
likely to believe in an afterlife. This finding contradicts hypothesis 5b. Furthermore, 
we see that people who grew up under communist regime are less likely to believe in 
an afterlife. Communism indeed negatively affected people’s religious beliefs, as stated 
in hypothesis 8. In contrast to hypothesis 12b, we found that people who experienced 
war are relatively less likely to believe in an afterlife. Possibly, the experience of a war 
makes people wonder how God can allow such atrocities. This could make the notion 
of an all-powerful god and the related beliefs of Heaven and Hell less plausible. 
However, we did not find evidence for our expectation that the absence of war makes 
the belief in Hell less likely (H12c).  
In table 5.8 we examine the extent to which the influence of industrialization on 
the cohort level is indirect and runs via other processes. We see that the influence of 
industrialization is not affected when we control for socialization under a communist 
regime, and only slightly decreases when we take people’s war experience into 
account. However, the influence of industrialization is no longer significant when we 
include the effect of rationalization. In model 5, the variance in the belief in an afterlife 
on the cohort level decreases by almost 25 percent. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we raised and answered the question about the relation between 
ongoing industrialization and people’s beliefs in Heaven and Hell. More specifically, we 
answered the question of how individual and contextual characteristics, referring to 
ongoing industrialization, affect the belief in Heaven and Hell of individuals living in 
agrarian, industrial and post-industrial societies. We examined which factors influence 
the likelihood of believing in an afterlife or not, and the likelihood of believing in both 
Heaven and Hell rather than believing in Heaven only. 
On the individual level, we found that people working outside the agrarian 
sector have more problems with the belief in Heaven and Hell than those working 
within that sector, especially the belief in Hell. This is partly due to the fact that people 
working outside the agrarian sector are politically more left-oriented and are more 
detached from traditional institutions. Furthermore, we found that higher educated 
people, people with stronger egalitarian attitudes, and people who are less integrated 
in traditional institutions are relatively less likely to believe in an afterlife. Regarding 
people’s insecurities, we found that widowed people and people with a low income are 
more likely to believe in an afterlife. People’s political orientation and church 
attendance also affect the contrast between believing in both Heaven and Hell and 
believing in Heaven only. People with more egalitarian attitudes and people who 
attend church less often find the belief in Hell more problematic than the belief in 
Heaven. Whether or not people are members of a church only partly explains the 
relationship between individual characteristics that relate to industrialization and the 
beliefs in Heaven and Hell. 
We argued that industrialization can also affect people’s beliefs in Heaven and 
Hell on the contextual level, irrespective of their individual characteristics. In addition 
to Norris and Inglehart (2004), we took into account both the context situation in 
which people currently live and the context situation in which people grew up. The 
former appears to be the most important in explaining differences in people’s beliefs 
in Heaven and Hell. On the country level, we found that people who live in countries 
where the death penalty is abolished are less likely to believe in an afterlife. People 
who live in societies with higher levels of existential insecurity are more likely to 
believe in Heaven only than believing in both Heaven and Hell. Contrary to our 
expectation, we found that people who grew up with higher levels of rationalization 
are more likely to believe in Heaven and Hell.  
To summarize, ongoing industrialization negatively affects the beliefs in Heaven 
and Hell, although there is not one specific process that can account for this influence. 
This supports the assumption of Nolan and Lenski (2006) that people’s experience 
with a new social structure leads to new ideas about the supernatural. Our findings 
offered some support for Topitsch’s (1954) analogy argument that the sociomorphic 
notion of an all-powerful god who sends his subjects to Heaven and Hell does not hold 
in industrial societies where political power is more equally divided and political 
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leaders do not have the power to dispose of citizens’ lives. Moreover, we demonstrated 
that the transmission of the beliefs in Heaven and Hell is complicated by the 
detachment of individuals from religious and communal structures. The finding that 
higher educated people believe relatively less often in Heaven and Hell supported the 
assumption that people in (post-)industrial societies no longer think in analogies, but 
have more cognitive abilities and rather think logically (De Graaf et al. 2000). 
Regarding the role of human insecurity, our findings offered some support for 
both the emotional and cognitive approach. On the individual level, we found that 
people who feel less secure believe relatively more often in Heaven and Hell, as 
suggested by Norris and Inglehart (2004). However, on the cohort level we found that 
the belief in Heaven and Hell is less plausible for people who experienced war, 
contradicting the argument that the belief in Heaven functions as a comfort belief. In 
accordance with the cognitive approach, and in conflict with the emotional approach, 
we found that increasing levels of human security negatively affect the belief in Hell, 
but not the belief in Heaven. 
5.5.1 Some last remarks 
In this chapter, we examined the relationship between ongoing industrialization and 
people’s beliefs in Heaven and Hell on the individual and contextual level. When our 
data allowed it, we included similar variables on both the individual and the 
contextual levels. However, in some cases the variables on the individual and 
contextual levels differed from each other. For example, we did not have individual 
level data at our disposal concerning people’s opinion about the death penalty. Of 
course, it can be argued that people who are politically more left-oriented will view 
the death penalty as more problematic. Nonetheless, future research including 
people’s opinion about the death penalty would be valuable. Moreover, the variables 
that measure personal insecurity differ to some extent from the variables that 
measure insecurity on the contextual level. On the individual level, we took into 
account information about people’s income, unemployment, widowhood / 
widowerhood and happiness. However, because Norris and Inglehart (2004) discuss 
existential insecurity, it would be an improvement to include individual level data 
about more severe problems. For example, whether or not people lost a child to illness 
or lost a relative in war. However, we think that a person’s level of happiness is an 
acceptable replacement for these variables since loosing a child or other relative 
severely harms people’s happiness. 
Regarding people’s belief in Heaven and Hell, we distinguished between people 
who believe in both Heaven and Hell, people who believe only in Heaven and people 
who do not believe in Heaven and Hell. However, our data revealed a fourth category 
of people. Although the category ‘don’t know’ is originally a missing value, a large 
percentage of the respondents in some countries chose this option. In these countries, 
this percentage even exceeds the 20 percent, such as in Albania (27.7%), Latvia 
(20.5%), Lithuania (39.2%) and the Republic of Moldova (25.2%). Because our 
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hypotheses did not concern the category of people who do not know what to believe, 
we excluded this category from our data. However, future research could focus on this 
specific group of ‘believers’ and try to explain why there exist large differences 
between countries in this respect. 
Table 5.1 showed that the percentage of people who believe in God is higher 
than the percentage of people who believe in Heaven and Hell. We concluded that the 
belief in an afterlife is not fully determined by the belief in God. However, a possible 
explanation is that the belief in Heaven and Hell is rather related to the belief in a 
personal god, not to the belief in God in general. In this regard, Miller et al. (2006) 
already demonstrated that people’s beliefs about evolution are negatively related with 
the notion of a personal god. This can also be the case for people’s beliefs in Heaven 
and Hell. After all, the belief in Heaven and especially the belief in Hell are inextricably 
related to the notion of an all-powerful god who punishes and rewards his people. 
Future research could examine whether ongoing industrialization directly affects 
people’s belief in Heaven and Hell, or indirectly by making the belief in a personal god 
less plausible. Regrettably, we did not have data at our disposal concerning people’s 
ideas about God for all countries in our dataset. 
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion and discussion 
6.1 Background 
The central issue addressed in this study is worldwide religious diversity. We did not 
only want to explain why people have different religious ideas, but also why these 
religious ideas are not randomly distributed over societies. Thus, our aim was to 
answer the overarching research question: what religious ideas prevail under which 
circumstances? 
The answer we provided is based on Lenski’s ecological evolutionism, a major 
macro-theory in contemporary anthropology and sociology that offers an explanation 
for processes of change in human societies (Lenski 1970; Nolan and Lenski 2006; 
Nolan and Lenski 2008). Ecological evolutionism considers changes in societies’ 
subsistence technology as the primary force driving social evolution, including 
religious change. By combining this macro-level theory with the micro-level 
assumption that people explain the unknown in terms of what is known and important 
to them (Topitsch 1954), we derived new predictions about the relationship between 
subsistence technologies and religious ideas. These predictions were tested in four 
empirical chapters. 
In this concluding chapter, we summarize our findings in order to answer our 
overarching research question about worldwide religious diversity. In paragraph 6.2 
we discuss the relationship between subsistence technologies and religious traits in 
pre-industrial societies, in which hunting and gathering societies are the least 
technologically advanced, while agricultural societies are the most technologically 
advanced. In paragraph 6.3 we focus on religious diversity in (post-)industrial 
societies and discuss in what manner the shift from agriculture to industry has 
affected people’s religious beliefs. Finally, in paragraph 6.5 we discuss some 
suggestions for further research, for theoretical development and for a shift to 
pertinent follow-up questions. 
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6.2 Religious diversity in pre-industrial societies: a shift from 
questions regarding gods who now and then create, to 
questions about creations that sometimes involve a god. 
Although Lenski showed that there exists a relationship between subsistence 
technologies and prevailing godly images, this relationship remains unexplained. It 
remains unclear in what manner industrialization affect people’s ideas about God. For 
that reason, we shifted the descriptive question about the relationship between 
subsistence technologies and godly images to explanatory questions about this 
relationship. In chapter 2, we posed three questions regarding the explanation of the 
relationship between subsistence technologies and the belief in an all-powerful god. 
The first question reads: 
1. Is the relationship between a society’s subsistence technology and the 
belief in a moralizing all-powerful god a spurious relationship, a direct 
relationship, or an indirect one? 
Our answer is: the relationship between a society’s subsistence technology 
and the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god is partly spurious due to the 
effect of ecology on both characteristics. There is no direct relationship 
between subsistence technology and the belief in a moralizing all-powerful 
god, and the relationship is partly indirect and mediated by economic 
craftsmanship. 
The first part of this question relates to the possibility of a spurious relation, where 
environmental limitations determine both societies’ subsistence technology and 
people’s ideas about God (Lenski 1970; Snarey 1996). Snarey stated that 
environmental scarcity has a direct effect on the presence of a moralizing all-powerful 
god, because one almighty god makes the necessary attractive. He showed that the 
belief in a moralizing all-powerful god is more common in societies where people have 
insufficient water at their disposal. Although Lenski recognized that societies’ 
subsistence technology is attuned to the natural resources, he considers technological 
change to be the driving force behind religious change. In this study we tested to what 
extent the relationship between subsistence technology and godly images is a spurious 
one. After all, environmental scarcity could influence both the dominant subsistence 
technology of a society and its godly images. We found that in societies with less 
precipitation, herding as a subsistence technology is more probable, as is the belief in 
a moralizing all-powerful god. Nevertheless, ecology explained only a limited part of 
the correlation between subsistence technology and ideas about God. Other 
environmental limitations, such as a steep landscape or soil infertility did not affect 
the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god. 
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The second part of the question related to the political and economic structure of 
societies as mediating factors in the relationship between subsistence technologies 
and godly images. According to ecological evolutionism, a society’s subsistence 
technology will not only affect the prevailing godly images, but also other 
characteristics of society, which in turn, could affect the belief in a moralizing all-
powerful god. Swanson (1960) and Underhill (1974) suggested that the influence of 
subsistence technology is primarily indirect and is brought about via political and 
economic aspects of societies. In this regard, we took into account societies’ political 
differentiation and economic complexity. We demonstrated that the belief in a 
moralizing all-powerful god frequently occurs in agricultural societies, because it is 
closely linked with economic craftsmanship. 
Our second question concerned the explanation for the relationship between 
subsistence technologies and godly images on the individual level. Here, we aimed to 
understand why religious ideas, to some extent conform to the dominant subsistence 
technology of societies in which they arise. Whereas Lenski’s ecological evolutionism 
relates to societies, there are also theories that offer a micro-level explanation for the 
relationship between subsistence technologies and people’s religious ideas. The 
rational choice approach of religion claims that people are thinking logically (Stark 
and Bainbridge 1987): people will not enter into an exchange with a god when a 
cheaper or more efficient alternative is available. However, this approach cannot 
explain why all people did not immediately start believing in ‘one true god’, and 
neglects religious diversity in societies where people do not believe in an all-powerful 
god. Topitsch (1954, 1958) offered a more promising micro-explanation for the 
relationship between subsistence technologies and religious ideas. According to him 
and others, people reason in analogies and fall back upon the things that are familiar 
and crucial to their society when accounting for the unknown. Hereby what is known 
can consist of vital processes (biomorphism), social phenomena (sociomorphism) and 
manual skills and productive powers (technomorphism). In this study, we examined 
the assumption that, in the case of religion, people think in terms of ‘like…, so too… ’, 
instead of ‘if…, then… ’. Our second question is a theory-building question and reads: 
2. Assuming that people understand the unknown by analogy with what is 
known and important to them, then exactly which hypotheses explain the 
relationship between a society’s subsistence technology and the belief in a 
non-moralizing all-powerful god and a moralizing all-powerful god? 
Our answer is: the belief in a non-moralizing all-powerful god prevails in 
societies where people reason in technomorphic terms, whereas the belief in 
a moralizing all-powerful god prevails in societies where people reason in 
sociomorphic terms that refer to states. 
By relating Lenski’s ecological evolutionism -a macro-theory- with Topitsch’s micro-
hypothesis that people reason in terms what’s known and important to them, we could 
account for more findings about the godly images that emerge in societies. Here, we 
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argued that in societies with different subsistence technologies, different things will be 
known and important for survival. First, we suggested that biomorphic thought 
models predominate in hunting and gathering societies, fishing societies, and simple 
horticultural societies where the repertoire of tools is limited and economic and 
political specialists are almost absent. Second, technomorphic thought models were 
expected to emerge, next to biomorphic thought models, in the advanced horticultural 
societies where what’s known and important to people encompasses products of 
human creativity and inventiveness. Third, we argued that in agricultural societies and 
herding societies, sociomorphic thought models are important given the strong 
growth of the state and the occurrence of dictatorial leadership. Subsequently, we 
argued that the image of God as an all-powerful creator will occur more frequently in 
societies where technomorphic thought models are dominant. Furthermore, the image 
of a moralizing god will occur more frequently in societies with sociomorphic models 
of thought. Our theoretical answer is summarized in table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Subsistence technology, thought models and godly images 
Subsistence technology Dominant thought model Godly image  
Hunting and gathering biomorphic no god or only gods without a high god 
Simple horticulture biomorphic no god or only gods without a high god 
Advanced horticulture technomorphic non-moralizing all-powerful god 
Agriculture sociomorphic moralizing all-powerful god 
 
Using Murdock’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample, we affirmed that the belief in a non-
moralizing all-powerful god flourishes in advanced horticultural societies, whereas the 
belief in a moralizing all-powerful god prevails in agrarian and herding societies. We 
also found support for the suggestion that fishing societies less frequently believe in 
an all-powerful god than hunting and gathering societies do, and that the often 
militant herding societies more frequently believe in a moralizing all-powerful god 
than agrarian societies do. When hunting and gathering societies and simple 
horticultural societies are more dependent on fishing, the belief in a non-moralizing 
all-powerful god occurs less frequently. We also demonstrated that agricultural 
societies that are dependent to a larger degree on herding more frequently display the 
belief in a moralizing all-powerful god. 
Our third research question concerned the distinction between the adaptive and 
the by-product variants of the evolutionary explanation of religion (Dawkins 2006). 
The adaptive variant states that religions increase the reproductive success of 
societies. Regarding the belief in a moralizing all-powerful god, this would imply that 
societies where this belief is present are more successful than societies where this 
belief is absent, with the population density taken as the indicator of reproductive 
success. Conversely, the by-product variant of evolutionism argues that religion is a 
by-product of adaptive change. In the case of ecological evolutionism, religious ideas 
are considered a by-product of improvements in subsistence technologies. Ecological 
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evolutionism argues that improvements in subsistence technologies are the driving 
force behind societal changes, including religious change, and contribute to societies’ 
reproductive success. Religion, however, is not expected to have an independent 
influence on the reproductive success of societies. In testing both the adaptive and 
non-adaptive variant of evolutionism, we examined whether the belief in a moralizing 
all-powerful god, independent of technology, influences the population density of 
societies and, if both factors have consequences, which factor has the largest effect. 
Our third research question was: 
3. Is the independent effect of subsistence technology on reproductive 
success larger than the independent effect of a society’s godly image? 
Our answer is: the independent effect of subsistence technology on societies’ 
population density is larger than the independent effect of a society’s godly 
images. 
Our findings showed that the effect of subsistence technology on a society’s population 
density is much larger than the influence of godly images on such success. In fact, we 
did not found an independent effect of godly images on population density when we 
took into account a society’s level of subsistence technology. These findings support 
the non-adaptive variant of the evolutionary explanation of religion at the expense of 
the adaptive variant. 
In chapter 3 we shifted attention from questions regarding gods who now and 
then create to questions about creations that sometimes involve a god. Although 
Lenski (1970) argued that religious ideas, to some extent, correspond to a society’s 
subsistence technology, he only took into account the belief in all-powerful gods. 
However, Topitsch’s analogy argument (1954) does not specifically relate to people’s 
ideas about God, but more generally to their ideas about the unknown. We argue that 
the belief in God only explains a limited part of the unknown for a select group of 
societies. For that reason, we performed a more elaborate test of the analogy 
argument and examined in which terms people in societies with different levels of 
technology explain the unknown. We hold that the origin of the world is an important 
void, since no living member of a society was around at the time of its nascence. 
Because almost every society has a creation story about how the world and mankind 
came into being, we examined whether there is a relation between a society’s 
dominant subsistence technology and the content of its creation story. Our fourth 
question was: 
4. Given that a relation has been established between a society’s subsistence 
technology and its godly ideas, is its technology also linked to the content 
of its creation stories? 
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Our answer is: in technologically less advanced societies (hunting and 
gathering, fishing and horticultural societies) people more often portray the 
creative force as an animal, a natural entity or an ancestor, whereas in 
technologically more advanced societies (agrarian and herding societies) 
people more often portray the creative force as a distant human being. A 
parental creator, a female creator and creation through sexual reproduction 
occur less often in technologically more advanced societies, whereas creation 
by command occurs more often in technologically advanced societies. 
This descriptive question was followed by an explanatory question: 
5. To what extent does the thesis that human beings comprehend the 
unknown by drawing particular analogies explain the relation between a 
society’s subsistence technology and the substance of its creation stories? 
Our answer is: in technologically less advanced societies creation myths are 
based on biomorphic analogies, kinship analogies and female participation 
analogies, whereas in technologically more advanced societies creation 
myths are based on male dominance analogies and ruler analogies. 
We coded field reports from the Human Relations Area Files for 116 pre-industrial 
societies on characteristics of their creation stories. We combined this information 
with data from Murdock’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample about subsistence 
technologies. Our data supported the thesis that people in societies with different 
subsistence technologies use different thought models to explain the unknown. Table 
6.2 gives an overview of our findings regarding the relationship between societies’ 
subsistence technologies and the prevailing thought models. 
Table 6.2 The relationship between a pre-industrial society’s level of technology and its thought models 
A society’s level of subsistence technology The main thought models in a society’s creation stories 
Hunting and gathering / fishing – biomorphic analogies, sexual reproduction analogies 
– kinship analogies, female influence analogies 
Simple horticulture – biomorphic analogies, sexual reproduction analogies 
– kinship and ruler analogies 
– female influence analogies 
Advanced horticulture – sexual reproduction analogies 
– kinship and ruler analogies 
– female influence analogies 
Agriculture / herding – ruler analogies 
– male dominance analogies 
 
Our findings demonstrated that biomorphism is most common in technologically less 
advanced societies. An animal as creative force is most common in hunting and 
gathering societies and fishing societies, and a natural entity as creative force is most 
common in hunting and gathering societies, fishing societies and simple horticultural 
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societies. We found that explaining the creative act by sexual reproduction occurred 
most often in hunting and gathering societies, fishing societies and simple 
horticultural societies. As expected, people in these societies explain the unknown in 
terms of natural phenomena and vital processes. However, we did not find support for 
our expectation that people in the least technologically advanced societies explain the 
unknown in terms of spontaneous creation since knowledge in these societies about 
human reproduction is not always present or accurate. 
The data also did not support our expectation that technomorphism arise in the 
advanced horticultural societies where craft specialization has emerged and where 
people depend to a lesser extent on nature. The creative act, seen as a result of 
technical achievement is quite common in all societies. Possibly, part-time 
craftsmanship in technologically less advanced societies also boosts technomorphism, 
especially in small societies. 
We expected sociomorphism to be present in all human societies because every 
society is a group of people. However, societies with different subsistence technologies 
differ from each other in their social structure. We expected kinship analogies to be 
more important in technologically less advanced societies, and ruler analogies more 
important in more technologically advanced societies with a strong state and 
autonomous leadership. We indeed found that an ancestor or culture hero as creative 
force is more common in hunting and gathering societies, fishing societies and simple 
horticultural societies. In agrarian societies and herding societies, the creator is least 
likely to be portrayed as a parent. Ruler analogies are more likely in technologically 
more advanced societies. The creative force as a distant human being is a common 
belief but is least likely in hunting and gathering societies and fishing societies. In this 
respect, we also found that creation on command is least likely in hunting and 
gathering societies and fishing societies. Furthermore, we expected male dominance 
analogies to replace female influence analogies in the technologically more advanced 
societies. We indeed found that the creative force is least likely to be portrayed as 
female in agrarian and herding societies. Nonetheless, the presence of a female creator 
is not only related to sexual reproduction, that is prompted by biomorphism, but also 
to women’s food production that is instigated by sociomorphism. 
6.3 Religious diversity in (post-)industrial societies: a shift from 
the question of who believes in God to questions about which 
god people believe in and what other phenomena feature in 
stories about God. 
In the second part of this study, chapters 4 and 5, we shifted our focus from religious 
diversity in pre-industrial societies to religious diversity in (post-)industrial societies. 
More specifically, we examined the influence of ongoing industrialization on people’s 
religious ideas. An important difference with the first part of this study addressed in 
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chapters 2 and 3 is that we had individual level data at our disposal. Data from the 
European Values Studies and Word Values Surveys offered three important 
advantages. First, the data allowed us to study individual beliefs, whereas in the first 
part of this study we could only study a society’s dominant belief. This is especially 
important because religious ideas in (post-)industrial societies are more 
heterogeneous than religious ideas in pre-industrial societies. Second, the data 
provided us with the opportunity to perform a more direct test of Topitsch’s analogy 
thesis because we had data at our disposal about people’s own characteristics and 
attitudes. Third, we could specify Topitsch’s analogy thesis by making a distinction 
between individual and contextual influences of industrialization. Although Topitsch’s 
argument that people reason in analogies implies a contextual influence of 
industrialization, we argue that people’s world view and beliefs are also determined 
by their own situation. 
Comparative research in (post-)industrial societies mainly focused on the shift 
from a fully religious society to a complete non-religious society, secularization 
(Martin 1978; Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Bruce 2002). However, in chapter 4, we 
argued that it is still important to study religious diversity in (post-)industrial 
societies. After all, people who believe in God can still think in different ways about 
God. For this reason, we made a shift from the question who believes in God to the 
question in which god do people believe? In chapter 4, we studied in more detail what 
substitutes the image of a personal god, the idea of an impersonal or abstract god, the 
idea that God is unknowable (agnosticism) and the idea that God does not exist 
(atheism). 
Regarding societal change, Nolan and Lenski (2006) acknowledge that in 
technologically more advanced societies, ideologies play a more important role. In 
industrial and post-industrial societies, the range of available options is larger, and for 
that reason, ideologies are expected to exert more influence on a society’s social-
cultural characteristics than in technologically less advanced societies. In this regard, 
Nisbet (1966) argued that the Industrial Revolution, along with political transitions in 
Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century caused the break-up of the old 
European order based on family, local community, authoritarian rule and social class. 
According to Nisbet, an important consequence of these developments is the fading 
away of the traditional image of God. Our sixth research question was: 
6. How do individual and societal characteristics that refer to 
industrialization and democratization affect the adherence to the idea of a 
personal god, the idea of an abstract god, the idea that God is unknowable 
and the idea that God doesn’t exist, of individuals living in (post-)industrial 
societies in Europe? 
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Our answer is: the image of a personal god is relatively less likely among 
people who work outside the agrarian sector, higher educated people, people 
with more egalitarian attitudes, people who are more detached from 
traditional institutions, and people who grew up in more industrialized 
societies, in favor of the belief in an abstract god, agnosticism and atheism. 
Data from the European Values Surveys, wave 1999/2000, demonstrated that 
industrialization and democratization indeed affect people’s ideas about God. On the 
individual level, we found that people who work outside the agrarian sector, higher 
educated people, people with more egalitarian attitudes, people who attach more 
importance to personal freedom, and people who are less integrated in traditional 
institutions believe relatively less often in a personal god. This supports the argument 
that in industrialized societies, the sociomorphic notion of the personal god does not 
concord with scientific thinking and people’s contemporary view on political power 
and social life. It also demonstrates that the transmission from traditional beliefs 
about God to new generations is complicated by their detachment from religious 
institutions and strong families. Furthermore, we found that people who attend church 
less often and who are politically more left-oriented are relatively less likely to believe 
in an abstract god than being agnostics or atheists. This implies that more 
conservative people are most likely to believe in an abstract god and least likely to be 
atheists. However, we also found that higher educated people, and people who 
distance themselves from family and community life are relatively less likely to be 
agnostics than believing in an abstract god or being atheists. Apparently, the belief in 
an abstract god is rather popular among high educated people and individualistic-
oriented people, whereas agnosticism is popular among people with less clear-cut 
opinions. This questions an assumption by Lambert (1999), that agnosticism comes 
somewhere between the belief in an abstract god and atheism. 
Based on Inglehart’s (1990) notion of formative years, we expected people’s 
godly images to be mainly formed during their socialization period. Although we found 
that within countries, one-year cohorts differ in their ideas about God, these 
differences mainly amount to compositional differences between cohorts. However, 
apart from people’s individual characteristics, we found that people who grew up in 
societies with a larger non-agricultural sector believe relatively less often in a personal 
god. With regard to the level of democratization in people’s socialization period, we 
did not find that strong socialist parties within a society clearly influenced people’s 
ideas about God. 
In chapter 5, we shifted the focus from the question in which god people believe 
to the question which phenomena feature in ideas about God. In chapter 3, we argued 
that human beings comprehend the unknown by drawing analogies with what they 
know, and we demonstrated that the substance of creation stories is related to a 
society’s subsistence technology. In chapter 5, we focused on another important 
aspect of the unknown; ideas about life after death. More specifically, we focused on 
people’s ideas about Heaven and Hell. 
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We argued that in (post-)industrial societies, the beliefs in Heaven and Hell do 
not concord with people’s views on political power. According to Topitsch (1972), the 
sociomorphic notion of an all-powerful god who sends people to Heaven and Hell is 
derived from the presence of a strong ruler in agrarian societies who rewards loyal 
subjects and punishes those who trespass laws. We expected this sociomorphic notion 
to be problematic for people living in democratically governed societies. However, we 
also expected industrialization to directly affect people’s beliefs in Heaven and Hell. 
Norris and Inglehart (2004) demonstrated that the beliefs in Heaven and Hell decrease 
with ongoing industrialization. They suggested that decreasing risks in (post-
)industrial societies can explain why people in these societies no longer need comfort 
beliefs, such as the belief in Heaven. However, their emotional approach to religion 
cannot explain why the percentage of people believing in Hell is lower than the 
percentage of people believing in Heaven and why the belief in Hell is decreasing more 
rapidly than the belief in Heaven. We theoretically can explain these findings on the 
basis of the cognitive approach of Topitsch. The belief in Hell will decrease more 
rapidly than the belief in Heaven because in industrialized societies, abject poverty is 
no longer part of what people know, and therefore cannot provide the analogy 
supporting the idea of Hell. Our seventh research question was: 
7. How do individual characteristics and societal characteristics that refer to 
industrialization and democratization affect the belief in Heaven and the 
belief in Hell of individuals living in agrarian, industrial and post-industrial 
societies? 
Our answer is: the belief in an afterlife is relatively less likely among people 
who work outside the agrarian sector, higher educated people, people with 
more egalitarian attitudes, people who are more detached from traditional 
institutions, people with more personal insecurity, people who live in 
societies where the death penalty is absent, people who did not experience 
war, people who grew up under a communist regime and people who grew 
up with lower levels of rationalization. Compared to the belief in Heaven, the 
belief in Hell is less plausible for people who attend church less often, people 
who are politically more left-oriented and people who live in societies where 
life in general is less secure. 
Our findings showed that ongoing industrialization affect the beliefs in Heaven and 
Hell on both the individual and contextual levels. We demonstrated that there is not 
one specific process that can account for the relationship between ongoing 
industrialization and the beliefs in Heaven and in Hell. On the individual level, we 
found that people who work outside the agrarian sector, higher educated people and 
people who are politically more left-oriented relatively less often believe in Heaven 
and Hell. This supports the idea of Nolan and Lenski (2006) that industrialization 
changed people’s view of the world and for that reason, also altered their belief in the 
supernatural. Moreover, we found that with ongoing industrialization, traditional 
institutions such as the Church, the Family and its strongholds are less able to imprint 
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their members with knowledge residing within religion. In accordance with the 
emotional approach of Norris and Inglehart (2004), we found that people with a low 
income and widowed people believe relatively more often in Heaven and Hell. On the 
country level, our findings demonstrated that people who live in societies where the 
death penalty is absent are relatively less likely to believe in Heaven and Hell, and that 
people who live in societies with more human security are relatively more likely to 
believe in Heaven only than to believe in both Heaven and Hell. Although the influence 
on the cohort level is much smaller, we found that people who grew up in societies 
with higher levels of rationalization believe relatively more often in Heaven and Hell. 
This finding contradicted our expectation. 
Our findings support both the emotional and cognitive approaches to religion. 
On the individual level, our results corroborate the assumption of Norris and Inglehart 
(2004) that the belief in Heaven functions as a comfort belief. However, on the cohort 
level we found that experiencing war makes the belief in an afterlife less likely instead 
of more likely. Regarding the cognitive approach to religion, we discovered that the 
belief in Heaven, and especially the belief in Hell, are incoherent with scientific 
thinking, egalitarianism, the abolishment of the death penalty and higher levels of 
human security. 
6.4 General overview 
Now that we have answered the seven sub-questions of this study, we come to 
answering our overarching research question: 
8. What religious ideas prevail under which circumstances? 
Answer: the religious ideas that prevail in societies are modeled on people’s 
experience with familiar and crucial aspects of the societal structure, and 
therefore are linked to a society’s dominant subsistence technology. 
In summary, we can conclude that societal differences in religious ideas for a large 
part can be traced back to societal differences in subsistence technologies. In this 
study, we demonstrated that there is a clear-cut relationship between subsistence 
technologies and ideas about God (chapters 2 and 4), ideas about creation (chapter 3), 
and ideas about the afterlife (chapter 5). This supports the argument of ecological 
evolutionism (Nolan and Lenski 2006) that religious ideas reflect aspects of a society’s 
structure, and for that reason are linked to the dominant subsistence technology. In 
chapters 2, 4 and 5 we demonstrated that this relationship between subsistence 
technologies and religious ideas is indeed mediated by aspects of societies’ political 
and economic structure. Moreover, in chapters 4 and 5 we showed that religious 
change is not only the result of people’s experience with a new social structure, but 
also of a change in people’s own characteristics and attitudes. 
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Furthermore, we demonstrated that on the micro-level, the analogy argument by 
Topitsch (1954) appears to be fruitful in explaining the relationship between 
subsistence technologies and ideas about the unknown. Without Toptisch’s argument, 
predictions about the substance of creation stories, ideas about Gods and ideas about 
Heaven and Hell would be more ad hoc. After all, the analogy argument relates to 
people’s ideas about the unknown and not only to people’s ideas about God. Our 
findings confirm the assumption that people reason in analogies and explain the 
unknown in terms of what is known and important to them. Our results indicated that 
people in societies with different levels of subsistence technology use different 
thought models to explain the unknown. First, we demonstrated that biomorphism is 
most common in technologically less advanced societies, in which people heavily 
depend on nature for their survival without having the actual means to control it, 
whereas in technologically more advanced societies technomorphism is more 
important. Second, we detected a shift from sociomorphism, which is based on kinship 
analogies and female influence analogies in technologically less advanced societies, to 
sociomorphism that is based on ruler analogies and male-dominance analogies in 
technologically more advanced societies. In chapter 4, we demonstrated that the 
sociomorphic notion of a personal god which dominates in agrarian societies does not 
hold in industrialized societies. On both the individual and contextual levels, we 
demonstrated that the belief in a personal god who rewards people by sending them 
to Heaven and punishes people by sending them to Hell does not concord with 
people’s own characteristics and attitudes and their view on society. Finally, we 
demonstrated that in industrialized societies, the transition of traditional ideas from 
old generations to new generations is complicated by people’s detachment from 
traditional institutions, such as the Church and the strongholds of the Family. This 
reinforces the idea that religious beliefs in (post-)industrial societies are more and 
more a matter of private choice. 
6.5 Suggestions and discussion 
In this paragraph we will make some suggestions for further research, for theoretical 
improvement and for a further shift in research questions. 
6.5.1 Suggestions for further research 
A first suggestion for further research is to examine to what extent the relationship 
between subsistence technologies and religious beliefs is due to the spurious 
correlation caused by cultural diffusion. In cross-cultural research Galton’s problem is 
considered to be an important statistical problem. Naroll (1961) defines Galton’s 
problem as drawing inferences from cross-cultural data due to autocorrelation. In 
other words, the relationship between cultural traits can be due to diffusion or 
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independent invention. In the case of diffusion or common descent, researchers run 
the risk of overestimating the relationship between cultural traits. The consequences 
of Galton’s problem are especially underlined when doing cross-cultural research, 
although it is now recognized that the problem applies to all non-experimental studies, 
including survey-designs. After all, people who have regular contact can imitate each 
other in their behavior and attitudes. In this study, a question arises as to what extent 
the relationship between subsistence technologies and religious ideas can be 
attributed to diffusion and common descent. In the second and third chapter of our 
study, we examined religious diversity in pre-industrial societies and for that reason 
made use of Murdock’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS). In this Sample three 
measures were taken to minimize the problem of diffusion and common descent 
(Murdock & White 1969). First, neighboring societies were excluded from the sample. 
Murdock (1968) divided the world into ‘distinctive world areas’ or clusters that have 
similar traits due to diffusion or recent common origin. One society was selected from 
each cluster. Second, for each selected society, information was used for the earliest 
period for which data was available. To further avoid Western influence on the 
dataset, the great colonizing and imperialistic societies of Europe were excluded from 
the SCCS. However, as Murdock and White (1969) point out, it is not possible to 
eliminate all influences from diffusion and common origin from the dataset. 
Nonetheless, we argue that cultural diffusion is unlikely to solely explain the 
relationship we found between subsistence technologies and religious ideas. 
Because societies in the SCCS are not neighboring societies, we expect the 
colonizing of large areas by the Western world and the emergence of missionaries to 
be the most important sources of cultural diffusion. In the case that cultural diffusion 
only affected religious traits, this would imply an underestimation of the relationship 
we found between subsistence technologies and religious beliefs. After all, people in 
technologically less advanced societies will have copied the belief in an all-powerful 
moralizing god from Western cultures. Cultural diffusion will only be problematic 
when technologically less advanced societies not only copied Western religious beliefs 
but also their subsistence technologies and elements of their economic and political 
structure. However, this seems unlikely, because societies only selectively adopt 
technologies (Nolan and Lenski 2006). Moreover, in the ethnographic literature 
several examples can be found of pre-industrial societies who intertwined Western 
beliefs with supernatural elements of their own culture (Lanternari 1963). This 
indicates that people do not completely borrow a foreign religion when it does not 
concord with their own world view. In this regard, Smart (1999) noticed that in some 
societies massive religious movements are mingled with native religions. He also 
observed that religions within societies that never came into contact with each other 
contain similar elements. In chapters 4 and 5 we studied religious diversity in (post-
)industrial societies. We used survey-data to measure people’s ideas about God, 
Heaven and Hell. To take into account people’s ‘common descent’, we performed a 
multilevel analysis in which we controlled for the fact that people living in the same 
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country and who are born in the same cohort resemble each other more than people 
who live in different countries and who are born in other cohorts. 
A second suggestion for further research is the use of longitudinal data. In this 
study, we tested the relationship between subsistence technologies and religious ideas 
with coded information from fieldwork descriptions (chapters 2 and 3) and with 
survey data (chapter 4 and 5). An advantage of this approach is that we could test the 
relationship between subsistence technologies and religious ideas for a larger set of 
societies. However, we recommend an additional test in which the relationship 
between subsistence technologies and religious traits is demonstrated with 
longitudinal data. By following a randomly selected number of societies through time, 
researchers can test the causality in the relationship between subsistence technologies 
and religious ideas. In other words, one could answer the question whether a change 
in people’s religious ideas is preceded by a change in a society’s subsistence 
technology. Although we did not use longitudinal data and know of no useful ones, we 
demonstrated that people within countries have different religious ideas, partly 
because they grew up in different contexts. Nonetheless, more research is needed on 
this point. 
6.5.2 Suggestions for theoretical improvement 
A first suggestion for theoretical improvement is to elaborate on Lenski’s distinction 
(1970) within ecological evolutionism between intersocietal and intrasocietal 
selection as causes of overall societal change. Ecological evolutionism states that 
because of intersocietal selection, large changes occurred in human life, while the 
great majority of individual societies hardly changed through time. The societies that 
survived intersocietal selection were societies that did not resist technological change 
(Nolan and Lenski 2006). Now the question arises whether religious change is for the 
most part the result of intersocietal selection or of intrasocietal selection. Ecological 
evolutionism considers religion to be a byproduct of technological progress. 
Technologically more advanced societies survived at the expense of technologically 
less advanced societies and as a result religious ideas within these societies became 
more dominant. However, ecological evolutionism also states that people will adapt 
religious beliefs that no longer concord with people’s experience of every day life. In 
our study, we demonstrated that people in technologically more advanced societies 
have different religious ideas than people in technologically less advanced societies. 
However, it remains unclear whether this is the result of intersocietal or intrasocietal 
selection. In chapters 4 and 5, we showed that people who were socialized within the 
same country but who grew up in different cohorts have different religious ideas. 
Moreover, we show that intersocietal selection does play a role in the process of 
religious change. 
Second, we suggest that researchers should address the question of which 
analogies prevail in (post-)industrial societies. In chapters 4 and 5 we argued that 
sociomorphic analogies that relate to the notion of a strong leader no longer apply in 
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societies where political power is not vested in a single leader and people have more 
egalitarian attitudes. However, we do not address the question of what analogies do 
people in (post-)industrial societies use to explain the unknown. In chapter 2, we 
argued that technomorphism gradually replaced biomorphism in technologically more 
advanced societies. It is possible that these technomorphic analogies still reside in 
(post-)industrial societies where people act strategically and are used to making plans. 
We can think, for example, about the intelligent design theory, which is considered a 
‘scientific theory’ by its adherents. This theory assumes that important features of the 
universe are the result of an ‘intelligent design’ and not the result of an undirected 
process as natural selection. Another possibility is that analogical reasoning will be 
gradually replaced by logical and deductive thinking, as proposed by the rational 
choice theory of religion. Our findings in chapters 4 and 5 indicated that higher 
educated people view as problematic the belief in something that cannot be 
empirically proven. 
A third theoretical suggestion is that researchers should address the way in 
which the ‘abstract god’ in (post-)industrial societies differs from the ‘non-moralizing 
all-powerful god’ in horticultural societies. In other words: did the non-moralizing all-
powerful god from horticultural societies make a come-back in industrial and post-
industrial societies? Or are there some important differences between these two types 
of gods? A possible difference is that the non-moralizing god from horticultural 
societies has a more human character, whereas the abstract god from the (post-
)industrial societies is impersonal and does not have a human face. 
6.5.3 Suggestions for further shifts in research questions 
Each empirical chapter of this study shifted to a new question. In this concluding 
chapter, we will make some suggestions for pertinent follow-up questions. A first 
suggestion is a shift from questions regarding religious beliefs to questions regarding 
religious rites. Whereas Lenski (1970) was primarily interested in religious beliefs, 
Durkheim (1912) primarily focused on religion as an integrating force within human 
societies. Durkheim stated that religion always consists of two fundamental 
categories: beliefs and practices. According to him, religious practices or rites 
strengthen ties between people because they are performed collectively. However, we 
argue that religious rites are not always performed by all people in society and that 
those who perform religious rites have different roles. Moreover, religious rites serve 
different goals. For example, there are rites of passage, seasonal rites and magical 
rites. A new question arises: to what extent can ecological evolutionism explain 
diversity in religious rites? Further research could relate a society’s subsistence 
technology to different aspects of its religious rites. 
A second suggestion is a shift from questions regarding beliefs that involve 
supernatural beings to questions about beliefs that also involve people themselves. In 
this regard, Frazer (1922) describes magic as a system of ritual techniques used by 
human beings to influence impersonal powers or supernatural creatures to reach 
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certain goals. This definition implies that people are themselves active and control 
supernatural powers to reach their own goals. Nolan and Lenski (2006) observed that 
magic is a widespread belief in agrarian societies along with the widespread attitude 
of fatalism. They argue that the popularity of these beliefs are a strange combination, 
because people who use magic do not need to be fatalistic. They find a solution to this 
paradox by stating that magic encouraged people, in agrarian societies, to depend on 
supernatural forces for answers to their problems. We agree with them, but also 
remark that people who practice magic still have the power to manipulate 
supernatural forces. The question arises whether or not magic beliefs are active 
beliefs. We argue that in further research, a distinction should be made between 
performers of magical rites and believers in magical rites. In societies where magic is a 
widespread belief, people might believe that they can manipulate supernatural powers 
themselves or believe that powerful people in their societies can manipulate these 
powers. The same applies to the belief in witchcraft. 
A third and last suggestion is a shift from questions regarding the beginning of 
the world and the ending of human life to questions about the end of the world. In 
chapter 3 we focused on the relationship between subsistence technologies and the 
substance of creation stories, whereas in chapter 5, we focused on people’s ideas 
about life after death. The analogy argument by Topitsch assumes that people reason 
in analogies and explain the unknown in terms of what they know. A more profound 
test of the analogy assumption would be to look at the relationship between 
subsistence technologies and people’s ideas about the end of the world. Schipper 
(2009) collected stories about the ending of the world for countries all over the world. 
By combining Lenski’s ecological evolutionism with Topitsch’s analogy assumption, 
one could make new predictions about the substance of stories about the ending of the 
world in societies with different levels of technology. It would be interesting to 
examine in which terms people explain the way the world will end, its initiator, its aim 
and its consequences. 
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Samenvatting 
(summary in Dutch) 
Hoofdstuk 1 - Inleiding en onderzoeksvragen 
In de hedendaagse sociologie is veel aandacht voor de teruggang van religie in (post-) 
industriële samenlevingen. Er is echter weinig aandacht voor de vraag waarom 
mensen verschillende ideeën hebben over het bovennatuurlijke. In deze dissertatie 
staat de wereldwijde diversiteit in religieuze denkbeelden centraal. Meer specifiek 
wordt een antwoord gegeven op de vraag welke religieuze ideeën zich voordoen 
onder welke omstandigheden. 
Het uitgangspunt van deze studie is de bevinding van Lenski (1970) dat het 
geloof in een morele oppermachtige god vaker voorkomt in technologisch hoog 
ontwikkelde samenlevingen. Lenski ziet hierin de bevestiging van zijn hypothese dat 
goden actiever zijn in die samenlevingen waar mensen meer controle uitoefenen op 
hun directe omgeving. Ander onderzoek in voorindustriële samenlevingen laat zien 
dat er verbanden bestaan tussen de religieuze ideeën in een samenleving en 
kenmerken van de economische, politieke en sociale organisatie. Er wordt echter aan 
voorbij gegaan dat deze kenmerken, en daarmee religieuze kenmerken, niet 
willekeurig zijn verdeeld over samenlevingen. Een verklaring wordt geboden door 
Lenski’s ecologisch evolutionisme. Deze theorie veronderstelt dat veranderingen in de 
wijze waarop mensen in hun bestaan voorzien, de bestaanstechnologie, de drijvende 
kracht zijn achter andere veranderingsprocessen in samenlevingen, zoals 
veranderingen in de sociale organisatie en veranderingen in religieuze denkbeelden. 
Op basis van deze theorie maken wij nieuwe voorspellingen over het verband tussen 
de religieuze denkbeelden van mensen en kenmerken van de sociale wereld waarin zij 
leven. 
Het ecologisch evolutionisme stelt dat technologieën mensen informatie geven 
over hoe ze de natuurlijke hulpbronnen in hun omgeving kunnen gebruiken om in hun 
bestaan te voorzien. De dominante bestaanstechnologie in een samenleving stelt 
grenzen aan de organisatie van samenlevingen, zoals haar omvang en complexiteit. 
Ideologieën, zoals ook religieuze denkbeelden, zijn een tweede belangrijke kracht in 
samenlevingen. Ze stellen niet zozeer grenzen aan het mogelijke, maar beïnvloeden de 
keuzes die mensen maken binnen de grenzen van het mogelijke. Ideologieën zijn 
gerelateerd aan technologieën, omdat mensen ideologieën, waaronder religieuze 
ideeën, gebruiken om het sociale leven te structureren en begrijpen. Volgens het 
ecologisch evolutionisme hebben bestaanstechnologieën een sterkere invloed op de 
sociale organisatie van samenlevingen dan ideologieën. 
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Het ecologisch evolutionisme behoort tot een traditie van evolutionaire 
theorieën die het verschijnsel religie probeert te verklaren. Het belangrijkste 
onderscheid dat gemaakt kan worden binnen deze traditie is tussen theorieën die 
religie als een adaptief verschijnsel beschouwen en theorieën die stellen dat religie 
niet adaptief is. Adaptieve theorieën stellen dat religie het reproductief succes van 
individuen of samenlevingen vergroot. Theorieën die religie als niet adaptief 
beschouwen stellen dat religie geen invloed heeft op het reproductief succes van 
individuen of samenlevingen. Religie wordt verklaard als een aanpassing aan vroegere 
omstandigheden dat in de huidige omstandigheden niet langer adaptief is of wordt 
beschouwd als een bijproduct van een adaptieve verandering. Het ecologisch 
evolutionisme behoort tot deze tweede stroming. Ze beschouwt religie als niet 
adaptief en stelt dat religieuze verandering een bijproduct is van technologische 
verandering. Technologisch hoog ontwikkelde samenlevingen zijn reproductief meer 
succesvol dan technologisch laag ontwikkelde samenlevingen. Omdat religieuze 
ideeën zijn gerelateerd aan de dominante bestaanstechnologie, zal de religie van 
technologisch hoog ontwikkelde samenlevingen domineren, zonder dat religie een 
onafhankelijke invloed heeft op het reproductief succes van samenlevingen. In dit 
onderzoek zeg ik niet dat religie het reproductief succes van individuen en 
samenlevingen niet kan beïnvloeden, maar ik stel dat technologieën een grotere 
invloed hebben op reproductief succes dan ideologieën. 
Het ecologisch evolutionisme is een macrotheorie en geeft een verklaring voor 
het verband tussen bestaanstechnologieën en religieuze denkbeelden op het 
samenlevingsniveau. Echter, wanneer de relatie tussen twee macro kenmerken 
verklaart dient te worden, is het belangrijk om terug te gaan naar de relatie tussen 
deze kenmerken op het microniveau. Ik stel daarom de vraag waarom mensen in 
samenlevingen van verschillend technologisch niveau verschillende ideeën hebben 
over god. Een mogelijk antwoord op deze vraag wordt gegeven door de markttheorie 
van religie. De belangrijkste veronderstelling is dat mensen rationeel denken. Mensen 
zullen niet met een god onderhandelen wanneer een goedkoper of meer efficiënt 
alternatief beschikbaar is, en een almachtige en invloedrijke god is een dergelijk 
alternatief. Deze verklaring laat sommige vragen echter onbeantwoord. Als mensen 
rationeel denken, waarom geloven ze dan niet allemaal meteen in één oppermachtige 
god, en waarom blijven mensen in sommige delen van de wereld langer geloven in 
meerdere goden dan mensen ergens anders? Een meer belovende microverklaring 
voor godsdienstige verscheidenheid is de analogieredenering van Topitsch (1954). 
Deze stelt dat mensen niet altijd rationeel denken, maar het bekende als 
referentiekader gebruiken om het onbekende te verklaren. Topitsch onderscheidt drie 
denkmodellen of referentiekaders waarmee mensen het onbekende verklaren: vitale 
processen (biomorfisme), sociale verhoudingen (sociomorfisme) en technische 
vaardigheden (technomorfisme). Door te beredeneren welke denkmodellen worden 
gebruikt in welke samenlevingen kunnen nieuwe hypothesen worden opgesteld over 
religieuze diversiteit. 
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De onderzoeksvraag die in deze studie centraal staat is welke religieuze ideeën 
onder welke omstandigheden opgang doen. Om deze vraag goed te kunnen 
beantwoorden is de vraag opgedeeld in verschillende deelvragen. Deze deelvragen 
volgen op elkaar en worden beantwoord in de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5. In 
hoofdstuk 2 gaan we in op de relatie die Lenski vond tussen bestaanstechnologieën en 
godsbeelden en wordt geprobeerd deze relatie te verklaren. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt aan 
de orde gesteld dat het geloof in een oppermachtige god bijna niet voorkomt in 
samenlevingen van een technologisch lager niveau. Dit betekent echter niet dat er in 
deze samenlevingen geen sprake is van religieuze diversiteit. Om deze reden verschuif 
ik vragen over goden die al dan niet scheppen naar vragen over scheppingsverhalen 
waarin de schepper al dan niet een god betreft. Waar we in de hoofdstukken 2 en 3 
kijken naar religieuze diversiteit in voorindustriële samenlevingen, maken we in de 
hoofdstukken 4 en 5 de sprong naar industriële en postindustriële samenlevingen. In 
tegenstelling tot veel onderzoek in industrielanden zijn we in hoofdstuk 4 niet 
geïnteresseerd in de vraag welke mensen in god geloven, maar in de vraag in welke 
god mensen geloven. In hoofdstuk 5 verschuiven we onze aandacht naar een ander 
aspect van het onbekende: het geloof in hemel en hel. 
Hoofdstuk 2 - Analogieën, bestaanstechnologieën en oppermachtige goden. 
Volkenkundigen uit West-Europese landen hebben in de eerste helft van de 20e eeuw 
veldwerk verricht in samenlevingen met een beduidend eenvoudiger bestaanswijze. 
Dit onderzoek liet zien dat er samenlevingen zijn met een oppermachtige god die de 
wereld heeft geschapen en hier actief in blijft door het kwade te bestraffen en het 
goede te belonen. Het veldwerk wees ook uit dat er naast deze samenlevingen met een 
morele oppermachtige god samenlevingen zijn met een oppermachtige god die geen 
richtlijnen geeft over wat goed en wat fout is, een niet-morele oppermachtige god, en 
samenlevingen zonder een oppermachtige god. 
Lenski (1970) laat zien dat het geloof in een morele oppermachtige god vaker 
voorkomt in technologisch hoog ontwikkelde samenlevingen. Zijn verklaring van het 
gevonden verband tussen bestaanstechnologie en godsbeeld blijft echter onduidelijk: 
leidt een bepaalde technologie tot een bepaald godsbeeld of is er sprake van een 
schijnverband. Is bijvoorbeeld de natuurlijke omgeving bepalend voor zowel de 
dominante bestaanstechnologie als het heersende godsbeeld? En, in hoeverre loopt de 
invloed van bestaanstechnologie op godsvoorstellingen via andere kenmerken van de 
sociale structuur, en is daarmee indirect. Dit leidt tot de eerste onderzoeksvraag: 1. Is 
het verband tussen bestaanstechnologie en het geloof in een morele oppermachtige god 
in samenlevingen een schijnverband, een direct verband, of een indirect verband? De 
bevindingen van Lenski roepen meer vragen op. Zo blijkt het verband tussen 
bestaanstechnologie en de aanwezigheid van een morele oppermachtige god niet 
rechtlijnig te zijn. Ook gaat Lenski nauwelijks in op de aanwezigheid van een niet-
morele maar wel oppermachtige god. De tweede onderzoeksvraag betreft daarom een 
theoretische vraag: 2. Ervan uitgaand dat mensen het onbekende verklaren naar 
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analogie met het bekende, hoe kunnen we dan de relatie verklaren tussen 
bestaanstechnologie en de aanwezigheid van een (niet-)morele oppergod? De derde 
onderzoeksvraag betreft het onderscheid tussen adaptieve en niet adaptieve 
verklaringen van religie. Er wordt een antwoord gegeven op de de vraag of 
godsbeelden, onafhankelijk van de bestaanstechnologie, een invloed hebben op het 
reproductieve succes van samenlevingen (gemeten aan de hand van 
bevolkingsdichtheid): 3. Is het effect van bestaanstechnologie op reproductief succes 
groter dan het effect van godsbeelden op reproductief succes? 
Op basis van het ecologisch evolutionisme wordt gesteld dat het verband tussen 
bestaanstechnologie en godsbeelden niet per definitie direct hoeft te zijn. Het 
ecologisch evolutionisme onderkent dat de dominante bestaanswijze in 
samenlevingen afhankelijk is van de aanwezige natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Onderzoek 
heeft aangetoond dat natuurlijke schaarste de kans op de aanwezigheid van een 
morele oppermachtige god vergroot. Een sterke god zou het nodige aantrekkelijk 
maken. Omdat natuurlijke schaarste zowel de bestaanstechnologie van samenlevingen 
kan bepalen als de godsvoorstellingen kan het verband tussen beide kenmerken een 
schijnverband betreffen. Een andere optie is dat het verband tussen 
bestaanstechnologie en godsvoorstellingen indirect is. Het ecologisch evolutionisme 
stelt immers dat de bestaanstechnologie van samenlevingen grotendeels haar sociale 
structuur bepaalt, en dat kenmerken van deze structuur op hun beurt weer een 
invloed hebben op de aanwezigheid van een morele oppermachtige god. Het 
combineren van het ecologisch evolutionisme van Lenski met de analogieredenering 
van Topitsch leidt tot de volgende voorspellingen: Het geloof in een oppermachtige 
(scheppende) god zal opkomen in samenlevingen waar mensen ambachten uitoefenen 
en meer in hun natuurlijke omgeving ingrijpen (technomorfisme). Dit zal zijn in de 
ontwikkelde tuinbouwsamenlevingen. Het geloof in een morele oppermachtige god zal 
domineren in samenlevingen waar de leider meer macht naar zich toe trekt 
(sociomorfisme). Dit zal zijn in de akkerbouw- en veehouderijsamenlevingen. 
Deze verwachtingen over samenlevingskenmerken en godsbeelden worden 
getoetst met gegevens uit Murdocks Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. De Standard 
Sample heeft informatie over 186 samenlevingen, steeds voor een specifieke plaats en 
tijd, en is representatief op wereldniveau voor volkeren die zijn beschreven door 
deskundigen die daar enige tijd hebben doorgebracht. De data laten zien dat in 
samenlevingen waar weinig neerslag valt veehouderij als bestaanstechnologie vaker 
voorkomt, evenals het geloof in een morele oppermachtige god. Natuurlijke schaarste 
verklaart echter maar een beperkt deel van het verband tussen bestaanstechnologie 
en godsvoorstellingen. De bevindingen laten zien dat het geloof in een morele 
oppermachtige schepper vaak voorkomt in akkerbouwsamenlevingen, niet door een 
direct effect van bestaanstechnologie, maar grotendeels door de aanwezigheid van 
vakmanschap. De theoretische verklaring van het verband tussen bestaanstechnologie 
en godsvoorstellingen wordt grotendeels ondersteund. Het geloof in een niet-morele 
oppermachtige god komt vaker voor in samenlevingen waar de verwachting is dat 
mensen het onbekende verklaren in technomorfe termen. Het geloof in een morele 
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oppermachtige god floreert in samenlevingen waar de verwachting is dat mensen het 
onbekende in sociomorfe termen verklaren. Als laatste wordt een antwoord gegeven 
op de vraag of godsvoorstellingen, onafhankelijk van bestaanstechnologie, het 
reproductief succes van samenlevingen beïnvloeden. Dit blijkt niet het geval. De 
bijproduct variant van het evolutionisme ondervindt in dit hoofdstuk meer steun dan 
de adaptieve variant van het evolutionisme. 
Hoofdstuk 3 - Analogieën en de inhoud van scheppingsverhalen: kwantitatieve 
vergelijkingen van voorindustriële samenlevingen 
Vergelijkend onderzoek naar religieuze diversiteit in voorindustriële samenlevingen 
richt zich vaak op godsvoorstellingen in samenlevingen van verschillend technologisch 
niveau. Echter, de analogieredenering van Topitsch heeft niet zozeer betrekking op 
godsvoorstellingen, maar meer in het algemeen op voorstellingen van het onbekende. 
Het geloof in goden kan slechts een beperkt deel van het onbekende verklaren. De 
analogieredenering wordt beter getoetst wanneer we bestuderen in welke termen 
mensen in samenlevingen met een verschillende bestaanswijze het onbekende 
verklaren. Scheppingsverhalen zijn universeel en geven weer in welke termen mensen 
een belangrijk aspect van het onbekende verklaren: de oorsprong van de wereld en de 
mensheid. In dit hoofdstuk staan de volgende onderzoeksvragen centraal: 4. In welke 
mate is de dominante bestaanswijze van samenlevingen gerelateerd aan de inhoud van 
scheppingsverhalen? 5. In welke mate kan het argument dat mensen het onbekende 
verklaren met bepaalde aspecten van het bekende een verklaring bieden voor het 
verband tussen bestaanstechnologie en de inhoud van scheppingsverhalen? 
Topitsch (1954) stelt dat mensen in analogieën redeneren en bij het verklaren 
van het onbekende terugvallen op aspecten van de samenleving die zichtbaar en 
belangrijk zijn. In de loop van de geschiedenis hebben mensen het onbekende 
verklaard in termen van vitale processen (biomorfisme), technische vaardigheden 
(technomorfisme) en sociale verhoudingen (sociomorfisme). Door te beredeneren 
welke denkmodellen worden gebruikt in welke samenlevingstypen kunnen we tot 
nieuwe voorspellingen komen over de inhoud van scheppingsverhalen. Zo zal het 
biomorfisme overheersen in technologisch lager ontwikkelde samenlevingen waar 
mensen sterk afhankelijk zijn van hun natuurlijke omgeving zonder dat ze hier zelf 
controle over uitoefenen. Het gaat hier om jaag en verzamel-, visserij- en eenvoudige 
tuinbouwsamenlevingen. Het bekende en belangrijke in deze samenlevingen zal 
bestaan uit natuurlijke en vitale processen, zoals seksuele voortplanting. Een 
kanttekening is echter dat de kennis over menselijke voortplanting niet altijd 
aanwezig is samenlevingen met een eenvoudige bestaanswijze. De verwachting is dat 
in deze samenlevingen, voornamelijk jaag en verzamel- en visserijsamenlevingen, de 
schepping plaats zal vinden door spontane creatie. Het technomorfisme zal in 
populariteit toenemen in technologisch hoger ontwikkelde samenlevingen. In 
ontwikkelde tuinbouwsamenlevingen oefenen mensen ambachten uit en zijn ze meer 
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controle gaan uitoefenen op hun natuurlijke omgeving. Het bekende in deze 
samenlevingen zal worden gevormd door de menselijke inventiviteit. 
Omdat elke samenleving een sociale organisatie kent zal het sociomorfisme in 
alle samenlevingstypen aanwezig zijn. Echter, met de technologische vooruitgang 
hebben zich twee belangrijke veranderingen voorgedaan die betrekking hebben op de 
sociale organisatie van samenlevingen. Een eerste verandering is dat in technologisch 
lager ontwikkelde samenlevingen de sociale organisatie in sterke mate is 
georganiseerd rond familiebanden, waar in technologisch hoog ontwikkelde 
samenlevingen steeds meer macht komt te liggen bij politieke leiders. De verwachting 
is daarom dat in samenlevingen van technologisch hoger niveau analogieën met 
betrekking tot familiebanden vervangen worden door analogieën met betrekking tot 
sterk leiderschap. Een tweede belangrijke verandering in de sociale organisatie van 
samenlevingen heeft betrekking op de maatschappelijke positie van mannen en 
vrouwen. Hoewel in voorindustriële samenlevingen vrouwen bijna altijd een lagere 
positie innemen dan mannen, verschilt de mate waarin dit gebeurt naar de bijdrage 
van vrouwen aan de voedselproductie. Vrouwen in technologisch lager ontwikkelde 
samenlevingen spelen een grotere rol in de voedselproductie in vergelijking met 
vrouwen in technologisch hoger ontwikkelde akkerbouw- en 
veehouderijsamenlevingen. Omdat de bijdrage van vrouwen het grootst is in de 
tuinbouwsamenlevingen verwacht ik dat in deze samenlevingen de schepper vaker 
vrouwelijk is. 
Informatie over de bestaanstechnologie van samenlevingen komt uit Murdock’s 
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. Omdat dit databestand geen informatie verschaft 
over de inhoud van scheppingsverhalen wordt tevens gebruik gemaakt van de Human 
Relations Area Files. Dit databestand bevat etnografische beschrijvingen voor 330 
samenlevingen waarvan er 138 ook voorkomen in de Standard Sample. Middels een 
inhoudsanalyse van deze etnografische beschrijvingen is het gelukt om informatie te 
verzamelen over scheppingsverhalen van 116 samenlevingen. 
De bevindingen laten zien dat er een verband bestaat tussen de dominante 
bestaanstechnologie van samenlevingen en kenmerken van het scheppingsverhaal. 
Biomorfisme komt vooral voor in technologisch lager ontwikkelde samenlevingen. In 
visserij-, en jaag en verzamelsamenlevingen is de schepper vaak dierlijk, terwijl een 
natuurlijk verschijnsel als scheppende kracht het meeste voorkomt in eenvoudige 
tuinbouwsamenlevingen. Schepping door seksuele voortplanting komt het meest voor 
in de visserij-, jaag en verzamel-, en tuinbouwsamenlevingen. Zoals verwacht 
verklaren mensen in deze samenlevingen het onbekende met natuurlijke 
verschijnselen en vitale processen. Schepping door spontane creatie komt echter niet 
vaker voor in technologisch lager ontwikkelde samenlevingen. Het idee dat de 
schepping het resultaat is van een technische handeling komt voor in alle 
samenlevingstypen en niet alleen in samenlevingen waar mensen in ambachten 
werken en meer grip hebben op hun omgeving.  
In alle samenlevingstypen verklaren mensen aspecten van het onbekende in 
sociomorfe termen. Welke sociale verhoudingen als referentiekader worden gebruikt 
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
165 
 
verschilt naar de bestaanswijze. Een voorouder of culturele held als schepper komt 
vaker voor in de jaag en verzamel-, visserij- en eenvoudige tuinbouwsamenlevingen en 
minder vaak in de technologisch hoog ontwikkelde veehouderij- en 
akkerbouwsamenlevingen. Analogieën die refereren aan sterk leiderschap komen 
vaker voor in technologisch hoog ontwikkelde samenlevingen. Hier is de scheppende 
kracht relatief vaak een persoon op afstand en vindt de schepping plaats op bevel of 
commando. Een vrouwelijke schepper komt relatief vaak voor in technologisch lager 
ontwikkelde samenlevingen, zoals de eenvoudige tuinbouwsamenlevingen. Dit blijkt 
echter niet alleen te komen door de relatief hoge bijdrage van vrouwen aan de 
voedselproductie (sociomorfisme), maar ook door het relatief veel voorkomen van 
seksuele voortplanting (geboorte) als de scheppingsdaad (biomorfisme). 
Hoofdstuk 4 - Na de persoonlijke god: een abstracte god, atheïsme of agnosticisme? 
Lenski laat alleen voor voorindustriële samenlevingen zien dat godsvoorstellingen 
gerelateerd zijn aan bestaanstechnologieën. In dit hoofdstuk komt de vraag aan de 
orde op welke manier de overgang van akkerbouw naar industrie, kortweg 
industrialisering, godsvoorstellingen van mensen heeft beïnvloed. In het huidige 
onderzoek naar religieuze diversiteit in industriesamenlevingen is veel aandacht voor 
de vraag waarom steeds minder mensen in god geloven. Ondanks aanwijzingen dat de 
godsvoorstellingen van mensen in industrielanden veranderen is er weinig aandacht 
voor religieuze diversiteit. De vraag wordt daarom verschoven van de vraag welke 
mensen in god geloven naar de vraag in welke god mensen geloven. 
Het ecologisch evolutionisme stelt dat technologieën een grotere invloed hebben 
op de organisatie van samenlevingen dan ideologieën. Echter, in technologisch hoog 
ontwikkelde samenlevingen is het aantal keuzemogelijkheden voor mensen groter 
geworden en zullen ideologieën aan belang toenemen. Nolan en Lenski (2004) laten 
zien dat de Industriële Revolutie belangrijke sociale veranderingen teweeg heeft 
gebracht samen met een belangrijke verandering op het politieke terrein: 
democratisering. In dit hoofdstuk toets ik op welke manier industrialisering en 
democratisering de godsvoorstellingen van mensen hebben beïnvloed. De zesde 
onderzoeksvraag luidt: 6. Hoe hebben kenmerken op het individuele en contextuele 
niveau die betrekking hebben op industrialisering en democratisering het beeld dat 
mensen hebben van god beïnvloed? Hierbij wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen het idee 
van een persoonlijke god, het idee van een abstracte god, het idee dat het niet zeker is 
of god bestaat (agnosticisme), en het idee dat god niet bestaat (atheïsme). 
Het ecologisch evolutionisme stelt dat de godsvoorstellingen van mensen 
gevormd zijn naar analogie met de meest zichtbare en belangrijke kenmerken van de 
maatschappelijke structuur, en dat deze kenmerken grotendeels worden bepaald door 
de bestaanstechnologie. Nolan en Lenski (2004) verwachten daarom dat mensen in 
industriesamenlevingen zich niet langer herkennen in de persoonlijke en 
oppermachtige god van de akkerbouwsamenlevingen. Industrialisering en 
democratisering kunnen de godsvoorstellingen van mensen op twee manieren hebben 
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beïnvloed. Een eerste mogelijkheid is dat deze processen hebben geleid tot 
veranderingen in de compositie van samenlevingen. Als gevolg van industrialisering 
en democratisering zijn mensen veranderd, en dit heeft vervolgens geleid tot een 
verandering van het godsbeeld. Mensen zijn bijvoorbeeld hoger opgeleid geraakt en 
hebben meer egalitaire denkbeelden gekregen. De analogieredenering van Topitsch 
suggereert echter dat er ook sprake kan zijn van een contextuele invloed van 
industrialisering en democratisering. Door deze processen zal het referentiekader van 
mensen zijn veranderd waarmee zij het onbekende verklaren. Een voorbeeld is dat 
mensen in industriesamenlevingen niet langer bekend zijn met een sterk politiek 
leider en daarom minder herkennen in het beeld van de persoonlijke oppermachtige 
god. 
De verwachting is dat industrialisering het geloof in god zal hebben aangetast. 
Het idee van een persoonlijke god die zich bemoeit met het leven van mensen zal 
immers niet samengaan met het idee dat mensen over hun eigen lot beschikken. Ook 
zullen hoger opgeleide mensen moeite hebben met het geloven in iets dat empirisch 
niet kan worden aangetoond. Deze argumenten gaan ook op voor het geloof in een 
abstracte god, zij het in mindere mate. Ook zal industrialisering de overdracht van 
godsvoorstellingen tussen generaties hebben bemoeilijkt. Mensen in industrielanden 
zijn immers minder afhankelijk van de kerkelijke gemeenschap en van hun familie. 
Naast industrialisering zal democratisering het idee van de persoonlijke 
oppermachtige god verder hebben aangetast. Mensen die niet bekend zijn met 
dictatoriaal leiderschap en mensen met egalitaire denkbeelden zullen eerder 
problemen hebben met een oppermachtige god die over de mensen heerst. 
In tegenstelling tot eerdere hoofdstukken is informatie beschikbaar over 
individuele godsvoorstellingen. Er is gebruik gemaakt van de European Values Studies, 
wave 1999/2000 voor dertien landen in Noord-, Zuid-, en West-Europa. Voor 
informatie over het percentage mensen dat buiten de agrarische sector werkt is 
gebruik gemaakt van de Cross-National Time-Series en de Wereldbank. Informatie 
over het percentage sociaal-democratische stemmen is verkregen uit het historische 
data handboek ‘The societies of Europe’. De contextuele data hebben betrekking op de 
situatie waarin mensen zijn opgegroeid, omdat verondersteld wordt dat 
godsvoorstellingen voornamelijk in deze periode worden gevormd. 
De data laat zien dat mensen die buiten de agrarische sector werken, hoog 
opgeleiden, mensen die meer belang hechten aan keuzevrijheid en mensen met meer 
egalitaire denkbeelden minder vaak in een persoonlijke god geloven. Dit ondersteunt 
de verwachting dat het sociomorfe beeld van de persoonlijke god niet samengaat met 
wetenschappelijk denken en met ideeën van mensen over politieke en sociale 
verhoudingen. Verder blijkt dat industrialisering de overdracht van traditionele 
godsvoorstellingen van oude naar nieuwe generaties bemoeilijkt. Het geloof in een 
abstracte god komt relatief minder vaak voor bij mensen met een linkse politieke 
voorkeur en mensen die minder vaak naar de kerk gaan.  In vergelijking met atheïsten  
en mensen die in een abstracte god geloven, zijn agnosten relatief lager opgeleid en 
sterker geintegreerd in traditionele instituties. Dit spreekt tegen de veronderstelling 
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dat agnosticisme slechts een verdere afzwakking is van het geloof in een abstracte god. 
Op het contextuele niveau zien we geen duidelijke invloed van democratisering. Wel 
zien we dat mensen die zijn opgegroeid in sterker geindustrialiseerde samenlevingen 
relatief minder vaak in een persoonlijke god geloven. 
Hoofdstuk 5 - Verdergaande industrialisering en het geloof in hemel en hel 
Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat het geloof in een persoonlijke god in industrielanden wordt 
vervangen door het geloof in een abstracte god, agnosticisme en atheïsme. In dit 
hoofdstuk wordt getoetst in welke mate industrialisering niet alleen de 
godsvoorstellingen van mensen heeft veranderd maar ook andere ideeën over het 
onbekende. Miller, Scott en Okamoto (2006) laten zien dat mensen die in een 
persoonlijke god geloven meer problemen hebben met het idee van evolutie. Het beeld 
van de persoonlijke god is niet alleen gerelateerd aan ideeën over de oorsprong, maar 
ook aan ideeën over het hiernamaals. In dit hoofdstuk bestudeer ik op welke manier 
de overgang van akkerbouw naar industrie het geloof in de hemel en de hel 
beïnvloedt. De zevende en laatste onderzoeksvraag luidt: Hoe hebben kenmerken op 
het individuele en contextuele niveau die betrekking hebben op industrialisering en 
democratisering het geloof in hemel en hel beïnvloed? 
Norris en Inglehart (2004) presenteren data waaruit blijkt dat het geloof in de 
hemel en het geloof in de hel afnemen met het proces van industrialisering. Zij zien 
hierin bevestiging voor hun idee dat religie minder belangrijk is in samenlevingen 
waar nog weinig onzekerheden bestaan, zoals honger, armoede en oorlog. Echter, 
enkele zaken zijn opvallend. Zo laten de bevindingen van Norris en Inglehart zien dat 
er meer mensen zijn die in de hemel geloven dan dat er mensen zijn die in de hel 
geloven. Ook is te zien dat het geloof in de hel sterker afneemt met industrialisering 
dan het geloof in de hemel. De theoretische verklaring van Norris en Inglehart kan 
deze bevindingen niet verklaren. In dit hoofdstuk toets ik welke processen 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor de afname in het geloof in de hemel en het geloof in de hel. 
Een ander punt is dat Norris en Inglehart het verband tussen industrialisering en het 
geloof in de hemel en de hel alleen op het macroniveau aantonen. Net als in hoofdstuk 
4 wordt in dit hoofdstuk getoetst in hoeverre dit macroverband terug te voeren is tot 
relaties op het microniveau. Met andere woorden: of verschuivingen in de compositie 
van samenlevingen hebben geleid tot veranderingen in de religieuze denkbeelden van 
mensen. Ook zal gekeken worden of er daarnaast een contextuele invloed van 
industrialisering bestaat. In tegenstelling tot Norris en Inglehart wordt hier niet alleen 
de huidige context in ogenschouw genomen, maar ook de context ten tijde van de 
socialisatieperiode. Hierbij veronderstel ik dat religieuze denkbeelden grotendeels 
worden gevormd in de periode tussen het tiende en twintigste levensjaar. 
Norris en Inglehart (2004) benadrukken de emotionele functie van religie. Zij 
stellen dat mensen die in onzekere omstandigheden verkeren religie gebruiken voor 
troost en als compensatie voor de huidige situatie. Dit kan echter niet verklaren 
waarom mensen ook in een hel geloven en waarom dit geloof sterker afneemt met 
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industrialisering dan het geloof in de hemel. De analogieredenering van Topitsch 
benadrukt de cognitieve functie van religie en stelt dat mensen het bekende als 
referentiekader gebruiken bij het verklaren van het onbekende. Dit betekent dat de 
ervaring van mensen met een nieuwe sociale structuur zal leiden tot nieuwe ideeën 
over het onbekende. Op basis van de analogieredenering heb ik vier argumenten 
waarom het geloof in de hemel, en voornamelijk het geloof in de hel, afnemen met 
industrialisering. Een eerste argument is dat het scherpe contrast tussen arm en rijk 
verdwijnt in industriesamenlevingen en daarmee ook het contrast tussen hemel en 
hel. Een tweede argument is dat het sociomorfe beeld van een god die mensen bestraft 
met de hel en beloont met de hemel niet langer opgaat in samenlevingen waar de 
politieke macht niet langer bij één persoon ligt. Ten derde beargumenteer ik dat in 
(post-)industriële samenlevingen het denken in analogieën wordt vervangen door het 
logisch en deductief denken. Tenslotte verwacht ik dat industrialisering de overdracht 
van traditionele analogieën van oudere naar jongere generaties bemoeilijkt. 
Voor het toetsen van deze verwachtingen is gebruik gemaakt van survey data 
van de European Values Studies en de World Values Surveys, wave 1999/2000. De 
contextuele data hebben betrekking op zowel de huidige situatie als de situatie tijdens 
de socialisatieperiode. Onze bevindingen laten zien dat industrialisering het geloof in 
hemel en hel beïnvloedt op zowel het individuele als het contextuele niveau. De 
context waarin mensen nu leven blijkt een grotere invloed te hebben op het geloof in 
hemel en hel dan de context waarin mensen zijn opgegroeid. De resultaten wijzen 
verder uit dat industrialisering het geloof in hemel en hel op verschillende manieren 
heeft beïnvloed. Op het individuele niveau blijkt dat mensen die buiten de agrarische 
sector werken, hoog opgeleiden, en mensen die politiek links zijn georiënteerd minder 
vaak in hemel en hel geloven. Een hoge opleiding en een linkse politieke oriëntatie 
blijken met name moeilijk te verenigen met het geloof in de hel. De resultaten 
bevestigen het idee dat de overdracht van religieuze ideeën tussen generaties wordt 
bemoeilijkt doordat mensen in (post-)industriële samenlevingen minder hecht zijn 
geïntegreerd in traditionele instituties. De bevindingen dat mensen met een laag 
inkomen en verweduwde mensen vaker in de hemel en in de hel geloven 
ondersteunen het idee van Norris en Inglehart dat religie troost kan bieden in 
moeilijke situaties. Echter, de bevindingen laten ook zien dat mensen die een oorlog 
hebben meegemaakt minder vaak in een hiernamaals geloven. In overeenstemming 
met de cognitieve benadering van Topitsch blijkt dat mensen die leven in 
samenlevingen waar de doodstraf is afgeschaft minder vaak geloven in de hemel, en 
nog minder vaak in de hel. Ook blijkt dat het geloof in de hemel, en in sterkere mate 
het geloof in de hel, minder waarschijnlijk zijn in samenlevingen waar men minder 
onzekerheden kent. 
Hoofdstuk 6 - Conclusie en discussie 
Nu de zeven deelvragen zijn beantwoord kan geconcludeerd worden dat verschillen 
tussen samenlevingen in religieuze denkbeelden zijn terug te voeren op verschillen in 
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de bestaanswijze. In dit onderzoek is aangetoond dat er een duidelijk verband bestaat 
tussen bestaanstechnologieën en ideeën over god (hoofdstukken 2 en 4), ideeën over 
onze oorsprong (hoofdstuk 3), en ideeën over het hiernamaals (hoofdstuk 5). Dit 
ondersteunt het argument van het ecologisch evolutionisme dat religieuze 
denkbeelden gevormd zijn naar analogie met maatschappelijke structuren, en daarom 
zijn gerelateerd aan de dominante bestaanstechnologie. In de hoofdstukken 2, 4 en 5 
heb ik aangetoond dat het verband tussen bestaanstechnologie en religieuze 
denkbeelden inderdaad loopt via aspecten van de economische, politieke en sociale 
organisatie. Bovendien laten de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 zien dat religieuze verandering 
niet alleen het resultaat is van een verandering in de maatschappelijke structuur, maar 
ook van veranderingen in de compositie van samenlevingen, en dus het resultaat van 
individuele kenmerken en houdingen. 
De analogieredenering van Topitsch biedt een verklaring voor de relatie tussen 
bestaanstechnologieën en religieuze denkbeelden. De assumptie dat mensen in 
analogieën redeneren en het onbekende verklaren aan de hand van het bekende en 
belangrijke wordt door de resultaten ondersteund. Mensen in samenlevingen van 
technologisch verschillend niveau gebruiken andere denkmodellen bij het verklaren 
van het onbekende. Een eerste bevinding is dat het biomorfe denkmodel veel wordt 
gebruikt in technologisch minder ontwikkelde samenlevingen waar mensen sterk 
afhankelijk zijn van hun omgeving en hier weinig controle over uitoefenen. Het 
technomorfisme lijkt aan belang te winnen in technologisch hoger ontwikkelde 
samenlevingen waar het biomorfisme aan belang afneemt. Een tweede bevinding is 
dat het sociomorfisme in technologisch laag ontwikkelde samenlevingen verschilt van 
het sociomorfisme dat voorkomt in technologisch hoog ontwikkelde samenlevingen. 
Waar mensen in technologisch laag ontwikkelde samenlevingen gebruik maken van 
analogieën die betrekking hebben op familiebanden gebruiken mensen in 
technologisch hoger ontwikkelde samenlevingen vaak analogieën die betrekking 
hebben op sterk leiderschap. Analogieën waarin vrouwen een rol spelen worden in 
technologisch hoger ontwikkelde samenlevingen vervangen door analogieën waarin 
alleen mannen voorkomen. In industrielanden vindt een nieuwe verschuiving plaats. 
Het sociomorfe beeld van de almachtige god gaat hier niet langer op. 
Ter afsluiting ga ik in op enkele suggesties voor verder onderzoek, voor 
theoretische vooruitgang en voor een verdere verschuiving van onderzoeksvragen. Ik 
heb twee suggesties voor verder onderzoek. Een eerste suggestie is om te 
onderzoeken in hoeverre de relatie tussen bestaanstechnologieën en religieuze ideeën 
toe te schrijven is aan culturele diffusie. Onderzoekers lopen het risico het verband 
tussen bestaanstechnologieën en religieuze ideeën te overschatten wanneer deze 
relatie niet in alle samenlevingen causaal is. In dit geval kan het verband tussen 
bestaanstechnologieën en religieuze ideeën zijn geïmporteerd uit andere culturen. 
Echter, dat het gevonden verband tussen bestaanstechnologieën en religieuze ideeën 
geheel toegeschreven kan worden aan diffusie lijkt onwaarschijnlijk. Een tweede 
suggestie voor verder onderzoek is het gebruik van longitudinale data. In dit 
onderzoek is het verband tussen bestaanstechnologieën en religieuze ideeën 
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onderzocht met cross-sectionele data. Echter, de causaliteit in deze relatie kan beter 
worden aangetoond door het bestuderen van religieuze voorstellingen van 
samenlevingen door de tijd heen.  
Een eerste suggestie voor theoretische verbetering is om het onderscheid dat 
Lenski maakt tussen selectie binnen en tussen samenlevingen verder uit te werken. 
Het ecologisch evolutionisme stelt dat grote maatschappelijke veranderingen het 
resultaat zijn van selectie tussen samenlevingen. De religieuze ideeën van 
technologisch hoog ontwikkelde samenlevingen zullen domineren omdat 
technologisch lager ontwikkelde samenlevingen, en daarmee ook haar religieuze 
ideeën, minder overlevingskansen hebben. Daarnaast stelt het ecologisch 
evolutionisme dat mensen hun ideeën over het onbekende aanpassen wanneer de 
traditionele ideeën niet meer passen in een nieuwe tijd. In dit onderzoek blijft het 
onduidelijk in hoeverre de relatie tussen bestaanstechnologieën en religieuze ideeën 
toe te schrijven is aan selectie tussen of binnen samenlevingen. Echter, in de 
hoofdstukken 4 en 5 laat ik zien dat selectie binnen samenlevingen in ieder geval een 
rol speelt bij het proces van religieuze verandering. Immers, mensen afkomstig uit 
verschillende cohorten hebben verschillende religieuze ideeën. Een tweede suggestie 
voor theoretische verbetering is dat onderzocht kan worden welke analogieën mensen 
gebruiken in (post-)industriële samenlevingen. In de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 laat ik zien 
welke analogieën niet meer opgaan in de industriesamenlevingen. Er wordt echter 
niet ingegaan op de vraag welke analogieën mensen dan wel gebruiken om het 
onbekende mee te verklaren. Een mogelijkheid is dat het technomorfisme nog steeds 
opgang doet in (post-)industriële samenlevingen waar mensen planmatig werken en 
strategisch handelen. Een voorbeeld hiervan is de ‘intelligent design theorie’ waarin 
wordt verondersteld dat het universum het resultaat is van een intelligent design en 
niet van een ongericht proces als natuurlijke selectie. 
In de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5 is steeds een nieuwe vraag gesteld die volgde 
op de voorgaande vraag. Nu heb ik enkele suggesties voor een verdere verschuiving 
van onderzoeksvragen. Een eerste suggestie is de verschuiving van vragen over 
religieuze ideeën naar vragen over religieuze riten. Religieuze riten lijken de banden 
tussen mensen binnen een samenleving te versterken. Echter, mensen hebben 
verschillen taken in deze riten, en sommige riten sluiten mensen uit. Een interessante 
vraag is dan hoe het ecologisch evolutionisme deze verschillende aspecten van 
religieuze riten kan verklaren. Een tweede suggestie is een verschuiving van vragen 
over ideeën waarin bovennatuurlijke wezens een rol spelen naar vragen over ideeën 
waarin mensen zelf een rol spelen. Als voorbeeld noem ik hier magie, een systeem van 
rituele technieken waarmee mensen invloed kunnen oefenen op bovennatuurlijke 
zaken. Welke mensen geloven dat ze zelf macht uit kunnen oefenen op 
bovennatuurlijke krachten, en welke mensen geloven dat andere mensen in hun 
samenleving deze macht bezitten? Een derde suggestie is een verschuiving van vragen 
over de oorsprong van de wereld naar vragen over het einde van de wereld. Dit is een 
aspect van het onbekende dat ik niet heb onderzocht in dit onderzoek. Door het 
ecologisch evolutionisme te combineren met de analogieredenering van Topitsch 
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
171 
 
kunnen we tot nieuwe voorspellingen komen over de relatie tussen 
bestaanstechnologieën en ideeën over het onbekende. 
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